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spend four months at New York University as visiting scholar. Jan de Ridder heeft
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to serve as introduction to this study. It is argued
what the study is about (Section 1.1), which approach has been used to study the
topic (Section 1.2), and why this is relevant (Section 1.4). The central topic of the
research is the dynamics of strategic alliances, which will be studied from a game
theoretical perspective. The main motivation for this study stems from theoretical
considerations. Two areas are understudied and will be developed here; namely,
the dynamics of alliances and dynamical game theory with a particular focus on
coalition theory. In Section 1.3, the research aim is presented. The introduction
ends with an outline of the study (Section 1.5).
1.1 The dynamics of alliances
In the past few decades, the world of business has witnessed an increasing num-
ber of strategic alliances among firms (Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002). In
strategic alliances, two or more firms cooperate, for instance, in order to produce
a product together, to achieve scale advantages, to learn from each other, or to
set a technical standard. What is typical in the case of strategic alliances is that
the firms remain independent and that the cooperation is intentionally long term.
There is evidence that the role of cooperation among firms will become even more
important in the future (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995). Besides the popular-
ity of alliances in practice, the scientific literature has, as a consequence, also paid
substantive attention to alliances (Zajac, 1998). When considering the literature
on strategic alliances, several deficiencies in the literature can be denoted. These
deficiencies raise the questions to be answered in this study.
An important deficiency in strategic alliance research is the lack of substantial
attention paid to the dynamics of alliances (Bell, 2003; Bell, Den Ouden, and
Ziggers, 2006; Das and Teng, 2002; Reuer, 2000; Styles and Hersch, 2005). The
major theoretical perspectives used in the alliance field are transaction cost eco-
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nomics (e.g. Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985; 1991), the resource-based theories
(e.g. Barney, 1991; Das and Teng, 2000; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), strategic be-
havior theory (e.g. Hagedoorn, 1993; Kogut, 1988), and the relational elements
perspective (e.g. Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Muthusamy and White, 2005).
The main focus of these theoretical perspectives is to explain why firms cooper-
ate in alliances and what determines high alliance performance. The question of
how alliances are formed, evolve, and are terminated remains understudied. No
coherent theoretical perspective on the dynamics of alliances has been proposed
as of yet. In order to make a start with bridging this gap, a different theoretical
perspective will be adopted, game theory. Section 1.2 explains in depth why this
perspective has been adopted.
This lack of a dynamic perspective can be seen as a flaw for at least three
different reasons. First, the alliance field is aimed at providing insight into the
phenomenon of alliances. This insight should also include understanding the
processes underlying alliances in order to grasp the full understanding of alliances.
Knowing how alliances are formed, evolve, and are terminated should be a part
of alliance theory so that a more complete and comprehensive explanation of
alliances can be gained. Hence, a lack of dynamics creates a theoretical flaw.
Secondly, static theory cannot explain the dynamic reality of alliances. It seems
unnatural to provide static explanations for phenomena which take anywhere
from a few months to even a few years to be formed and which could last for
years, sometimes even decades before being terminated. Thirdly, the processes
underlying alliances play a role in the performance of the alliance (Das and Teng,
2002; Doz, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Hence, insights
into the dynamics can help to intervene and improve alliance performance.
The dynamics of alliances is the main object of this study. The concept of
dynamics refers to a process view: it considers the drivers of change of and within
a system (Stewart, 1989). Throughout this study, the dynamics of alliances will
be considered as both the dynamics of an alliance and the dynamics within an
alliance.
The dynamics of an alliance include the process that an alliance goes through
during its life cycle. Three steps are discerned: the process of alliance formation,
the life of the alliance (management), and the process that leads to the termination
of an alliance (De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004; Styles and Hersch, 2005). The first
phase of alliance formation includes internal firm preparations, partner selection,
and negotiations concerning the composition and the contract of the alliance. In
the alliance management phase, the alliance starts operating and needs to be
managed to organize further the alliance and to balance internal and external
tensions. Finally, an alliance is terminated, which does not necessarily imply
alliance failure. The literature studying the life cycle of the alliance mainly has a
managerial perspective (e.g. Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy, and Forbes III, 1996),
whereas the scientific body of studies is restricted.
The dynamics within an alliance refer to the interaction among partners during
each step of the alliance. What is relevant in these partner dynamics are, for
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instance, trust, commitment, power balance, and coordination between partners.
Partner dynamics within an alliance are ongoing processes of constantly observing,
learning, and acting to keep the dynamics within the alliance stable (Arin˜o and
De la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Although
this area has been studied more often in scientific literature (e.g. Arin˜o and De
la Torre, 1998; Das and Teng, 2002; Doz, 1996; Koza and Lewin, 1998), many
subjects are still open to study (Inkpen, 2001), as, for instance, the interaction
between the partner dynamics.
From these different aspects of alliance dynamics, this study will focus on two:
(1) the process of alliance formation and (2) partner dynamics within an alliance.
This implies that no attention will be paid to alliance management and alliance
termination. These topics are not considered to be less relevant, but a choice has
been made to keep the study manageable.
Moreover, there are several reasons for focusing on formation and partner
dynamics. First, since the current theoretical alliance perspectives focus on why
alliances are formed, a natural next step would be to study how alliances are
formed. It also seems natural to start with the first step in the alliance life cycle:
the process of alliance formation. Secondly, by taking both kinds of dynamics into
account, a more complete picture of alliances’ dynamics can be achieved. Thirdly,
it is expected that the game theoretical perspective adopted in this study can play
a role, especially in explaining alliance formation and partner dynamics. In this
way, a more coherent approach to alliance dynamics is aimed at. The next section
will further motivate the choice for the game theoretical approach.
1.2 Game theoretical approach
In short, game theory is a mathematical approach to study social interactions
which can be applied to various empirical domains. We will dive more into the
peculiarities of game theory in Chapters 3 and 4. Here, several reasons for using
this approach will be discussed.
First, both the cooperative and non-cooperative branch of game theory can
be used to study the two kinds of dynamics under study here.
The cooperative branch of game theory focuses on the formation of coalitions
among players. Coalition theory can model a situation in which a set of players,
for example a group of firms (an industry), form different coalitions. A coalition
is a group of (any kind of) players which coordinate their behavior, as an alliance.
Hence, this theory can also be used to study cooperation among firms within
alliances.
In the non-cooperative branch, strategic games are an important class of games
which study interaction among players which cannot make binding agreements.
Behavior of firms, once they are participating in an alliance, can be “character-
ized by inherent instability arising from uncertainty regarding a partner’s future
behavior and the absence of a higher authority to ensure compliance” (Parkhe,
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1993a, p. 794). These characteristics imply that a strategic game approach would
be a better choice to model the dynamics within alliances, which is also in line
with earlier research (e.g. Parkhe, 1993a; Zeng and Chen, 2003). In sum, game
theory is able to focus on the formation of and behavior within alliances.
Secondly, interaction is important in both alliance formation and partner dy-
namics. Alliances are in essence the result of an interaction among several firms.
Both forming and managing an alliance is the result of an interplay between
(potential) members; the result is a collective effort. Knowing ‘how’ demands
studying the collective result of these firms, as only in this way insight can be
gained in what (collectively) will happen. The more traditional alliance theories
have not paid considerable attention to this level of analysis. Hence, with its focus
on interaction, game theory is well-suited to study how alliances are formed and
how partners interact.
Thirdly, game theory is thought capable of providing a dynamic approach
to alliances. In contrast to the traditional alliance theories, many branches of
game theory have been developed in a dynamic way, especially strategic games
(e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987). Moreover, coalition theory has approached
coalitions more and more as a dynamic process (e.g. Brams, Jones, and Kilgour,
2002; Grofman, 1982; Perry and Reny, 1994; Rubinstein, 1982). Unfortunately, a
dynamic approach to coalition theory has not yet become the generally accepted
approach (Arnold and Schwalbe, 2002; Laver and Schofield, 1990; Luce and Raiffa,
1957; Tohme´ and Sandholm; Van Deemen, 1997; 1999; Wu, 1977). Nevertheless,
from a game theoretical perspective, a dynamic approach to coalitions is also de-
sirable as the formation, evolution, and termination of coalitions is in essence a
dynamic process. Departure points for developing more dynamic coalition theo-
ries are the static concepts of the theory which can be dynamically adjusted or
expanded, earlier dynamic developments of coalition theory, and insights from the
more dynamic branches of game theory (for example repeated strategic games).
Fourthly, the aim of this study is not only to describe, but to explain the
dynamics of alliance. Describing refers to enumerating relevant elements of a
phenomenon or process. When explaining, a researcher points to the causes and
consequences of a phenomenon or process. The explanations provide reasons why
a phenomenon or process occurs in a certain way. Since the current dynamic
alliance studies are more descriptive in nature, having a theory which explains
alliance dynamics is more than welcome. Game theory is believed to be such a
theory. With its abstract approach it focuses on a few essential elements and
neglects details in order to offer an explanation of a phenomenon.
1.3 Research aim
To sum up, the main subject of this study is alliance dynamics. More specifically,
I will focus on the process of alliance formation and on the partner dynamics
within an alliance. To study these subjects, a game theoretical approach will
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be adopted. Several models will be developed which explain the subjects under
study. In order to present these models, two issues need to be resolved. First,
as noted before, coalition theory particularly needs to be made more dynamic.
Secondly, making the models applicable to the alliance field is an important task.
Game theory is a theory which has not been designed for a specific empirical
domain. This makes the theory, in combination with its abstract nature, difficult
to apply. Moreover, game theory, as yet especially coalition theory, has not been
applied systematically to the field of alliances (Camerer, 1991). The current body
of alliance studies which use game theory illustrate this as the vast majority of
those studies have adopted strategic games (e.g. Arend and Seale, 2005; Parkhe,
1993a), leaving other branches of game theory aside. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss
further which elements of game theory need adjustment for the field of alliances.
This brings us to the following research aim:
To develop dynamic game theoretical models
in order to explain the dynamics of and within strategic alliances.
Since the aim of this study is to develop new models, the emphasis is on model
development, without empirical testing of the models. A dynamic approach to
alliances will be stronger if it includes an empirical part. However, the need for
theory- and model development is greatest since a dynamic approach to alliances
is missing, a dynamic approach to coalition theory is underdeveloped, and the
application of these models to the field of alliances is a new field of research.
Therefore, in this project, no data were collected and analyzed in order to test
the models.
1.4 Relevance
After having discussed the object of study and the theoretical perspective which
is adopted, I will briefly elaborate on this study’s relevance. Both the scientific
relevance (Section 1.4.1) and the practical relevance (Section 1.4.2) are addressed.
1.4.1 Scientific relevance
This study is mainly motivated by theoretical considerations. It aims to provide
theoretical contributions in two fields: alliance research and game theory.
In the field of alliances, the main contribution will be to offer models which
study the dynamics of alliances. As mentioned earlier, the dynamics underlying
alliances have not been studied extensively in alliance literature (Bell, 2003; Bell,
Den Ouden, and Ziggers, 2006; Das and Teng, 2002; Reuer, 2000; Styles and
Hersch 2005). As a result, many crucial questions remain unanswered: how is
an alliance formed, how do alliance members reach an alliance agreement, what
happens once an alliance has been formed, and do pre-alliance interactions play
a role? A deeper comprehension of alliances can be gained if these questions are
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studied and if dynamics are taken into account. Moreover, a dynamic approach
does more justice to the dynamic nature of alliances. Consequently, this study
with its dynamic focus aims to complement the current, mainly static, theoretical
approaches to alliances. Furthermore, the goal is to explain alliance dynamics
which complements more descriptive dynamic alliance studies. Chapter 2 develops
this argument more in depth.
In the field of game theory, the aim is to make the following contributions.
First, in coalition theory, coalition formation has mainly been studied with a
static approach1 (Arnold and Schwalbe, 2002; Laver and Schofield, 1990; Luce
and Raiffa, 1957; Tohme´ and Sandholm, 1999; Van Deemen, 1997; Wu 1977).
Coalition formation is in essence a process: coalitions need to be formed before
they materialize. To offer a complete analysis of coalition formation, this forma-
tion phase should be included. Hence, since this study offers a dynamic approach
to coalition formation, the aim is to contribute to the dynamics of coalition theory.
Secondly, in order to provide a game theoretical perspective to the dynamics
of alliances, we need to overcome the problems with certain elements of game
theory which are not in line with the field of alliances. We will meet these incom-
patibilities more in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
To conclude with the scientific relevance of this study, the models developed
are believed to contribute to the following aspects:
• Dynamics of alliances: explain how alliances are formed and explain how
partners interact during alliances.
• To repair static shortcomings of coalition theory.
• Develop new models so that game theory is more in line with the field of
alliances.
1.4.2 Practical relevance
The scientific attention paid to strategic alliances has often been justified by re-
ferring to the high failure rates of alliances (Das and Teng, 2003; Inkpen and
Beamish, 1997; Madhok and Tallman, 1998). Although the number of alliances
has increased dramatically over the past few decades (Ireland et al., 2002), firms
have not been able to profit extensively because of the disappointing performance
of alliances. Hence, more knowledge about the phenomenon of alliances could help
reduce this failure rate. Especially knowledge about how to manage alliances and
knowledge about alliance performance factors would be relevant. The dynamics
of the alliance play a role for both alliance performance and alliance manage-
ment (Doz, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). That is,
alliance performance depends on how the alliance processes evolve and alliance
management implies controlling the processes underlying alliances. Furthermore,
1As noted earlier, the theory of strategic games, which can also be of relevance for the
dynamics of alliances, has already been treated in a more dynamic way.
Introduction 7
a dynamic approach to alliances can do justice to the volatile and complex world
of alliances.
The perspective adopted in this study has practical relevance in several ways.
First, the concepts and models in this study can help managers to make decisions.
Although game theory is not used as a prescriptive perspective (Section 3.1), the
explanatory approach can help managers to make decisions concerning alliances:
which partners to choose, how to form alliances, which strategy to follow during
negotiations, and how to deal with opportunistic partners. These examples are
dealt with in the presented models. Secondly, this study is expected to yield useful
insights into the dynamics of alliances. Game theory should be capable of handling
the complexity of alliances and their dynamics. Think for example of the com-
plexity of a cooperation among a group of firms within an alliance (multi-partner
alliances) or the role of previous interactions. Equipped with this theory, one can
point at several essentials which may offer more insight and knowledge than a
detailed description. These insights into alliances can contribute to practitioners’
knowledge. Finally, the models developed stem from a different tradition than
the more traditional business science view concerning alliances. Game theory has
often been able to provide insights which are counter-intuitive (for example the
prisoner’s dilemma) or unexpected. It is believed that in the field of alliances and
their dynamics, game theory can also provide a fresh view which shows aspects
which otherwise would not have been highlighted.
Although it is not the explicit aim of this study to offer practical guidelines to
managers, the game theoretical approach adopted here can help decision-makers
to comprehend alliance dynamics complexity, and to offer an unconventional per-
spective. This can contribute to the knowledge about alliances and their dynam-
ics, so that alliance performance can be improved.
1.5 Outline
In this section, I will briefly discuss methodological considerations, the plan of
the book, and the terminology adopted.
1.5.1 Methodology
This thesis is aimed at model construction in order to explain the dynamics of
alliances. The models will be developed in the game theoretical tradition by
adopting the tools of the rational choice approach and the axiomatic-deductive
method. According to the axiomatic approach, a model is a system of primi-
tive terms, definitions, and assumptions, from which theorems can be deduced.
Furthermore, the models will be presented in the formal, mathematical tradition.
Although the focus is on model development and no empirical testing actually
takes place, the relevance of the models for the field of alliances is not ignored.
There are several ways of emphasizing the alliance relevance of the models. First,
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the models are built in line with the alliance literature. Secondly, examples of
alliances will be provided to show in which kinds of cases the models hold. Thirdly,
each model will be enriched with an illustration. Two models will use small cases
adopting secondary data which show how the model can be applied. One model
will use simulations to illustrate which kind of results can be achieved by applying
the model. Finally, one model will be illustrated with experimental results. A
more in-depth discussion of the methodology is provided in Section 3.1.3.
1.5.2 Plan of the book
This dissertation contains six chapters in addition to this one. The thesis can be
divided into three parts . The first part contains three literature chapters: Chap-
ters 2, 3, and 4. These chapters present the object of study and the theoretical
lens adopted. By defining the research agenda for the remainder of the study,
these chapters justify the second part of the dissertation: the models in Chapters
5 and 6, the core of the study. Finally, the last part is Chapter 7 which contains
the conclusion.
Chapter 2, ‘Strategic alliances’, discusses in great (more) detail the object of
study: alliances and the dynamics of alliances. A review of theoretical approaches
to alliances is given and it is argued how game theory can contribute to this debate.
Furthermore, the state of the art concerning studies on the dynamics of alliances
is defined. I point to research gaps and argue where contributions are needed.
To fill these research gaps, it is argued that game theory can be used. This
theory is the subject of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3, ‘Game theory ’, introduces
the methodology and basic elements of game theory. Subsequently, the chapter
focuses on the theory of strategic games. The chapter concludes with an assess-
ment of the problems arising when applying game theory to the field of alliances.
In Chapter 4, ‘Coalition theory ’, the branch of coalition theory is discussed. After
reviewing n-player cooperative game theory and coalition formation theories, a
research agenda has been defined which consists of the shortcomings found in the
current body of coalition theory. As argued earlier, the dynamics of coalition
theory is an underdeveloped element.
In order to meet the research objectives in the field of alliances and coalition
theory, Chapters 5 and 6 present four separate models developed during this study.
The two models in Chapter 5, ‘Modeling the dynamics of alliance formation’, deal
with the process of alliance formation and use n-player coalition theory. In these
models, the process necessary for reaching an alliance and different procedures of
multi-partner negotiations are studied. The two models in Chapter 6, ‘Modeling
partner dynamics within an alliance’, focus on the behavior of partners within an
alliance and adopt 2-player games in strategic form. The models study the role
of a past interaction on coordination within an alliance, and opportunism within
equal and unequal alliances.
The book ends with Chapter 7: the ‘Conclusion’. In the conclusion, the main
findings are stated. Furthermore, the theoretical and practical reflections on the
9contribution of this research will be discussed.
1.5.3 Terminology
The motivation for this study can be found in several of the research gaps which
are discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The research gaps build further upon the
main research aim of this study. Research gaps refer to those areas in the literature
which have been understudied. In other words, there is a gap between the supply
and demand of knowledge. This implies that there are research problems which
need to be resolved. In order to fill these research gaps, this study bridges the
fields of alliances and game theory.
Bridging two fields implies that the terminology of both fields should be used.
Because game theory is a mathematical approach to interactions, it employs the
language of mathematics. The models found in Chapters 5 and 6 also make use
of symbols and other formal language. Throughout the entire book, I have tried
to explain the formal language used as much as possible in plain English. By
skipping the formulas, the reader should still be able to follow the story line.
For those interested in the formal part, an appendix has been presented with an
overview of all the symbols and their meanings (see page 187).
In the dissertation, several terms will be used extensively and, for convenience
sake, they will now be explained. A player is the decision-maker in any kind
of interaction. Two alternatives for this term are ‘actor’ or ‘agent’. Here, it is
assumed that the relevant players are firms. Firms refer to organizations (corpo-
rate level) or parts of organizations (sub-units) which can make decisions on the
formation and management of alliances. The individual level in a theory refers
to the level of the player, whether this player represents an individual or a group
of individuals (that is, a firm). When referring to a player, the term ‘it’ will be
used, and not ‘he’ or ‘she’, since a player refers to a firm and not a person.
Furthermore, the term coalition is important. A coalition is a sub-set of play-
ers which cooperate with the full consideration of all the participants so that it
has binding consequences for all the participants (Van Deemen, 1997). This defi-
nition will hold for the remainder of this study. Throughout the research, strategic
alliances are interpreted as coalitions. Alliances refer to inter-organizational co-
operative forms.
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Strategic alliances
The main objective of this chapter is to position this study in the field of strate-
gic alliances. I will argue what the contribution of this study is with regard to
(1) a theoretical point of view and (2) a content point of view (the dynamics of
alliances). The chapter is therefore divided into two parts. The first part re-
views different theoretical perspectives on alliances. In Section 2.2, I discuss five
theoretical perspectives: transaction cost economics (Section 2.2.1), resource the-
ories (Section 2.2.2), strategic behavior theory (Section 2.2.3), relational perspec-
tive (Section 2.2.4), and a game theoretical perspective (Section 2.2.5). Section
2.3 will compare these different theories, argue what the research gaps are, and
demonstrate the position and contribution of game theory. The second part of the
chapter (Section 2.4) deals more in depth with the object of study: the dynamics
of alliances. Here, I also review the literature, define research gaps in Section
2.4.3, and show what the contribution of this study will be for the dynamics of
alliances. The chapter starts with an introduction to the concept of an alliance
(Section 2.1).
2.1 Alliances
2.1.1 Characteristics and objectives
The term alliance or strategic alliance is a broad term which includes many forms
of inter-organizational cooperation. This study does not focus on one form of
alliances, but rather provides a general and abstract perspective on alliances.
Therefore, no detailed description of alliances will be provided. For more spe-
cific definitions, consider Barringer and Harrison, (2000), Das and Teng (2000),
and Inkpen (2001). An alliance is different from a market transaction, contract,
or merger, but the term contains inter-organizational forms such as equity joint
ventures, licensing agreements, shared product development projects, shared pur-
chasing and manufacturing, and minority equity relationships (Inkpen, 2001).
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To characterize alliances, one can say that the firms within an alliance re-
main formally independent (Inkpen, 2001). This denotes the difference between
alliances and mergers. Also, cooperation makes the partners mutually dependent
on one another (Inkpen, 2001; Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002); each firm
needs the other or others to achieve a good performance. This dependence is com-
plicated by the uncertainty the partners face with regard to the behavior of their
partners (Inkpen, 2001). Furthermore, strategic alliances are intentionally long-
term, as compared to a market transaction. Related to this long-term intention
of alliances, the term strategic alliances is often used. In this dissertation, for the
sake of convenience, I will often use the shorter term of ‘alliance’. Although al-
liances are intended to be long-term, they are in principle temporal organizational
forms (Das, 2006).
The term alliance is broad and encompasses different variations. First, one
can make a distinction between dyadic and multi-partner alliances. The former
contains two partners, while multi-partner alliances contain more than two part-
ners. Both are relevant objects to study. As most alliances are dyadic (Das and
Teng, 2002), studying two-partner alliances is most relevant for real-life situations.
However, multi-party alliances are also relevant since they are analytically more
complex to study and more difficult to manage (Garc´ıa-Canal, Valde´s-Llaneza,
and Arin˜o, 2003; Hwang and Burgers, 1997). In this study, I will consider both
dyadic and multi-partner alliances.
Secondly, strategic alliances can be horizontal and vertical. The difference
relates to the kind of stakeholders a firm allies with. While vertical alliances
imply buyer - supplier alliances, horizontal alliances are relationships among firms
in the same industry (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). In horizontal alliances, firms
cooperate with their competitors and complementers (Bloch, 2002; Lado, Boyd,
and Hanlon, 1997). This kind of ‘coopetition’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996)
makes alliances both interesting and complex to study. In this dissertation, one
model will apply more to vertical alliances (Model 3), while the other three two
models (Model 1, 2, and 4) hold for both horizontal and vertical alliances.
In general, firms form alliances to create additional value. More specifically,
different reasons for forming alliances can be discerned: to gain economies of
scale, to gain access to particular resources, to share risks, and for the purpose
of collective lobbying (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001). Economies
of scale refer to efficiency advantages achieved through cooperation. In the last
decades, a shift has taken place from these more traditional cost-driven alliances to
knowledge-intensive alliances (Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, and Looise, 2000).
This coincides with the second motive for alliance formation; getting access to
the resources of partners. Resources can refer to certain tangible goods, but also
to capabilities and market access (Beamish et al., 2000; Inkpen, 2001). With the
additional resources of alliance partners, products and services can be produced
and set to market which could not have been developed alone. These kind of
alliances are called co-development and co-marketing alliances (Bucklin and Sen-
gupta, 1993). Moreover, firms can learn through the access to these resources and
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use the knowledge thus gained in their own organization. The third reason for
forming alliances is to reduce risk. If certain markets are (technologically) unsta-
ble or are risky for investment, a solution to deal with this is sharing the risk.
Finally, collective lobbying implies the idea of standing strong together. Espe-
cially when new technology is involved, setting a standard is important (Axelrod,
Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and Bruderer, 1995). Firms can decide to cooperate
in an alliance to set a standard with the idea that investments in technologies are
more valuable if this technology becomes the standard.
2.1.2 Fit among partners
Depending on what motivates a firm to form a strategic alliance, its preferences
for a partner will differ. Douma et al. (2000) have developed a theory of fit
which explains on which aspects alliance partners should strive for a fit (see also
Parkhe, 1991). They define a fit as an effective and efficient alignment (Douma
et al., 2000, p. 581). The following aspects of fit are distinguished:
• strategic fit
• cultural fit
• organizational fit
• operational fit
• human fit
Within this list, a distinction is made between strategic fit on the one hand and
four other kinds of fits on the other hand.
A strategic fit is the condition required to start an alliance. To achieve a strate-
gic fit, partners need to provide mutual added value. For knowledge and resource-
intensive alliances, complementarity of resources and capabilities is important
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 2001; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, Echambadi,
Cavusgil, and Aulakh, 2001). If partners complement each other, added value is
created. However, for alliances that are set up for efficiency reasons, a strategic
fit might not only call for complementarity, but may also require similar part-
ners. Hence, only if a strategic fit is achieved, there will be a raison-d’eˆtre for the
alliance.
Once such a strategic fit exists, attention will be paid to the other four fits:
cultural, organizational, operational, and human. For these fits, similarity is
needed (Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar et al., 2001) as dissimilarities between partners
on these fits would negatively affect the duration and effective functioning of
alliances. Think here in terms of a match in cultural norms, leadership style, and
corporate culture.
Not all fits will be equally important in each alliance. In an efficiency-driven
alliance, cultural fit might be less relevant than in an alliance set up for learning.
14 Chapter 2
Moreover, a mismatch on one fit can be compensated by matches on other fits.
In sum, a strategic fit is crucial for each alliance as it is usually the reason an
alliance is set up in the first place. Cultural, organizational, operational, and
human fits play more of a role in the durability and efficient functioning of an
alliance (Parkhe, 1991).
2.1.3 Alliance performance
Although strategic alliances have been formed more frequently in recent years,
the number of alliances that have failed prematurely has not decreased (Das and
Teng, 2003; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Rather, firms face substantial difficulties
achieving the potential synergies that can result from alliances (Madhok and
Tallman, 1998). These observations denote the importance of research on alliance
performance. This section briefly discusses this area of research. The subject of
alliance performance is not only getting more attention in alliance research, but
it can also be characterized as problematic as researchers disagree how to define
and measure alliance performance.
First, there are different ways to define alliance performance (Combs and
Ketchen, 1999; Doz, Olk, and Smith Ring, 2000; Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Olk
and Young, 1997). One indication for a high alliance performance could be sur-
vival or alliance durability (Pangarkar, 2003). On the one hand, a durable alliance
might refer to success. Durable alliances give partners the opportunity to learn
and perform optimally in the alliance. On the other hand, a prematurely ended
alliance does not imply alliance failure, nor does an alliance with a long duration
necessarily imply alliance success (Olk and Young, 1997). In sum, alliance dura-
bility gives some indication for the performance of alliances but cannot be the
only indicator.
Another way of determining alliance performance is to focus on alliance out-
comes:
• strategic goal fulfillment (e.g. Parkhe, 1993)
• financial outcomes of an alliance (e.g. Combs and Ketchen, 1999)
• learning by partners
All three issues refer to the rewards an alliance brings for the partners: the goals
of the alliance, financial means, and new knowledge. Although these outcomes
might have been achieved for partners, this does not guarantee that the alliance
was a success in the sense of a smooth, cooperative, and constructive relationship
among firms. It also seems important to determine how the alliance functioned.
Yet another element of a good alliance performance is therefore alliance sta-
bility (e.g. Arin˜o and Doz, 2000). Alliance instability is defined as “... a major
change that was unplanned and premature from the perspective of either one of
the partners ...” (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997, p. 182). Alliance instability is
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undesirable because it is harmful for at least one of the partners (Das and Teng,
2000a); the alliance has not evolved as was planned and expected. A stable al-
liance hence refers to an alliance with no major unplanned and undesired changes.
The alliance evolves to the satisfaction of the partners.
A second topic related to alliance performance is how to measure the concept
(Geringer and Hebert, 1991). A distinction is often made between the level of
the firm and the level of the alliance. An alliance might achieve its goals on a
collective level, but a partner might be disappointed with its individual achieve-
ments. Conversely, a partner might be satisfied with an alliance because of, for
example, the learning possibilities it has had, while on a collective level the al-
liance might have failed to achieve its goals. Furthermore, approaches differ on
measuring alliance performance with objective measures such as financial rewards
versus perceived performance by participants (Geringer and Hebert, 1991, see the
overview of approaches in Park and Ungson, 2001).
Although the debate on alliance performance should be acknowledged, the
focus of this study is not directly on measuring or improving alliance performance.
However, insights provided in this study can lead to a better understanding of
alliances, and in this way help managers to improve alliance performance.
2.2 Overview of theoretical perspectives on al-
liances
This section presents an overview of different theoretical perspectives on strategic
alliances. An explanation will be given of the rationale of each separate theoretical
perspective. Based on this review, in Section 2.3, it will be discussed what the
research gaps in the field are, and, based on that, argued what kind of contribution
game theory can make.
Most theoretical literature on alliances is found in the multi-disciplinary field
of strategy. Strategy studies key decisions on behalf of the entire firm on how to
improve a firm’s performance (Dess and Lumpkin, 2001). As with the strategy
school, the literature on alliances is multi-disciplinary in nature and varies from
an emphasis on more economic aspects to more behavioral issues (borrowed from
psychology and sociology) (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Baum, 1998; Dess and
Lumpkin, 2001; Hitt, Freeman, and Harrison, 2001).
This section discusses the following perspectives on strategic alliances:
• Transaction cost economics (Section 2.2.1)
• Resource-based theories (Section 2.2.2)
• Strategic behavior theory (Section 2.2.3)
• Relational elements (Section 2.2.4)
• Game theory (Section 2.2.5)
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The first four perspectives are the more traditional alliance theories and will be
presented from more economically oriented (transaction cost economics) to more
behaviorally oriented (relational elements) (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
These theoretical perspectives have been selected because of their frequent
occurrence in alliance research and because they are believed to represent the
main streams of research in the alliance field. Of course, making a selection among
the many alliance approaches results in neglecting others, as, for instance, agency
theory, institutional theory, and organizational learning. For more complete and
comprehensive reviews, consider Barringer and Harrison (2000), Ireland et al.
(2002), Lengnick-Hall and Wolff (1999), or Ritter and Gemu¨nden (2003).
2.2.1 Transaction cost economics
According to transaction cost economics (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985; 1991),
firms’ guiding business principle for acquiring assets is to minimize costs. Relevant
costs in this consideration are, amongst others, transaction costs; the costs of
running the economic system (Williamson, 1991), or, an alternative description,
the costs required for an exchange (Das and Teng, 2000). During the decision
process that a firm undertakes when making transactions, the level of costs is the
only rationale behind this decision (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).
To complete a transaction, a firm can use several alternative governance mech-
anisms. Hennart (1988) discerns a market transaction (buy or sell), an equity joint
venture (partner), and a wholly owned investment1. Others also take internal so-
lutions (make) into account, which of course do not bring about transaction costs,
but production costs and coordination costs (Das and Teng, 2000; Kogut, 1988).
Different considerations hold for finding the optimal mechanism as each form of
transacting brings its own specific costs.
According to the transaction cost framework, joint ventures or alliances are a
way to bypass inefficient transactions. A market transaction can be inefficient in
two ways. First, a market transaction makes a firm dependent on others (Kogut,
1988). Furthermore, markets can be inefficient or can just fail. Given these market
failures and dependency issues, the transaction costs for buying at the market can
be high. Producing internally can be inefficient if the firm has, for example, little
knowledge, technology, or manpower to produce the specific product or service. In
other words, the production costs will be relatively high. Hennart (1988) also takes
wholly owned investments and acquisitions into account. Hennart argues that
taking over another firm leads to substantial management costs and, moreover,
the initiating firm acquires much more assets than it needs since it takes over a
whole firm.
Consequently, if production costs are high, markets are inefficient, and acqui-
sitions yield spill-over costs, a joint venture or alliance might be the most efficient
1In his 1993 article, Hennart considers more intermediate forms of transaction in between
market and hierarchy, in what he calls the ’swollen middle’.
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alternative. Through joint ownership and/or joint control rights, partners have a
mutual commitment towards the alliance. Both parties gain or lose by the per-
formance of the cooperation; they find themselves in a mutual hostage position
(Kogut, 1988). Although this mutual dependence can lead to opportunistic be-
havior, the unilateral dependence of the initiating firm in acquisitions is avoided in
this way. Moreover, through alliances, firms can avoid the need to internalize any
activity that does not belong to the core business of the firm. Of course, alliances
also generate costs, such as contract costs, management costs, and search costs.
But an alliance might be a better solution than other mechanisms if it leads to
the most efficient way of doing transactions.
2.2.2 Resource theories
In this section, I discuss both the resource-based view and resource-dependency
theory. Whereas the resource-based view is more an internally oriented theory
explaining competitive heterogeneity between firms, resource-dependency theory
focuses on resources as a means to exert control.
Resource-based view
In the last two decades, the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Barney and
Arikan, 2001; Peteraf, 1993) has become a generally accepted theory in strat-
egy research explaining a firm’s performance. The theory is a response to the
external orientation of earlier theories (Das and Teng, 2000), especially to the
ideas of Porter (1980; 1985). While Porter explains performance of firms through
their position in the industry and the structure of the industry, the resource-based
view poses that there is a relation between the resources of a firm and its perfor-
mance. What a firm possesses or has access to determines what it accomplishes
(Das and Teng, 2000).
The starting point of the resource-based view is to consider the firm as a bundle
of resources. Resources are all the assets, capabilities, processes, information
and knowledge controlled by the firm, and are a potential source of competitive
advantage for the firm (Barney and Arikan, 2001; Ireland et al., 2002). The degree
of competitive advantage a resource yields for a firm is dependent on how valuable,
scarce, imperfectly imitable, and lacking in direct substitutes the resources are
(Barney, 1991). Valuable resources enable a firm to improve its efficiency and
effectiveness. A resource is scarce if it is rare in the market of a firm’s current and
potential competitors. Inimitability means that information asymmetry exists
such that resources cannot be obtained or recreated by other firms without a
cost disadvantage. And finally, it matters whether resources are substitutable or,
in other words, whether competitors have a strategic equivalent (Barney, 1991;
Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, and Yiu, 1999).
Although the resource-based view is usually adopted to explain competitive
heterogeneity between firms (Hoopes, Madsen, and Walker, 2003), the theory
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can also be used in the alliance field (Das and Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt and Bird
Schoonhoven, 1996; Harrison et al., 2001). The central argument is that alliance
formation is caused by a firm’s aim to maintain or achieve a competitive resource
profile. In this way, firms have access to partners’ resources in order to achieve an
optimal competitive resource configuration in which the value of their resources
is maximized. According to Das and Teng (2000), the resource-based alliance
framework can account for (1) the likelihood of alliance formation caused by
firms’ resource characteristics, (2) a firm’s preferences regarding the structural
characteristics of the alliance, and (3) alliance performance through the influences
of inter-partner resource alignments.
Within the general resource rationale, a distinction is often made between re-
sources and capabilities (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993), which roughly coincides
with the labels of tangible and intangible resources (Hall, 1992, 1993). Tan-
gible resources are, for example, buildings, machinery, equipment, capital, and
manpower. Intangible resources or capabilities are non-physical and information-
based, such as know-how, intellectual property rights, trade secrets, contracts and
licenses, databases, information in the public domain, networks, reputation, and
the culture of the organization. Another important difference between tangible
resources and capabilities is their transferability and location-specificity (Fur-
rer, Sudharshan, and Thomas, 2001). Roughly speaking, capabilities are more
location- and person-related and more difficult to transfer. Given that intangible
resources are scarcer, harder to imitate, and often lacking in direct substitutes,
these resources give the firm in general the most competitive advantage.
Several theoretical streams have been derived from the resource-based view.
The capabilities school is such a stream and focuses on the role of capabilities
(Sanchez, 2001; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Another extension of the re-
source rationale is the knowledge-based view of the firm. This stream of research
considers a firm as being a heterogeneous knowledge-bearing entity (Hoskisson et
al., 1999). Therefore, it is assumed that firms form alliances to learn from their
partners’ capabilities and knowledge. An alliance gives access to other firms’
intangible resources and, in this way, an alliance provides opportunities to in-
ternalize the resources that the partners have contributed (Dussauge, Garrette,
and Mitchell, 2000). How well a firm can learn during an alliance depends on its
absorptive capacity, which refers to the ability of a firm to appropriate knowl-
edge generated through an alliance (Kumar and Nti, 1998). Several studies have
focused on the learning aspect of alliances, see Dussauge et al. (2000), Hamel
(1991), Inkpen and Beamish (1997).
Resource-dependency theory
Resource-dependency theory (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978) puts more emphasis on the dependency and power role of resources as
compared to the more internally oriented resource-based view. A basic assump-
tion of Pfeffer and Salancik is that in order to understand a firm’s behavior, one
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must understand the context or environment of that firm (the ecology of the firm,
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 1). In addition to the idea that firms consist of
a bundle of resources, resource-dependency theory also assumes that firms are
dependent on their environment for input of resources, and interaction with the
environment is therefore necessary. In other words, firms’ resources are interde-
pendent. These dependencies between firms create power relations between them;
managing these resource interdependencies is vital.
According to resource-dependency theory, firms have two reasons for form-
ing strategic alliances: to obtain access to other firms’ critical resources and to
increase control with regard to other firms. With regard to the first reason,
if resources are not mobile, hard to imitate, rare, and not easily substitutable,
they cannot be acquired easily through the market and hence alliances can be
required. In this way, partners in an alliance become mutually dependent on each
other’s resources. Hence, the need to obtain resources externally (for example
via alliances) creates interdependencies between firms. This leads to the second
reason for alliance formation; a firm can adopt resource-dependencies to increase
its power. On the one hand, alliances can be used to gain power by controlling
essential resources. On the other hand, alliances can be used to minimize threats
to organizational autonomy and even minimize others’ power.
A firm will not acquire all its resources through external ways. A firm will
focus on developing a few key resources internally and will cooperate with others
to gain access to additional complementary resources (Das and Teng, 2000; Grant
and Baden-Fuller, 2004). In this way, a firm can protect itself from becoming an
irrelevant player, which may happen if all its resources become obsolete or are
copied by other firms.
The difference between the resource-based view and resource-dependency the-
ory is that the former focuses on internal resources; firms need a profile of scarce
and valuable (internal) resources in order to be competitive. As discussed above,
strategic alliances can be a way to achieve this. However, resource-dependency
theory focuses exclusively on resources that must be obtained externally (Bar-
ringer and Harrison, 2000). In this way, alliances lead to resource-dependency
structures and become a power mechanism.
2.2.3 Strategic behavior theory
The stream of research that studies strategic behavior of firms focuses on the
competitive positioning of a firm. As in resource-dependency theory, the focus is
external; the environment of the firm is important. Porter’s seminal book ‘Com-
petitive strategy ’ (1980) considers the industry in which a firm competes as the
key factor for studying the firm. More specifically, the industry can be charac-
terized by its competition through the underlying economic structures. Amongst
other things, the number of competitors in an industry is relevant, as well as
the number of potential entrants, buyers, and sellers. The behavior of a firm is
directed towards influencing the balance of forces in the industry and improving
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its own competitive position.
Several authors have used this rationale to explain alliance formation (Bar-
ringer and Harrison, 2000; Hagedoorn, 1993; Kogut, 1988). According to the
strategic behavior school, alliances are formed because firms want to improve
their competitive position vis-a`-vis their rivals (Kogut, 1988). This does not only
imply improving a firm’s own competitive position, but firms also aim at neu-
tralizing or blocking moves of competitors. Moreover, firms use alliances to gain
market power and to increase their speed to market. The empirical results of
Hagedoorn (1993) show that firms indeed use alliances (amongst others) to gain
market access and influence the market structure.
2.2.4 Relational perspective
Transaction cost economics theory, resource-based theories, and strategic behav-
ior theory are usually characterized as more economic approaches to alliances.
Strategic alliances are formed for reasons of optimization and efficiency; either to
have the most efficient transaction (transaction cost economics), to optimize the
competitiveness of a resource profile (resource-based view), to acquire resources
efficiently (resource-dependency theory), or to have an optimal strategic posi-
tion (strategic behavior theory). However, to fully grasp the rationale of alliance
formation, such calculative cost-benefit analyses are insufficient (Barringer and
Harrison, 2000). As already partly argued in the section on resource-dependency
theory, several elements play a role in alliance formation (Peng and Shenkar,
2002). Besides the role of control and power (resource-dependency theory), other
relevant issues include reputation, trust, and social networks. In sum, not only
economic assessments are taken into account when explaining alliances, but also
more social and relational ones. Therefore, as a final stream of research, placed in
the more sociological tradition, I will discuss the relational perspective and social
network perspective on alliances.
In general, attention for relationship management has grown (De Wulf and
Odekerken-Schro¨der, 2001; Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman, 1992). According
to this perspective, a relationship among partners grows, develops, deteriorates,
and is eventually terminated through repeated relational interactions. These re-
lational actions are not subject to strict accounting, but rather serve as a sense
of duty to the alliance (Muthusamy and White, 2005). Alliance members are not
only focused on economic gains and resources, but are also aware that relational
elements such as trust and commitment are relevant.
This perspective is less directed towards explaining a rationale behind alliance
formation, but rather on (relational) factors that contribute to the performance
of an alliance. Arin˜o and De la Torre (1998) explain that relational quality serves
both as the input and output of an alliance. As input, relational quality helps to
make the alliance successful; it serves as an antecedent for alliance performance.
Nevertheless, one can also consider the level of relational quality as a measure for
output. How successful was the alliance; did the partners have a good relation-
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ship?
An important element of the exchange in alliances which influences alliance
performance is trust (Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Inkpen and Currall, 2004).
Trust refers to the expectations that partners have on each other’s behavior, such
that partners will be for example faithful and non-opportunistic (Gulati, 1995).
A different way of phrasing this is to say that trust implies the decision to rely
on the alliance partner, by permitting one’s faith to be determined by the other
(Inkpen and Currall, 2004, p. 588). A general finding in alliance studies is that
successful alliances exhibit trust, while unsuccessful alliances lack trust (Koza and
Lewin, 1998). As trust has to develop between partners, it can account for alliance
performance, but to a lesser extent for alliance formation. It is however acknowl-
edged that trust plays a role in repetitive alliance formation among firms (Gulati,
1995). In other words, if firms have previously been engaged in alliances and have
built up trust, this might affect their future inter-organizational behavior. In this
way, trust might explain partner selection.
When studying the social relations among firms, one can also adopt the level
of a network of firms instead of the level of the alliance and its members. This
perspective is adopted in social network theory of alliances (Gulati, 1998; Wilkin-
son and Young, 2002; Zajac, 1998). The network approach acknowledges the
interactive elements of the market. A market consists of a set of firms more or
less related to each other. These relations form a social network and shape the
firm and its alliances (Gulati, 1998). More specifically, the social context of a firm
influences its behavior and performance. Gulati gives some examples of the role of
a network. A social network enables firms to discover new alliance opportunities,
and hence the network influences how often and with whom alliances are formed.
Furthermore, if two firms form an alliance, their position and proximity in the
network may determine the type of governance chosen. In contrast to the previous
theoretical approaches outlined, the social network approach of alliances is less
focused on explaining the formation of alliances. It rather serves as a method or
mechanism for mapping the network of relations of a firm.
2.2.5 A game theoretical perspective on alliances
Camerer stated in 1991 that “[game theory] has rarely been applied in a domain
where it could naturally be (business strategy decisions)” (Camerer, 1991, p. 144;
see also Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996). This section presents an overview
of the contributions in the field of alliances which have so far adopted a game
theoretical approach2.
To briefly characterize game theory, it is defined as a mathematical approach
to social interactions. Although game theory consists of many different branches
2I will ignore here game theoretical approaches to strategy in general (e.g Brandenburger
and Stuart, 1996; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) and more practice-oriented business applications
(as Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991, and Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996).
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each with its own different assumptions and theories (see Section 3.2 for an in-
depth discussion of these branches), there is a common rationale underlying the
theory. It is important that players are assumed to be unitary actors who act so
that they maximize their utility. The outcome of an interaction among players
is however determined by the choices made by all participating players in the
interaction, which makes them interdependent. Hence, in order to maximize its
utility a player also takes the decisions of the other players in the game into
account. Many different theories have been built on this basis. One common
element in these theories is their structure; game theory predicts under which
conditions there is a certain solution.
In particular, one division into branches of game theory is significant for this
study: the non-cooperative branch and the cooperative branch. In the non-
cooperative branch, players face the task of selecting a strategy without being
able to make binding agreements. Here, cooperation is seen as one among many
strategies from which players can choose. In essence, it is under research under
which conditions players have the incentive to choose the strategy cooperate.
Strategic games are a part of this non-cooperative branch.
In the cooperative or coalition theory branch, players can make binding agree-
ments. Actually, the basic assumption is that players cooperate since the games
are designed to make cooperation rewarding. The set of players in such games
consists of more than two players (n-player games). Given this, the question is
which coalitions will form from the set of n players and how the coalition mem-
bers will distribute the rewards of the coalition. To solve these questions, coalition
theories have been developed.
In both branches, each theory has its own assumptions concerning what kind
of preferences the players have. These vary from simply getting the maximum
payoff to rationally sharing power, achieving policy goals, or teaming up with
preferred partners. A more complete and in-depth discussion of game theory is
found in the following two chapters.
In contrast to the perspectives discussed above which all have developed to-
wards a quite coherent rationale for alliances and behavior of firms in alliances,
the role of game theory in alliance research has been much less uniform. Instead
of one unifying rationale for alliance formation, researchers adopting a game the-
oretical perspective have worked on separate aspects of alliance formation with
certain games and models from game theory. More specifically, two groups of
studies can be discerned in game theoretical literature on alliances.
The first group of articles is formed by Park and Zhou (2005), Song and
Panayides (2002), and Bloch (2002) which all study alliance formation. These
studies show the role of the competition in the market (Park and Zhou, 2005),
the sequence and exclusiveness of alliance formation (Bloch, 2002), and game
theory for liner shipping alliances (Song and Panayides, 2002). Part of those
studies adopt coalition theory.
The second group of studies focuses on the behavior of partners during the
alliance. Those studies consider an alliance as a strategic game with commitment
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and opportunism as strategies (a social dilemma) (Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria,
1994; Hill, 1990; Hwang and Burgers, 1997; Monge et al., 1998; Zeng and Chen,
2003). Arend and Seale (2005) and Phelan, Arend, and Seale (2005) expand the
analysis with an exit option and Parkhe (1993 and 1993a) combines the social
dilemma with alliance performance. While this second group is quite coherent
in theme and social dilemma approach, the first group is more diverse in theory
choice and rationale for alliance formation. The following two sections give a
summary of both groups of studies.
Game theoretical perspective on alliances: alliance formation
To study the formation of alliances, Park and Zhou (2005) focus on the decision
of a firm to enter an alliance from the perspective that this decision is assumed
to be primarily based on the competitive pressures in the market. They therefore
adopt a strategic game form setting and perform simulations. For the decision
of firms to set up an alliance, Park and Zhou oppose a sole internal cost-benefit
approach, but defend taking the behavior of the other firms in the industry into
account. Such competitive dynamics are, for example, the increased competition
in an industry caused by alliance formation and (hence) the potential loss for a
firm which does not participate in an alliance. This explains why the model of
Park and Zhou predicts that weak firms are more likely to form alliances despite
little expected gains. If firms in the industry form alliances, the competitive
pressures for the others will increase and they will therefore potentially lose if
they do not participate in an alliance.
Song and Panayides (2002) observe not only an increase in alliance formation
in the liner shipping industry, but also that several of these alliances had to reor-
ganize because of mergers and acquisitions between firms from different alliances
which destabilized the alliances. Their goal is to use cooperative game theory (see
Section 4.1 for an extensive discussion) to study the formation of these alliances.
Their analysis however does not go any further than explaining the theory of co-
operative games and showing two examples. Since no real application or empirical
tests take place, their conclusions are limited to the idea that the liner shipping
market is well explained by the core solution. The core solution is a traditional
way to discriminate between the many solutions in a cooperative game and is
explained further in Model 4.
The most formal approach to alliance formation is found in Bloch (2002). His
formal analysis studies two extreme kinds of cooperation: on the one hand cartels
which have positive externalities on firms outside the agreement and which might
suffer from free-riding, and on the other hand cost-reducing alliances which have
negative externalities for non-members. Bloch considers differences in formation
of those two extreme forms in Cournot and Stackelberg-like models. By study-
ing expected behavior of firms in those two different kinds of cooperation under
different conditions, conclusions on a more general level can be drawn.
A first conclusion of Bloch is that simultaneous formation of a cartel leads
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to a coherent group of members. Simultaneous formation refers to forming the
cooperation at once with all members, while in sequential formation the group
forms incrementally; firms can join later. For cartels, this sequential order of
formation leads to unstable cartels as every firm has the incentive to free-ride
on the decision of other cartel-members. Non-members can benefit from the
externalities from the cartel. However, if formation is simultaneous, the decision
to participate has to be taken before one knows if the cartel will actually form
(enough members) and before one knows whether the externalities can be misused.
For cost-reducing alliances, a crucial factor appears to be the openness or
exclusivity of the alliance. An open membership means everyone can join, as
compared to a more exclusive approach which can exclude firms. Bloch con-
cludes that open membership of cost-reducing alliances leads to large, efficient
alliances, while exclusive membership leads to multiple fragmented, inefficient al-
liances which compete with one another. A final conclusion is that the level of
cooperation is expected to be higher when negotiations are bilateral.
Game theoretical perspective on alliances: behavior of partners during
the alliance
A second theme which has been dealt with in game theoretical alliance research
is the evolution of the alliance, and more specifically, the behavior of partners
during the alliance and the consequences of this individual micro behavior on
the macro level of the alliance. Once an alliance has set off, each firm wants
to achieve the potential value of the alliance by committing to the alliance - a
necessary condition for alliance success. However, the benefits of the alliance are
shared by its members, so each member will have a strong incentive to compete
for a large portion of the benefits (opportunism). In sum, firms face a dilemma
between commitment and opportunism. Such a dilemma is modeled with a strate-
gic game form. Each firm has the incentive to be opportunistic and behave in a
non-loyal and self-interested way, but if all firms lack commitment by not con-
tributing to the value creation in the alliance, a collectively undesired situation is
the result. This structure of the dilemma between commitment and opportunism
closely resembles the prisoner’s dilemma from game theory. Different authors
have therefore modeled an alliance with such a prisoner’s dilemma (Gulati et al.,
1994; Hill, 1990), a more general social dilemma (Hwang and Burgers, 1997; Zeng
and Chen, 2003), or a public goods approach (Monge et al., 1998). This dilemma
is studied further in Section 6.2.
Arend and Seale (2005) and Phelan et al. (2005) focus on another aspect
of firms’ behavior during the alliance: exiting the alliance. They argue that
modeling an alliance as a prisoner’s dilemma neglects the exit option that is
available to partners. They therefore propose a game in which alliance partners
have three strategies at their disposal: commitment, opportunism, and exiting.
In the Phelan et al. article (2005), a computer tournament and simulations, in
combination with theoretical insights (from Arend and Seale, 2005), show how
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partners should behave when both high and low payoffs exist for exiting. When
the payoff for exiting (that is, the reward for leaving) is relative high compared
to the other payoffs in the game, the incentive to leave the alliance is great. In
that case, firms should be intolerant of misbehavior on the part of their partner.
Alliance termination will already take place after a small number of occasions
of opportunism. If, by contrast, the payoff for leaving is low, firms should be
more tolerant since the benefits of the alliance may exceed the benefits of exiting.
Alliance termination is only to be expected after a series of problems has occurred.
The final theme addressed is alliance performance. Parkhe (1993, 1993a) uses
game theory to study the performance of alliances, and relates the individual
behavior of partners as studied in a social dilemma to the collective level of the
alliance. He defines performance as the degree to which firms fulfill their strategic
needs and attain indirect, spill-over effects from the alliance. In his study (1993),
empirical results show support for the idea from game theory that a long time
horizon (a high discount factor, see Section 3.3.2) promotes reciprocal coopera-
tion. Furthermore, the anticipated relation between perceived opportunism by
partners and alliance performance was indeed affirmed by the data. In a second
study, Parkhe (1993a) finds support for a correlation between game theoretical
structure and alliance performance. Here, however, Parkhe defines game theoreti-
cal structure as the pattern of payoff, a long shadow of the future, and the number
of players, based again on the prisoner’s dilemma. In line with the articles that
study the balance of cooperation and competition, Parkhe shows the link between
this balance and alliance performance. Finally, Parkhe can affirm the role of game
theory, but also acknowledges that game theory alone cannot “... capture the rich
complexity of real-world strategic alliances” (Parkhe, 1993, p. 320).
2.3 Research gaps in theoretical perspectives on
alliances
In this section, the contributions of the perspectives already discussed will be
compared and, in this way, several research gaps will be defined. The theories
will be compared on three issues: their level of analysis, the nature of the theories,
and what the theories aim to explain. It is acknowledged that more gaps in the
alliance literature exist, but these will not be discussed in this study. It has been
chosen to focus on three issues in order to be able to zoom in and really deal with
those gaps. Those specific three issues have been chosen as they are considered the
most important differences between the traditional theoretical perspectives and
game theory. With this comparison and the derived research gaps, it is shown
what game theory can contribute. The defined research gaps are a research agenda
for the model chapters.
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2.3.1 Level of analysis
The first major difference between the theoretical perspectives is the level of
analysis adopted. In order to attain a complete picture of a phenomenon, it is
useful to adopt several levels of analysis. Alliances have also been studied with
different levels of analysis. The resource-based rationale argues on the level of
the firm. By determining the resource profile of a firm, and reasoning from this
profile, alliances are set up according to resource needs and dependency relations.
Transaction cost economics adopts the level of the transaction. It is argued which
mechanism is considered most efficient for a transaction. The strategic behavior
perspective studies the firm in relation to its environment. The key thing is to aim
at the best competitive positions relative to competitors. Finally, the relational
approach also studies firms in alliances in relation to their environment. Here, the
relations among firms in an alliance or the whole network around a firm (social
network theory) are key elements. In sum, several theories use the firm as level
of analysis, while other theories take the firm and its relations as their starting
point. The arguments are all made by taking the firm as focal point; why do firms
form strategic alliances and what is the role of a firm’s social environment?
However, what the collective result of an interaction among separate firms
is, remains understudied. The collective result of an interaction refers to the
aggregated level, also labeled the macro or multi-actor level. So far, the focus
has been on the motivation of separate firms, but not what happens if these
firms start interacting with each other. Can all firms in an industry achieve their
alliance motivation goals? Given the preferences of firms, how can a distribution
of firms across alliances be found that satisfies all firms? Alliances are the result
of interactions among firms. Therefore, it is natural to pay attention to firms,
as they are the building blocks of the interaction. Alliance theory has however
ignored aggregating these building blocks to study the collective level; the result of
the interaction3. In the case of multi-party alliances particularly this interaction
can be complex (Das and Teng, 2002; Garc´ıa-Canal, Valde´s-Llaneza, and Arin˜o,
2003; Hwang and Burgers, 1997). Therefore, the issue of interaction among firms
which are forming and managing an alliance deserves attention (Bell, 2003).
Research gap 2.1 Alliance literature has not paid considerable attention to in-
teraction among firms when forming and managing alliances.
Aggregating the level of players to a collective level to model the result of their
interaction is the main idea of game theory. More specifically, in game theory,
all players’ actions together lead to a collective result, which allows individual
players to adjust their behavior to influence this collective result. Vice versa,
from a game theoretical perspective one can also reason from the collective level
3An exception is Godfroij (1981) who distinguishes the levels of ‘actor strategies’, interaction
(a game), and structure. He did however not apply the game concept in the game theoretical
tradition.
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and study how individual players shape this result. Hence, the link game theory
makes between the two levels is its added value.
With a game theoretical approach, one can study how rational individual
behavior might lead to collective irrational results. Furthermore, game theory is
able to deal with complexity resulting from a large number of players. Handling
this complexity and finding solutions to such interactions is one of the main tasks
of game theory. The aim is to develop game-solutions that satisfy a whole group
of players - irrespective of its size - and to study under which conditions such
a solution holds. Insights from game theory can therefore be used to study the
aggregated level of firms’ interaction leading to alliance formation, particularly in
multi-partner alliances.
2.3.2 Nature of theories
The second issue denoting a difference between traditional alliance approaches and
game theory is the nature of the theory. The more traditional alliance perspectives
are theories with a general rationale. This means that the resource-based view
and resource-dependency theory explain the behavior of a firm via its resources.
Transaction cost economics argues that all behavior of firms is explained through
reasons of efficiency. Strategic behavior theory focuses on competitive positions.
Finally, the relational perspective reasons that relational elements matter. In
other words, those theories offer general ideas on alliance formation and alliance
performance. These general ideas can of course be used to arrive at more singu-
lar propositions, in order to empirically test the ideas (Camerer, 1991). These
theories are mainly used to discover and empirically confirm ‘laws of business’
(Camerer, 1991).
In contrast, game theory has a different focus. Game theory is capable of
making concrete predictions and, more specifically, of showing under which con-
ditions which result (which equilibrium) will happen. As seen in Section 2.2.5,
game theory in alliance research has so far mainly shown the conditions under
which a committed strategy may be more rewarding than opportunistic behavior
in an alliance. In other words, game theory is more aimed at making predic-
tions or forecasting a result, given certain conditions. Although one could argue
that the more traditional theories also work with assumptions and conditions un-
der which the theory holds, the main differences between game theory and more
traditional approaches are the degree to which these conditions are being made
explicit and the number of conditions underlying the theory. Game theory can be
distinguished through its transparency concerning conditions and the relatively
large numbers of conditions. Although general laws and regularities can also re-
sult from game theory, these only hold under a quite large set of conditions which
are made explicit in the theory4.
4The number and nature of the conditions can be considered a disadvantage of game theory.
Do firms really behave as assumed by game theory? I will deal with these questions and
disadvantages of game theory in Section 3.4.
28 Chapter 2
These kinds of predictions are related to the more formal, deductive, and ab-
stract nature of game theory as compared to the other theoretical approaches.
First, game theory adopts a more formal and deductive approach to the study of
social phenomena. The theory arrives at hypotheses, propositions, and conclu-
sions by deductive reasoning and carefully building a theory as a set of primitive
terms, definitions, axioms, and theorems (axiomatic method). This is a different
approach than the other theoretical perspectives on alliances. These theories are
not built according to the axiomatic system and are less formal. Furthermore,
game theory is able to abstract complex situations by neglecting details and identi-
fying the essentials of such a situation (Aumann in Van Damme, 1998). Instead of
trying to give a complete explanation (almost a description), game theory reduces
and focuses (De Beus, 1993; Hinich and Munger, 1997).
When considering the research aims defined in this section and Section 2.4.3,
an approach that abstracts from description and aims at several essential elements
is welcome. The issues on the research agenda are complex and have received little
theoretical attention. As will be seen in Section 2.4, the dynamics of alliances has
received relatively much attention from more popular management literature. In
other words, given this set of more descriptive studies, there is rather a need for
a theory that, even more than other theories, aims at grasping the essentials of
the object of study by neglecting details. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) also
argue that game theory is therefore better equipped to handle the complexity of
the world of business than other approaches. Besides these advantages, it would
also enrich and mature the study of alliances if a more formal approach were to
be developed. Such a formal approach is currently lacking the field.
2.3.3 What the theories explain
Finally, a difference between the theories is what they explain. In the more eco-
nomic theories, such as transaction cost economics, resource theories, and strategic
behavior theory, the emphasis is on the rationale behind alliance formation. The
theories explain under which conditions the advantages of alliances outweigh the
disadvantages (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
Strategic alliances are set up if firms can achieve efficient transactions, meet a need
for resources, can use resources as power means, or achieve a competitive position.
The resource-based view cannot only explain why and when firms form alliances
but also which partners a firm selects and the performance of the alliance (Das
and Teng, 2000). The relational perspective is not directed towards explaining
why alliances are formed. Rather, it focuses on explaining alliance performance.
The social network approach does not focus on why alliances are formed, but
offers a more general method for mapping the environment of a firm. In this way,
it can for example be explained how successful an alliance is, or what kind of
alliance will be formed. In sum, the more traditional alliance theories study why
alliances are set up, under which circumstances they are valuable, which partners
to select, and why alliance succeed or fail.
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A natural follow-up to the knowledge about why firms set up alliances and why
some alliances are more successful is the question ‘How are alliances formed?’
(which process is relevant?). It is relevant to learn more about the process of
alliance formation, because knowledge about why alliances are formed and why
some alliances are more successful will become more valuable if one also knows
how to achieve and form such alliances. As a comparison, it is valuable to know
why a certain company is making profit, why certain people are more healthy than
others, and why some cows give more milk. However, knowing how to make such
a high profit, how to become more healthy, and how to attain more productive
cows is even more valuable. Of course, the ‘how’ knowledge is highly related to the
motivation and performance issues. One could even consider ‘knowing how’ as the
next step after ‘knowing why’. Moreover, it seems natural to study alliances in a
dynamic way because alliances take time to be set-up and eventually terminated,
and might exist for several years. Alliances are not static, but are the result of a
process in which cooperation is formed, evolves, and is terminated. This process
also influences the performance of the alliance (Das and Teng, 2002; Doz, 1996;
Hamel, 1991; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
From the state of the art of alliance theories, it can be concluded that alliance
theory has not paid much attention to the ‘how’ issue. I therefore introduce the
following research gap:
Research gap 2.2 Alliance literature has not paid considerable attention to the
process that leads to alliance formation.
Studying how alliances are formed refers to the dynamics of alliances. Gener-
ally speaking, the dynamics of alliances are considered to be understudied (Bell,
2003; Bell, Den Ouden, and Ziggers, 2006; Das and Teng, 2002a; Reuer, 2000;
Styles and Hersch, 2005). No comprehensive and complete theoretical framework
on these dynamics has been formulated yet. To carefully review what the research
gaps in this area are, I will first present an overview of studies on the dynamics
of alliances in the next section. Moreover, I will argue what game theory can
contribute to these research gaps.
2.4 Literature review: the dynamics of alliances
Although most studies on alliances adopt a static perspective (Doz, 1996; Ireland
et al., 2002; Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995), it has become more commonplace
to consider an alliance as a dynamic process. This section reviews a selection of
those more dynamic alliance studies. Based on this review, in Section 2.4.3, the
research gaps in this area of research will be presented.
In this study, the concept of dynamics refers to the changes that take place
within a system (Stewart, 1989), more specifically, alliances among firms. The
task at hand is to characterize and isolate the motion of and within alliances in
order to be more definite about the evolution of an alliance. What causes this
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motion to continue? What influences the process? Although time is infinitely
divisible (Stewart, 1989), I adopt a division of time into periods since “... very
small time-steps give a good approximation to a continuous flowing time” (Stew-
art, 1989, p. 17). In this way, the sequence of different stages of a system can
be studied. Why do changes take place, what drives them? In other words,
explanations are found for the dynamics.
Since the task is to focus on motion of and within alliances, I will divide the
discussion of the literature on the dynamics of alliances into two parts:
• dynamics of an alliance: a life cycle approach (Section 2.4.1)
• dynamics within an alliance: partner dynamics (Section 2.4.2)
The first kind of dynamics refers to the changes of the alliance from alliance for-
mation (birth), to evolution (life), and finally termination (death). The second
approach indicates dynamics that take place within the alliance and among part-
ners. These differences in the two kinds of dynamics are in line with the seminal
work of Smith Ring and Van de Ven (1994). They consider the dynamics of inter-
organizational relationships (that is alliances) as repetitive stages of negotiation,
commitment, and execution (the dynamics within the alliance, among partners).
This cycle is repeated several times during the formation, management, and ter-
mination of the relationship (the life cycle of the alliance).
2.4.1 The life cycle of alliances
The life cycle approach considers an alliance as a unique and predictable sequence
of stages. Different classifications of alliance phases have been discussed in the
literature (e.g. Das, 2002a; De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004; Ireland et al., 2002;
Spekman, Isabella, MacAvoy, and Forbes III, 1996; Styles and Hersch, 2005).
Based on these authors the following classification has been adopted in this study:
• Alliance formation, with alliance preparation, partner selection, and formal
agreement
• Alliance management
• Alliance termination
Assessing the strategic alliance literature, alliance formation has been treated
more as the question of why alliances are set up than as how they are set up.
The studies mentioned here are an exception to this. In general, alliances are
considered to start with preparations at the level of the firm. Firms envision
an advantage that can only be achieved through a partnership (Spekman et al.,
1996). Firms can have different strategic reasons for forming a partnership, and
these have been documented extensively in alliance literature (see Section 2.1.1).
After firms have internally considered the need to form an alliance, the partner
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selection phase takes place. Firms look for potential partners which meet their
envisioned needs (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000). Firms aim at
alliances that lead to a strategic fit, but partners also strive for, amongst others,
cultural, organizational, and personal fit (see Section 2.1.2).
The preparation stages at firm level are finalized by negotiations between
firms. These negotiations can again be divided into two phases: agreement on
the composition of the alliance (who will participate) and agreement within the
group of members about the specifications of the alliance. During the second type
of negotiations, partners have to agree on a multitude of issues. Examples are
the organization form and business model of the alliance, technological standards,
and the amount of investments each partner will make (Inkpen and Currall, 2004;
Spekman et al., 1996). Via investments, firms make a formal commitment to the
alliance in terms of financial, human, physical, and intellectual capital (Spekman
et al., 1996).
Once the formal negotiations have finished and partners start making invest-
ments, the alliance sets off and enters the management phase. To put it simply,
the alliance starts operating. The production starts, employees are transferred to
the alliance, and money will flow from partners to the alliance level. The main
task in this phase is to manage the alliance. Alliance managers should keep al-
liance investments up to expectations and monitor the alliance carefully. Also,
alliance managers have to adapt to both external and internal pressures on the
alliance (Spekman et al., 1996). This evolution phase is often interpreted as the
phase in which the partners truly start to interact. In that sense, one could con-
sider the partner dynamics, the subject of the subsequent section, as the events
in the evolution phase. However, this view ignores that partner dynamics take
place over the whole life of the alliance; partners also interact during negotiations
and termination phases.
The final phase of alliances is termination. As mentioned earlier, alliance ter-
mination only implies alliance failure if the termination is premature and partners
also perceive it as such (Das and Teng, 2000a; Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
If an alliance was task-oriented and the task was fulfilled to the satisfaction of all
partners, termination might be a logical and non-problematic final stage of the
alliance. But most often, alliance termination is problematic and characterized
as a ‘divorce’ associated with pain and distress (Peng and Shenkar, 2003).
Literature on the final phase of alliances focuses on why alliances terminate
prematurely or in disharmony, in other words, why alliances fail. Although know-
ing why alliances fail is valuable knowledge, it says little about the process an
alliance goes through. Furthermore, although the issue of alliance failure is an
ongoing assessment throughout the alliance, it can better be seen as the outcome
of an alliance and can therefore be positioned as a post-termination phase (Park
and Ungson, 2001). So, if we want to get a better insight into the motion of
the alliance, we need to know how alliance termination takes place. What are
the steps partners go through before they decide to call a halt to their alliance?
However, this process of alliance termination has received little attention in the
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alliance literature (Peng and Shenkar, 2002).
An exception to these observations are a few articles that discuss how al-
liances evolve before they are terminated: Arin˜o and Doz (2000), Park and Ung-
son (2001), and Peng and Shenkar (2002). The article by Arin˜o and Doz describes
the road an alliance travels when problems arise and how partners can rescue the
alliance. During the alliance, an ongoing assessment is made concerning whether
the alliance is still meeting the expectations of the alliance partners. An ex-
pectation shortfall can be the forewarning of alliance termination as it is likely
to trigger partner actions. For assessment purpose, it is relevant whether the
partners attribute the shortfall to external events or to internal circumstances
involving partner behavior. External events refer to industry and environmental
factors, and internal circumstances imply for example the perception of balanced
contribution and the pace of bilateral learning (Park and Ungson, 2001). Fur-
thermore, do partners perceive the shortfall as an efficiency (value creation) or
equity (value appropriation) shortfall? Arin˜o and Doz (2000) work out four types
of reactions to an expectation shortfall combing these two issues. The chances of
alliance termination are higher when the perceived shortfall is of an equity na-
ture (Arin˜o and Doz, 2000). If firms have decided to terminate the relationship,
the next steps are the public disclosure of the break-up and formal separation
negotiations (Peng and Shenkar, 2002).
The discussion of the life cycle approach has so far shown one life cycle: al-
liances evolve from start-up, to management, to termination. However, an alliance
and its members also have a past before the alliance is created. The extent to
which this shared past of the alliance partners influences their behavior within
the alliance is relevant in this context. Several studies examine the influence of
previous relations among partners on alliance behavior. An important finding is
that partners which are familiar with each other from earlier relations, might be
less prone to opportunism within an alliance. Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) for
example find strong empirical evidence for their hypotheses that a prior history
of business relations among partners within an alliance leads to a greater effec-
tiveness of the relationship. It might be easier to refrain from opportunistic and
selfish moves if a firm knows its partner better and can even trust him. Parkhe
(1993a) also finds support that a prior history between partners in an alliance
decreases perceived opportunism. Even if there has not been a relationship in the
past, the reputation of a partner might play a role. Hill (1990) argues that the
reputation of a firm might play an important role in determining the willingness
of others to cooperate. Hill also makes the link between reputation and oppor-
tunistic behavior. According to other studies, reputation has indeed proven to
play a role for firms and for alliance formation (Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton,
1997; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Saxton, 1997).
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2.4.2 Partner dynamics
In addition to the dynamics of the life cycle, an alliance also faces dynamics during
its daily partner interactions. These dynamics refer to the level of the partners
in the alliance. Van de Ven and Walker (1984) consider an inter-organizational
relationship as “... a gradual dynamic process that is continually shaped and
recreated by the actions and symbolic interpretations of individuals” and the
relation is “... likely to emerge incrementally with small transactions ...” (Van de
Ven and Walker, 1984, p. 604).
During the whole life of an alliance, alliance partners interact constantly. Dur-
ing those interactions, partners monitor each others’ behavior as well as events
outside the alliance. The challenge for partners is to constantly observe, learn,
and act during an alliance (Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Koza and
Lewin, 1998). In other words, the partners perform an ongoing assessment of the
alliance and its environment. After such an assessment, partners may want to act
to restore an observed imbalance of the relationship. Firms cannot always foresee
whether their actions will have a positive or negative effect. The adaptation of
firms over time results in an interplay between the firm, its environment, and the
alliance (Koza and Lewin, 1998). Considered in this way, an alliance is a learning
cycle in which firms constantly adjust their behavior along the way. One may call
this adjusting behavior coordination between partners.
Both internal conditions and external events play a role in this process. I will
first discuss the internal conditions, and then briefly mention the role of external
events. According to De Rond and Bouchiki (2004), an alliance is characterized
as a set of internal forces which determine the internal partner dynamics of the
alliance. A review of several articles provides the following list of internal con-
ditions (Das and Teng, 2002a; De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004; Doz, 1996; Kogut,
1989):
• trust
• flexibility
• commitment versus opportunism
• balance of power
In addition, other internal partner dynamics which might play a role are, amongst
others, communication, learning of partners, and adjusting alliance objectives. I
focus on the four mentioned above because they will be used for the models of
Chapter 6.
Internal conditions may influence the stability of an alliance. A lack of trust,
too much or too little flexibility, unbalanced commitment, or an asymmetrical
power balance all may lead to a lack of stability within the alliance. As a con-
sequence, alliance partners will observe these conditions carefully and may want
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to try to adapt them during their learning cycle. As trust has already been dis-
cussed extensively in Section 2.2.4, I will focus here on flexibility, commitment,
and power.
Flexibility refers to the adaptive capabilities of firms. As argued above, an
alliance is a learning cycle that partners go through. Each partner observes,
learns, and acts in order to restore the balance of internal forces and external
events. Nevertheless, too much flexibility leads to a lack of rigidity in the form of a
lack of binding mechanisms, a weak authority structure, and too little irreversible
commitment (Das and Teng, 2002), and vice versa. Hence, the level of flexibility
adopted by a partner should be balanced.
The balance between commitment and opportunism is important in an alliance,
since this balance can also upset the stability of an alliance (Das and Teng, 2000a;
Douma et al., 2000; Gulati et al., 1994; Kogut, 1989; Zeng and Chen, 2003).
Committed firms behave such that they pursue mutual interests in and common
benefits of the alliance. Opposite behavior is opportunism in which partners only
act in their own interest at the expense of others (Das and Teng, 2000a). Again,
these two forces should be balanced; too much opportunism leads to alliance
failure, and too much commitment by a partner leads to free-riding by the other
partners. As seen in Section 2.2.5, this balance has often been studied with a
game-theoretical perspective.
A final internal element considered to be important in the partner dynamics
of alliances is the balance of power of an alliance (Barringer and Harrison, 2000;
Kogut, 1989; Yan and Gray, 1994). Muthusamy and White (2005, p. 434) write:
“... most interfirm conflicts occur due to asymmetry in the power of parties in
a relationship ...”. Power refers to the extent to which a firm is dependent on
the alliance, the number of alternatives a firm has outside the alliance, and the
dependency of the alliance on the firm (Yan and Gray, 1994). In this way, each
firm within an alliance has a certain amount of power, which determines the
balance of power within an alliance. On a continuum, this balance of power can
be more equally distributed or the power balance can be asymmetrical with one
or more dominant members. During the alliance, both internal developments and
external factors can influence the balance of power (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
In sum, a symmetric power balance is more likely to lead to a stable alliance.
In addition to all these internal circumstances, the dynamics between partners
are also influenced by external events (Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998). External
events refer to events relevant for the whole alliance or one of its members. In
an alliance, a partner adjusts to changes in the environment and to the strategic
context of the firm. These external events are responsible for the unexpected
changes during an alliance making them unpredictable. The external events also
make alliances less controllable.
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2.4.3 Research gaps
I will now draw conclusions concerning the state of the art of the literature on the
dynamics of alliances and set several topics on the research agenda. Subsequently,
I will indicate what the role of game theory can be for the defined research gaps.
In the review, two different approaches to the dynamics of alliances have been
distinguished: the dynamics of alliances and the dynamics within alliances.
In general, the dynamics of alliances with a life cycle approach have received
more attention in popular management literature (e.g. Spekman et al., 1996) than
in scientific literature. The theoretical perspectives presented earlier do not play
any role in this debate. Hence, one can conclude that in general too few scientific
studies have researched the process of alliance formation (Das and Teng, 2002a;
Khanna, 1998; Rao and Schmidt, 1998). This was also concluded in Section 2.3.3.
The main traditional alliance perspectives have not studied how an alliance is
formed.
Focusing on phases within the life cycle, the second phase, alliance manage-
ment, is a subject that has received quite some attention in academic literature
(Douma et al., 2000; Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2001). However, scientific studies
on the first and last phase (alliance emergence and termination) are more scarce.
The question concerning why alliances are formed and terminated is much more
documented than how they are formed and terminated.
To further develop theory on the dynamics of alliances, this study focuses on
the dynamics of alliance formation, thereby ignoring the dynamics of alliance ter-
mination. The reason for that is that game theory is better equipped for studying
the process of alliance formation. This does not imply that the termination phase
is considered of less importance, it simply does not get the focus here. For this
stage of alliance formation, the following questions remain unanswered. What
are the mechanisms at play during alliance formation? More specifically, consider
the following aspects: How do firms find good partners? What is the process
of partner selection that firms go through? How can compromises be reached in
alliance negotiations? What is the role of different ways (procedures) of forming
an alliance?
It is argued that game theory should be capable of studying the process of
alliance formation, more than - or at least in a different way than - the other
alliance approaches. As will be seen in Chapter 4 on coalition theory, game
theory contains many theories explaining the formation of coalitions. Part of
these theories are dynamic (see Section 4.4). The non-dynamic coalition theories
are also useful as they focus more than the alliance approaches on how cooperation
arises, and can be used for further theory- and model development. Since coalition
theories were not designed specifically for the field of alliances, there will be a need
for further model building so that the theories can apply to the field of alliances. In
sum, the coalition branch of game theory offers many static and dynamic theories
which can be used as starting point for further development of dynamic alliance
models. An additional reason to use coalition theory is that some researchers
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consider this branch to be more relevant to business than non-cooperative game
theory (see Van Damme, 1998). Moreover, as explained earlier, game theory is
more directed at explaining, thereby complementing the descriptive literature.
In addition, alliances also have a phase ‘zero’; the phase that precedes an
alliance. Several articles have studied the effect of previous relations on oppor-
tunism, and others have shown that reputation might play a role (e.g. Bucklin
and Sengupta, 1993; Hill, 1990; Parkhe, 1993a). Nevertheless, the effect of previ-
ous interactions might be studied more in depth taking other effects into account.
Not much is known on what influence past interactions may have on behavior of
firms within an alliance. Do partners behave differently if they have interacted
before? In sum:
Research gap 2.3 Alliance literature has not paid considerable attention to the
effect of interactions among partners before an alliance on their behavior during
the alliance.
The second kind of dynamics in the review are the dynamics among the part-
ners of the alliance. The literature on this kind of dynamics has become quite
coherent and extensive over the years. There is literature on several aspects of the
internal balance: trust, commitment, flexibility, and the balance of power. New
routes of research will need to lead to combinations of these issues. For example,
what is the effect of a decrease in trust during an alliance on the three other
issues? Will less trust lead to more opportunism? Or, what is the consequence
of an unbalanced (dominated) alliance on the commitment of partners? To sum
up, these internal dynamics have been extensively documented, but a dynamic
assessment of the effects of their evolution is lacking. This leads to:
Research gap 2.4 Alliance literature has not paid considerable attention to the
interaction between partner dynamics.
To meet this research aim, I will use the theory of strategic games, a part of
non-cooperative game theory. In strategic games, players cannot make binding
agreements and the result of the interaction is dependent on the decision of each
individual player. The non-cooperative branch is sometimes called strategically-
oriented game theory (Van Damme, 1998) because of the focus on players’ strate-
gies as a means to reach an outcome. Strategies are a way to model the actions
or behavior of players. Furthermore, in contrast to cooperative game theory, the
focus is not necessarily on cooperation, but on behavior of firms in any kind of
interaction. Here, the alliance, as the interaction firms are participating in, is
under study. The issue is not who will form an alliance, but rather how firms in
an alliance behave. The outcome of the interaction (for example the stability of
the alliance) is dependent on the delicate balance between firms’ behavior. Recall
that relevant issues of behavior are trust, flexibility, and commitment, amongst
others. In such situations, no central authority guards the interaction, nor do
formal binding agreements play a role (Parkhe, 1993a). Therefore, to model such
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situations, the theory of strategic games is the best choice as binding agreements
are not taken into account, but the focus is on strategies. Moreover, using strate-
gic games to study partner dynamics is in line with earlier research (Section 2.2.5).
Finally, since the dynamics of strategic games are well-developed (Akiyama and
Kaneko, 2000; Axelrod, 1984; Marks, 2002; Samuelson, 2002; Taylor, 1987), it is
easy to build dynamic models. Strategic games and their dynamics are discussed
in Chapter 3.
For the sake of completeness, it should also be mentioned that the interaction
between the two kinds of dynamics has been understudied. Relevant questions
would be whether partner dynamics differ in subsequent stages of the alliance and
how events during the life cycle influence partner dynamics. However, tackling
this research gap is beyond the scope of this study.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has served two goals: to present the theoretical contribution and
content contribution of this study. What elements are lacking in the literature on
the dynamics of alliances? These issues have been defined in four research gaps.
Subsequently, the question is what a game theoretical perspective on alliances can
offer compared to other theoretical approaches.
In this chapter, it has been argued that game theory can contribute to the
defined research gaps. Arguments for this position were found in the level of
analyses of game theory. Game theory studies interactions by linking the micro
and macro level. This perspective has lacked alliance literature so far. Further-
more, game theory can study how alliances are formed and how partners interact
within an alliance. Hence, game theory is expected to be able to offer a more
dynamic perspective on alliance formation and alliance partner behavior. Both
issues have not received considerable attention in the literature so far. Moreover,
the abstract approach of game theory is expected to shed light on the complexity
of the dynamics of alliances. This should oppose a more descriptive approach.
However, from the review on game theoretical studies on alliances (Section
2.2.5), it can be concluded that game theory has so far not contributed extensively.
Most alliance studies using a game theoretical perspective have used the non-
cooperative branch of game theory. The strategic games adopted have mainly
been used to study the behavior of alliance partners during the alliance (partner
dynamics). Those studies are useful for the alliance field and will also be used in
this study to built new models upon (Chapter 6).
However, based on the presented reviews, it appears that the formation of
alliances and the process leading to formation are particularly understudied in al-
liance research. How alliances are formed has not received considerable attention
in scientific literature. Adopting a game theoretical perspective, alliance forma-
tion can best be studied with coalition theory which possess an excellent set of
tools and theories for studying alliance formation. Furthermore, game theory can
38
offer a broad set of (potentially) dynamic coalition theories.
Hence, the future of a game theoretical contribution to alliances lies in studying
the process of alliance formation with a coalition theory perspective. Remarkably,
no researcher (except Bloch, 2002) has taken up this subject yet. In the models
of Chapter 5, I will pick up this topic.
Before presenting the models, the next two chapters will discuss game theory
more in depth and will present the building blocks for the two model chapters.
Chapter 3
Game theory
This chapter and the next chapter deal with the theoretical lens used to study
the dynamics of alliances; game theory. This chapter focuses on strategic form
games, Chapter 4 discusses coalition games. The main goals of the chapters
are (1) to delve deeper into game theory and (2) to study to what extent game
theory is applicable to the dynamics of alliances. In these chapters, theories
will be presented which will be used to build the new models of Chapters 5 and
6. Some games and game forms will be discussed more thoroughly than others,
because these are more relevant to the problem of explaining the dynamics of
alliances. Being complete is not the goal, but rather presenting theories relevant
for the dynamics of alliances. To delve deeper into game theory, this chapter
starts with the underlying methodology (Section 3.1). After that, I will discuss
the assumptions underlying game theory and its different branches (Section 3.2).
The branch of strategic games is the subject of Section 3.3, and coalition games
will be extensively discussed in Chapter 4. Both game theory chapters start with
the basic static approach, but they also demonstrate dynamic developments of
the theory. To serve the second goal (studying applicability), throughout both
chapters the presented theories will be assessed on their usefulness for alliances.
3.1 Methodological reflections
The dynamics of alliances can be studied in many different ways. It was already
argued that I will adopt a game theoretical approach. In this section, I will discuss
further how I intend to examine the problem by discussing the methodological
choices and choices concerning philosophy of science underlying the study. By
clearly taking a stance on this topic, the reader can be helped to position and
interpret a study, without wondering about the underlying assumptions on the
role of theory and philosophy of knowledge (Johnson and Duberley, 2000).
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3.1.1 Building a formal model with the axiomatic approach
Game theory is embedded in several scientific and methodological traditions which
determine how game theory studies phenomena. To start with, game theory is
part of the rational choice paradigm (Osborne, 2004). In this paradigm, players
are assumed to know their preferences, to be able to rank them, and to act such
that they maximize their preferences. Particular to the rational choice paradigm
and, hence, to game theory is (1) the formal approach employed, (2) the use of
the axiomatic methodology (Thomson, 2001), and (3) the use of mathematics
(Johnson, 1996). Both the formal and axiomatic approach will be discussed in
the remainder of this section.
A formal approach implies that a researcher expresses the real-life situation
in abstract and symbolic terms through a set of explicitly stated assumptions.
Formal modeling was originally the dominant approach in the natural and math-
ematical sciences. In the field of economy, a formal approach developed after the
seminal work ‘Theory of games and economic behavior ’ (1944) of Von Neumann
and Morgenstern. After several years of more technical developments, more and
more economists began to apply game theory in the mid-1960s. During the 1970s
and 1980s, the field matured further with own scientific journals and conferences
and other disciplines started using game theory and formal modeling (Aumann,
1987). After a long period of descriptive approaches, disciplines such as sociol-
ogy, psychology, and political science (see Amadae and Buneo de Mesquita, 1999)
have been using mathematics and formal models more and more (Morton, 1999;
Suppes, 1993). Although formal models have been used in business science, the
use of game theory in business science and more specifically in the field of strategy
and alliances, has been less prevalent (Saloner, 1991), as seen in Section 2.2.5.
A formal theory or model is built by using the axiomatic methodology. The
essence of this method can be found in its clear distinction between, on the one
hand, an axiomatic base of a theory, and, on the other hand, a set of universal hy-
potheses called theorems, which are inferred from the axiomatic base by means of
logical rules. Tarski (1946) has written one of the leading works on the axiomatic
method with his ‘Introduction to logic, and to the methodology of deductive sci-
ence’. Other relevant articles are Spencer (1963) who discusses the method and
its potential for the field of accountancy; and Thomson (2001) with a thorough
review and defense of axiomatic methodology for game theory and social choice
theory.
According to Spencer (1963), one can make a distinction between four kinds
of statements in an axiomatic deductively-built theory:
• primitive terms
• definitions
• assumptions
• theorems
Game theory 41
The first three, primitive terms, definitions, and assumptions, together form the
axiomatic base of a theory. In an axiomatic base, first primitive terms are in-
troduced. These terms are presented without explaining their meaning for they
are the building blocks of the theory. To avoid infinite circularity of reasoning,
“every definition must eventually depend upon some words and ideas which have
not been defined” (Spencer, 1963, p. 311). For example, in game theory a player
is a primitive term. The second element consists of definitions. By using primitive
terms, certain new concepts can be defined. These definitions are established in
order to work with in the remainder of the theory. An example of a definition
is the concept of a coalition, which is a group of players (a primitive term) that
coordinate their behavior. Assumptions are the third element of an axiomatic
base. An assumption is a primitive statement which is accepted as true without
having established their validity (Tarski, 1946). In this study, assumptions are
important elements as they often replace older assumptions which do not hold
in the alliance domain. The idea that a player prefers a coalition partner that is
complementary in resources is an example of an assumption.
Built on an axiomatic base is a set of theorems, statements which are either true
or false and which have to be proven in order to establish them. New theories can
be obtained by formulating additional statements which are not in contradiction
with (any subset of statements of) the axiomatic base. Often an axiomatic base
from other theories or set of theories is used. The theorems are derived from the
axiomatic base by using rules of mathematical logic.
In this study, I will develop theories and models on the dynamics of alliances.
Each model will have an axiomatic base derived through pre-existing game theo-
retical models. For some reason, these ‘old’ models do not suffice for explaining
the dynamics of alliances. In the remainder of this chapter and the next chapter, I
will discuss the games and their deficiencies which underlie the new models found
in Chapters 5 and 6. In general, there are two problems with the existing game
theory: a lack of dynamics and assumptions that conflict with alliance formation.
In order to repair these aspects, I will develop new assumptions (partly) based on
existing axiomatic bases. This stage is called theory construction, since it deals
with extending and refining theoretical schemes of statements about coalition
formation without referring to, for example, the formation of strategic alliances
among firms or the formation of political coalitions.
Once a new theory is constructed according to the method just described,
it does not mean that these theories can, without any adjustment, be applied
to alliances. To arrive at more singular statements, which are connected to an
empirical domain, a second phase takes place: the model construction phase.
In this phase, the theory is transformed into a set of more concrete hypotheses
about real-life phenomena, which is called a model (Suppe, 1977). Modeling is
the art of determining the relevant elements that need to be included in a game
by using intuition, common sense, and empirical data (Rubinstein, 1991). This
transformation from a universal to a less abstract level is done by linking the
primitive terms, definitions, assumptions, and theorems to a specific empirical
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domain. Typically, players become firms, and coalitions become alliances. In the
presentation of the new theories and models of this study, the difference between
theory and model will not be made explicit. Since the aim is to develop models
for the field of alliances, the models will be presented immediately for the alliance
domain.
From the modeling phase, propositions will be derived; the main findings of the
model presented such that they translate and interpret the theorems into terms
from the field of alliances. In this dissertation, a special kind of proposition, a
conclusion, is used in case more empirical or computational material has confirmed
the earlier found propositions. The propositions and conclusions are the outcomes
of the models and serve as a basis for further research in the field of alliances.
3.1.2 Reflections on the role of (game) theory
It is important to realize that the axiomatic method does not arrive at a theory
or model by generalizing empirical facts (induction). Statements about the real
world are made by carefully and logically constructing a formal theory (deduc-
tion). Furthermore, game theorists have specific ideas about the role a theory
plays in the real world. All these considerations shape the philosophy of knowl-
edge underlying the research and will be discussed in this section.
Value of theory development
The deductive approach opposes induction, which generalizes empirical facts.
Popper (1963) invalidates the principle of induction by arguing that we could
never make a universal statement by generalizing singular statements. No matter
how many empirical facts one uses “... any conclusion drawn in this way may
always turn out to be false” (Popper, 1963, p. 27). As an alternative, Popper
offers the falsification of theories. Although one cannot confirm a theory by sin-
gular statements, a researcher is sure that his or her theory is falsified if a singular
statement contradicts the theory.
If scientists had strictly followed Popper’s falsification principle, we would not
have arrived at many theories, such as the current body of coalition formation
theories. The empirical performance of most of the political coalition formation
theories is poor and although new generations of more complex theories perform
better than simpler theories, the overall performance would provide sufficient rea-
son for Popper to reject them. However, an unsatisfactory empirical performance
does not imply the uselessness of a theory.
First, a theory can be a building block for future theories with a potentially
higher empirical performance. Nowadays Popper’s ideas on falsification are called
‘naive falsificationism’, and Lakatos (1970) has replaced them with a more real-
istic approach; the idea of research programs and sophisticated falsificationism.
Lakatos argues that theories should not be disregarded once empirical facts have
contradicted them. Lakatos considers a research program to be the typical unit
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of science. A research program has a protected hard core and a protective belt
of “... auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted
and re-adjusted, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core”
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 133). One should therefore not reject a complete program since
part of it might still be valuable. One should work on the protective belt around
the hard core of a program in order to improve a programme. Moreover, an old
theoretical stream or program should not be rejected until a new and better the-
ory can be presented. This is the idea of sophisticated falsificationism (Chalmers,
1987; Lakatos, 1970).
The approach used in this study is closely connected to Lakatos’ ideas. Even
though (political) scientists have empirically doubted some coalition theories,
these theories have not yet been entirely rejected. The existing body of coali-
tion theories has been used to build new and better theories which can replace or
complement the old ones. So far, in coalition research, but also in other branches
of game theory, progress can be seen. Coalition theories have become more so-
phisticated and they serve as better empirical predictors.
Secondly, theory has value by offering insights on and a focus on new, and yet
unforeseen elements; ‘the searchlight theory of science’ (Popper, 1963, p. 127).
Science and scientific theories throw light on certain (aspects of) phenomena in
the real world. Hence, this is in line with Aumann’s statement that science is not
a quest for truth, but for understanding. By using theory as a lens to focus on
certain aspects, it is hoped to understand the phenomenon under study, and not to
aim at describing the whole phenomenon (Van Damme, 1998). More specifically,
one aims at restricting in such a way that the core of a phenomenon can be
attained. This idea implies that there is no claim of a neutral observational
language, in which objectivist scientists believe (Johnson and Duberley, 2000);
it is the theory that colors the observation. By using theory as lenses and by
following a more subjectivist approach a well-considered choice is made.
In this study, game theory and its games are the lenses through which the real
world (the dynamics of alliances) are viewed. Since the number of aspects sur-
rounding the dynamics of alliances might be large, it requires that some aspect be
highlighted in order to thoroughly understand them, instead of describing them.
This game theoretical approach is supposed to exist next to other theoretical
approaches to alliances, in line with the idea of pluralism of theories (Aumann,
1985). Hence, a game theoretical approach to alliances is not the only and final
step; it is a way of how the world could be analyzed (Binmore and Dasgupta,
1986 ; Myerson, 1992).
Explanatory role of game theory
Within game theory, scientists differ on the role the theory should play (Binmore
and Dasgupta, 1986). On the one hand, this debate consists of scholars who
believe in game theory as a normative, prescriptive science (see e.g. Harsanyi,
1977; Rapoport, 1992). Game theory prescribes how players should behave within
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a game; given the game and its characteristics, it is rational for a player to behave
as prescribed. Harsanyi states that in a game one “... deals with the question of
how each player should act ... and not with the question of how he ... will actually
act ...” (Harsanyi, 1977, p. 16). On the other hand, others consider game theory
as a way to understand the world, to be able to explain phenomena (Aumann,
1985). Aumann claims that comprehension is the first step, and only afterwards
does the secondary step come, the engineering part or the prescriptive role of
game theory. In an interview, he remarked that game theory is not a religion,
but a tool to understand the world (Van Damme, 1998, p. 203). Samuelson sees
the development of game theory over the course of time to shift from a more
normative to a more explanatory role: “It is now more common to interpret a
game ... as an approximation of an actual interaction ...” (Samuelson, 2002, p.
48).
This study fits in the latter position in the debate; the explanatory role of
game theory. The aim of this study is to study and explain a real phenomenon;
the dynamics of alliances. The aim is not to prescribe alliance managers how
they should behave in order to achieve optimal results. Nevertheless, this can be
a next step after this study. For now, the models possess enough eloquence and
relevance to say something about real life. Whether the models explain correctly
is not tested in this study since the focus is on theory and model development.
Johnson (1996) points to overstating the role of empirical performance in judging
the validity of a theory. Referring to naive falsificationism, he claims that an
explanation (by a theory) can only be falsified with a competing explanation,
and not an empirical observation. Here, empirical testing is not rejected but is
considered a next step after theory and model development which are considered
of more relevance at this moment.
In order to judge the developed theories and models in this dissertation, other
approaches than empirical testing will be used. First, the analytical methods of
game theory and the logic method are used to build technically correct models.
Secondly, the models are judged on their applicability (Aumann, 1985, and Au-
mann in Van Damme, 1998). Applicability refers to the potential explanation the
models can offer for the dynamics of alliances. Whether the models are applica-
ble is judged by comparing the models and their ingredients (assumptions) with
the alliance literature. Furthermore, examples are provided of business situations
under which the model and its conditions hold. Finally, the applicability is val-
ued with an illustration for each model. The next section pays attention to the
methodology of these illustrations.
3.1.3 Illustrations
In order to illustrate the developed models, several kind of illustrations are used:
small cases (Model 1 and 4), a simulation (Model 2), and an experiment (Model
3). It should again be emphasized that there is no claim of empirical testing. The
illustrations only serve as an extra element in the model construction phase and
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in that sense are complementary to the axiomatic approach. The theories built
with the axiomatic approach lead to certain theorems about expected behavior
of firms or about expected outcomes of an interaction. After the phase of model
construction, these theorems become propositions and are studied in a more em-
pirical context, so that we can refer to applied theory. This empirical context is
given by case material, computer simulations, or an experimental setting. In this
way, it is shown how a model works and the model development can be enriched.
Especially more applied game theorists have made use of such illustrations to en-
rich their models (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and
Bruderer, 1995; Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2005).
Cases as illustration
Case study research aims at studying objects or processes in their natural envi-
ronment. In a case study, an object or process is studied with restrictions to time
and space. Here, a case is defined as a certain alliance situation in which the firms
involved interact with one another. More specifically, two cases are used: the al-
liance between Rover and Honda (Model 4), and the alliances between Heineken
and Krups and between Philips and Inbev (Model 1).
In this study, existing cases are used to illustrate the models. No data gather-
ing for the cases will take place and I will only make use of secondary data. Since
the cases used in the research do not serve as theoretical testing and since no data
have been collected, it seems best not to refer to the case study methodology as
explained by Yin (1994). Although case study research has been used extensively
in social sciences, game theory has mainly been used cases as illustrative material
(see e.g. Axelrod et al., 1995; and Brams et al., 2005).
Simulations
A second approach to study a model further is to perform simulations or computer
calculations (Axelrod, 1997; Bankes, 1994; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999). Gilbert
and Troitzsch characterize a simulation as a particular type of modeling in which
the researcher enters input and in which the output is observable as the result of
the calculations performed by the computer. Simulations are particularly valuable
as illustration when the model under study is too complex to study in a case or
experiment. Complexity can be ascribed to the number of variables, the number
of dimensions, or the number of players relevant in a model.
Simulations can be used for several objectives: sensitivity analysis (Axelrod,
1997), theory development, to reproduce dynamics (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999),
or to show potential results of a model. The latter objective is relevant in this
study. In this way, simulations can demonstrate that certain outcomes are possible
given a set of assumptions (Axelrod, 2000). The results found are calculated from
the model and are hence derived naturally from the model. However, the results
from a simulation might be counter-intuitive to what we realistically and naturally
46 Chapter 3
might expect. In that case, the combination of model and simulations are able to
reveal aspects of a phenomenon otherwise undetected.
In order to perform a simulation, an algorithm must be written which enables
to calculate the model under study. As input into such an algorithm, the re-
searcher can use existing data if available or use randomly generated data. With
these data, the computer calculates what the model predicts. After verifying
whether the simulation is actually doing what it is expected to do (Gilbert and
Troitzsch, 1999), the output can be used to state some propositions about ex-
pected behavior of actors given certain assumptions.
The use of simulations in the social sciences has increased recently due to more
powerful computers and due to the influence of the field of artificial intelligence
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 1999). Also in game theory, simulations have been adopted
more and more. Examples of such studied are Akiyama and Kaneko (2000),
Axelrod (1984; 1997), and Phelan, Arend, and Seale (2005).
Experiments
An experiment (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, and Futing Liao, 2004; Weibull, 2004) ap-
pears to be a suitable method for illustrating new models since “[it] is the most
suitable type of research for gaining experience with newly created situations or
processes, which can be used to assess the effects of these changes” (Verschuren
and Doorewaard, 1999, p. 156). What is characteristic of experiments is that
respondents or participants are split up at random into two groups: a control
group and an experimental group. By minimizing the outside influence, a re-
searcher can create a laboratory-like environment which enables the isolation of
a manipulation. The experimental group is subject to a manipulation which the
control group does not receive. Such a manipulation can be seen as providing
extra information or administering a new drug in medical research. With statis-
tics one tries to make sense of the collected data. The control and experimental
groups are compared in order to conclude whether the causal relation between the
independent variable (the manipulation) and the dependent variable holds true.
In this study, an experiment with a post-test-only control group design is used.
In the experiment, the level or amount of the independent variable is manipulated
and there is random selection of subjects into the two groups. In contrast to a
field experiment, the testing takes place at an artificial place. The design adopted
is a post-test-only control group design as no ex-ante (before) measurement takes
place.
In game theory, experiments have as a goal to learn about general principles
of strategic behavior (Crawford, 2002). Nowadays, experimental tests of game
theory become more and more common, see e.g. Camerer’s (2003) book with an
overview of experimental results in game theory and the special issue of Journal
of Economic Theory in 2002 (Crawford, 2002). In this field, experiment and
theory are complementary (Crawford, 2002) in the sense that “in an experiment
one tests whether the theoretical predictions are at least approximately correct in
Game theory 47
environments that approximate the assumptions” (Weibull, 2004, p. 86). This is
the role the experiment conducted in this study will play; it has served as a first
use of a model, an illustrative and premature trial.
3.2 Assumptions and branches of game theory
To further deepen our knowledge of game theory and its potential applicability,
let us move from the underlying methodology to the actual theory. Starting point
of any theory within game theory is a game. A game can be characterized as an
abstraction of a decision making situation and consists in general of at least three
elements:
• players
• strategies
• payoffs
The players in a game are the decision makers. A player is a primitive term
and can only receive meaning in an empirical setting. As mentioned in Chapter
1, players are interpreted here as firms. A players is a unitary actor which makes
decisions as if it is one decision making body. With regard to notation, a player
is represented either by the symbol i, or j.
A strategy is a complete plan of action which defines what a player might do
in any given situation during the game. A strategy is denoted by si. Note the
parallel between a strategy in game theoretical terms and the business meaning
of strategy. The strategic management literature contains a variety of definitions
of the concept strategy (see for example Barney, 2002), but most definitions have
in common that a firm’s strategy contains, on the one hand, long-term goals and
objectives, and, on the other hand, a plan of how to attain them. In game theory,
players also aim at a goal (utility maximization) and adopt a plan of how to
reach this in their strategy. All players make their own choices by selecting a
strategy, but the result for each player is partly dependent on the choice of the
other players. This is the interdependence of game theory.
A final element in a game is the payoff structure which gives each player a
payoff for each outcome in the game. A combination of strategies results in an
outcome. Each player attaches its own utility (ui) to the different outcomes a
game might have, called a payoff. Note that a payoff is a subjective appreciation
of an outcome.
Underlying these building blocks of game theory are several assumptions. Let
me mention two important ones: complete information and rationality. Complete
information entails that in any game it is clear who is playing, what their strategies
are, and what the payoffs are. The rules of the game are hence transparent. If
all the players know the game, the rules of the game, and the preferences of all
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players, then a game has complete information. All the games considered in this
study assume complete information.
A second assumption underlying game theory is the assumption of rationality
and stems from game theory having been embedded in the rational choice tradi-
tion; it is assumed players know their preferences and act such that they strive
for the highest ranked preference. Players will always choose the strategy which
yields the highest payoff. Expected utility theory (see Luce and Raiffa, 1957,
chap. 2 for a good description) is the principle theory on which this aspect of
game theory has been built.
Game theory is usually divided into three branches, which differ on the level
of abstraction1. From most detailed to most abstract the following branches are
distinguished:
• extensive form games
• strategic form games (Section 3.3)
• coalition form games (Chapter 4)
Games in extensive form are the most detailed form since they model decision
making in the most complete way. The players and their actions, in the correct
order of decision making, are presented in a game tree. Hence, the whole decision
making path is laid out in such a tree. Games in extensive form will not be
used in this study, because they say nothing about cooperation and its dynamics.
Furthermore, games in extensive form lack some of the explanatory power that
games in strategic and coalitional form have. For a detailed and critical discussion
of games in extensive form, consider Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis (2004, chap.
3).
Games in strategic form are less detailed and (hence) more useful to inter-
pret decision making processes. Some games in this branch can also be used to
study cooperative behavior of players, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the game
of chicken, and the battle-of-the-sexes game. These games and the general char-
acteristics of strategic games will be discussed in Section 3.3.
Games in coalitional form study coalitions among players. A coalition is a
group of players which cooperate. It is analyzed which groups will form and how
such a group distributes the payoffs of the coalition. Since cooperation among
firms is subject of this study, coalitional games seem useful and are the subject
of Chapter 4.
Within these three general branches, games can also be divided according to
other characteristics:
• number of players
• cooperative versus non-cooperative games
1A fourth level of abstraction is the branch of games in abstract form (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944).
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• static versus dynamic games
A first relevant difference in game theory is the number of players considered
in the game (denoted with n): 2-player versus n-player game theory. Formally,
in 2-player games n = 2 and in n-player games n > 2. While 2-player games only
have a set of players consisting of two, n-player games deal with three or more
players. Strategic games and games in extensive form can both be limited to two
players and be used for n-player analysis. Coalition games always contain more
than two players. The crucial difference is that in 2-player games no player can
outvote the other, while in the n-person version players can make coalitions and
can collude against the other(s) (Luce and Raiffa, 1957).
Two-player game theory might be more relevant to study the behavior of firms
within an alliance, since most alliances consist of only two members. In that case,
the game is defined as the interaction among members of an alliance. To analyze
the formation of an alliance, the game is the industry or market in which the
alliance will be formed. In that case, more than two players are relevant, hence
n-player game theory applies.
A second important distinction is cooperative versus non-cooperative game
theory. In cooperative games players can make binding agreements, while in non-
cooperative games there is no possibility of making binding agreements. Usually,
non-cooperative game theory coincides with games in extensive and strategic form,
whereas cooperative game theory corresponds to games in coalitional form. Au-
mann (Van Damme, 1998) reasons that a better name for cooperative game theory
would be coalitional or outcome-oriented game theory, and for non-cooperative
game theory he suggests strategically-oriented game theory. In line with this,
this dissertation uses the term coalition theory for n-player cooperative game
theory. Coalition theory studies the formation of cooperative agreements, and
thereby adopts a broader and more fundamental view (Van Damme, 1998) than
strategically-oriented or non-cooperative game theory. The latter focuses more
on how to reach an outcome through strategies (Montero, 2000).
In this dissertation, both forms of game theory will be used. As argued in
Section 2.4.3, partner dynamics within an alliance are modeled with strategic
games and the formation of alliances is modeled with coalition theory.
A final characteristic which distinguishes games is a static versus a dynamic
approach. While static games do not take time into account, dynamics games do
so. In a dynamic approach, a game is for example played more than once, or
the process of reaching a certain outcome is under study. For the understanding
of the dynamics of alliances, a dynamic approach seems a natural choice. In
the discussion of all the games in this and the preceding chapter, I will also pay
attention to the dynamic versions of those games.
In sum, after having presented the underlying methodology of game theory,
the basic elements and assumptions, I will now move to several concrete theories
and games.
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3.3 Strategic games
Strategic games or games in normal form are generally the best known part of
game theory. These games can be placed in the non-cooperative branch in which
both 2-player and n-player games are found. This branch is well-known for two
reasons. First, the symmetric two-by-two games which are often used are appeal-
ing and not too complex. The theory behind these games is the subject of the first
part of Section 3.3, including the dynamics of these games. Secondly, strategic
games appear to capture the core of some typical social interactions and therefore
appeal to our intuition (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2004). The prisoner’s
dilemma (Section 3.3.3), the game of chicken (Section 3.3.4), and the battle-of-
the-sexes (BoS) game (Section 3.3.5) represent such typical social interactions. A
majority of the concepts and games discussed in the remainder of this section will
be used for the models of Chapter 6.
3.3.1 The concept of Nash equilibrium
A way to represent a game in strategic form is to use a payoff matrix as seen in
2-player version in table 3.1. Some scholars believe that representing a decision
problem in such a matrix is the greatest contribution of game theory (Schelling
in Aydinonat, 2005). In this matrix, the interdependent character of the inter-
action is manifest. As explained in Section 3.2, a game consists of players, their
strategies, and a payoff structure. In table 3.1, two players are found, both with
two strategies. For player one, top and bottom are the strategies at its disposal
and player two can play left or right. In the middle cells of the matrix, one finds
the payoffs for the players. Here, a, b denotes the payoff for the two players for
outcome (top, left). The first payoff is by convention for player one, and the
second for player two. The presented matrix is a two-by-two game, because the
game contains two players both with two strategies at their disposal. A game
is symmetric when each player has the same strategies (s1 and s2), and under
the same circumstances the payoffs (utility attached to an outcome u1 or u2) are
similar for each player:
Definition 3.1 In a symmetric strategic 2x2 game it holds that:
u1(s1, s2) = u2(s2, s1) (Osborne, 2004).
To find the steady state of a game, the Nash equilibrium is generally used:
Definition 3.2 A Nash equilibrium is a profile of players’ strategies such that
no player individually has the incentive to deviate from its strategy, given that
the other players adhere to their strategy (based on Osborne, 2004).
Some games contain more than one Nash equilibrium (as we will see with the
game of chicken in Section 3.3.4) and it also happens that no Nash equilibrium in
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Table 3.1: A payoff matrix in strategic games
Player 2
strategy left strategy right
Player 1 strategy top a, b c, d
strategy bottom e, f g, h
pure strategies is found. If one considers no or multiple Nash equilibria an unsat-
isfying result2, one could adopt one of the refinements of the Nash equilibrium.
In the remainder of this chapter, several of these refinements are found: a mixed
strategy equilibrium, dynamic games, or the evolutionary approach.
Instead of choosing one strategy, a player can also vary its use of strategies,
creating a mixed strategy:
Definition 3.3 Amixed strategy of a player in a strategic game is a probability
distribution over the player’s strategies (Osborne, 2004, p. 107).
When a player plays a strategy with probability 1 this is called a pure strategy,
as we have seen so far. In a mixed strategy, players play strategy one with
probability p and strategy two with probability 1 − p, in case of two strategies.
Osborne (2004) gives two possible interpretations of a mixed strategy. A first
view is considering a player as a member of a whole population in which p% of the
population would opt for strategy one and the remaining (1− p)% plays strategy
two. This interpretation is in line with evolutionary game theory (Section 3.3.2).
An alternative interpretation is that a player plays in p% of the cases strategy
one and in (1− p)% the other strategy, so the game is played several times.
As in the pure strategies, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy form can
also be defined:
Definition 3.4 A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of players’
mixed strategies such that no player has a different mixed strategy that generates a
higher expected utility than the equilibrium strategies, given the mixed strategies
of the others (based on Osborne, 2004, p. 108).
Again, in this kind of equilibrium no single player has the incentive to deviate
unilaterally from this situation, because this would not imply an improvement. An
illustration of how a mixed strategy equilibrium is calculated is found in Section
3.3.5.
One can also combine different strategic games into a hybrid game. Hybrid
games are games in which the payoff structures for the players differ; for player
2Section 6.1.1 explains why and when multiple Nash equilibria are a disadvantage.
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one, a payoff structure from a different game applies than for player two. We will
meet a hybrid game in Model 4.
3.3.2 Repetition of strategic games
In real-life situations, social actors rarely meet just once. Also in the world of
business, firms interact frequently either within an alliance or in an industry. That
is why studying a sequence of interactions will give a more realistic view than
merely one-shot games. In the game theory literature, several ways of repeating
a strategic game can be found:
• repetition of the same game by the same players (iterated games)
• repetition of the same game with a pool of players (evolutionary approach)
• repetition of different games with the same players
In this section, I will briefly review these three approaches.
In iterated games (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Osborne, 2004), the same
game with the same players is played an infinite or indefinite number3 of times.
The whole game is now denoted as a super-game and consists of an infinite num-
ber of sub-games. In keeping with this, the players must determine a super-
strategy which covers all the subsequent sub-games. Besides unconditional super-
strategies, players can use conditional super-strategies; in this way, players punish
and reward their opponents by responding to the other players’ moves in earlier
rounds. To model the future, a discount factor is introduced; a real number be-
tween zero and one that denotes the worth of future payoffs at this moment. If
the discount factor is very small, future payoffs will currently be worth very little.
If the discount factor is large, the players will appreciate future payoffs to a high
degree. The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987) is the most
elaborated repeated strategic game and will be discussed in Section 3.3.3. Au-
mann (1981) made a survey of repeated game theory which also includes iterated
games with incomplete information.
The next approach found in the literature of repeated games is the evolutionary
approach (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2004, chap. 6; Samuelson, 2002) in
which games are played by two players which have been drawn from a homogenous
population of players. From this population, players are repeatedly and randomly
matched in pairs to play a symmetric game. Each of these players is programmed
with a certain strategy. By ‘trembles’ mutations in players’ strategies can take
place. Whether such a mutated strategy is viable depends on its success (the
payoff received) in playing with the rest of the population. If it works well, more
players will take over this strategy; it appeared to be a good way to survive. If
3Iterated games can also contain a finite number of sub-games, but this is less relevant to
the case of alliances. In alliances and during alliance formation, firms do not know when will be
the last round of interaction.
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too many players start adopting it, this might work out disadvantageously. After
a while, a balanced distribution of strategies distributed amongst the population
will arise and this is called an evolutionary equilibrium. A strategy is evolutionary
stable if it is a strictly best response to itself. In other words, no alternative
strategy would do better against this stable strategy than the stable strategy
itself.
An illustrative example is given in the joint venture game of table 3.2 (Samuel-
son, 2002). The game represents a situation in which two players can each choose
whether or not to join a joint venture (go in or stay out). This game has two pure
Nash equilibria: (in,in) and (out,out). The only evolutionary stable strategy is
nevertheless (in,in). The (out, out) strategy can be invaded by (in,in); in-players
which loose nothing against out, but win against other in-players. The in-players
tend do better on average (Samuelson, 2002).
Table 3.2: The joint venture game
Player 2
in out
Player 1 in 1, 1 0, 0
out 0, 0 0, 0
Akiyama and Kaneko (2000) refer to the previous two dynamic approaches
of strategic games as static game representations. Although several social phe-
nomena can indeed be modeled with the same game being played over and over
again, other situations might call for a more dynamic approach to the game rep-
resentation. A third approach to repeating strategic games is therefore presented:
repeating different kinds of games.
Marks (2002) worked out the idea that players can use information from a first
interaction to play a second, different, game in the associative approach. Marks
argues that one solution of the second game will be more prominent than others.
Players resolve problems (in the second game) by incorporating information that
is ‘readily’ available. Players will look for analogies with other situations, such
as the previous game. In other words, the former game creates a focal point in
the second game. Players can make associations in payoff, structure, or strategy.
Marks has not only developed the associative approach in a formal way, but
he also tested the theory by conducting experiments. The conclusion was that
participants indeed made an association between the two games, and Marks found
support for the associative approach.
A more ambitious approach to counter the critique on the static game repre-
sentations is the model of Akiyama and Kaneko (2000). They consider a game
to be a dynamic system in which the state of the game-environment, the state of
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the players, and the players’ possible actions vary in time. The authors describe
a social dilemma game: the lumberjack game, in which lumberjacks cut trees and
face the dilemma between waiting for a tree to fully grow (more reward per tree)
versus chopping it before others do. Through computer simulations, the dynamic
system in which this game takes place is being studied and in which interactions
take place between populations of different lumberjacks (evolutionary approach)
and different hills with different resources (trees).
In conclusion, it seems very natural to extend strategic games towards a dy-
namic approach. Especially in the world of business, firms often interact on a
regular basis. Firms are by intention players with a long life. And for alliances
it holds that partners will interact for more than just once since alliances are in-
tentionally long-term. It therefore seems useful to extend the theory of strategic
games to a dynamic version. The analysis becomes more realistic. Furthermore,
since modeling the dynamics of alliances is the central aim of this thesis, it only
seems natural to use dynamic game theory for this purpose. Since most alliance
games do not consist of a pool of firms playing the game, the evolutionary ap-
proach seems less useful. I will make use of repetition of different games (asso-
ciative approach (Marks, 2002)) in Model 3, and Model 4 will work with iterated
games.
3.3.3 The prisoner’s dilemma
A social dilemma models situations in which individual and collective interests
conflict (Colman, 2003). A social dilemma can take different forms, depending on
the specific payoff structure of the game. The most famous and most widely used
social dilemma is the prisoner’s dilemma, as presented in a two-player version in
table 3.3. Here, numbers are used as payoff to denote a ranking of the players
over the outcomes (ordinal level of measurement). The numbers do not refer to
any monetary reward (interval or ratio level). One can only say that player one,
for instance, prefers outcome (cooperate, cooperate) over (compete, compete). As
long as one adheres to the ranking by the players, one can change the payoffs into
different numbers. This specific sequence of valuation of the outcomes makes the
game a prisoner’s dilemma.
Table 3.3: The prisoner’s dilemma
Player 2
cooperate compete
Player 1 cooperate 3, 3 1, 4
compete 4, 1 2, 2
Game theory 55
The Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s dilemma is (compete, compete), al-
though both players would prefer (cooperate, cooperate). If player one deviates
from the Nash equilibrium to cooperate, it will go from payoff two to one, given
that player two stays with strategy compete. The same holds true for player two;
if one plays compete, it can only give a best reply by playing compete as well.
The payoff of the Nash equilibrium (2, 2) is lower than the payoff for (cooperate,
cooperate) (3, 3), but the latter will not be the result of the game. There, each
individual player has the incentive to play compete: 4 > 3. Since each player has
this incentive, the outcome of the game will be (compete, compete), a collective
undesired result which is nevertheless in each player’s individual interest.
The prisoner’s dilemma has been applied to a diversity of problems: collective
action problems (Taylor, 1987), the situation in the trenches of the First World
War (Axelrod, 1984), cooperation in biological systems such as the copulating
behavior of the sea-perch (Axelrod, 1984), price cheating in cartel agreements in
oligopolies, and the ‘innovation-to-organization dilemma’ (Kok and Van Deemen,
2005).
Besides these wide applications, the prisoner’s dilemma is also theoretically
well-elaborated. It has not only been studied in a basic way (2-player and static),
but the game has been extended to an n-player version (Hardin, 1971; Schelling,
1973; Taylor, 1987) and the dilemma has been made dynamic. Both sophisti-
cations have matured the dilemma extensively and have given new insights into
analyzing cooperation. In order to model behavior of firms in an alliance, this
study will use the 2-player dynamic version (Model 4). A 2-player version of the
game models dyadic alliances, which are met most often in reality. Moreover, it is
believed that the general rationale is caught with the 2-player version while keep-
ing the analysis simple. A dynamic version of the prisoner’s dilemma is required
to model the undefined end of the alliance.
According to the Folk theorem, in an infinitely or indefinitely repeated game,
like the prisoner’s dilemma, many strategies can enforce a Nash equilibrium; “any
of the potential payoff pairs ... can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium with a
suitable choice of strategies by the players” (Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis,
2004, p. 171-172). This implies that every infinitely repeated game has multiple
Nash equilibria. This makes it very difficult to forecast what will be the result of
such a dynamic game.
Nevertheless, the work of Taylor (1987) and Axelrod (1984) on the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma is valuable as it can offer a solution to this game, which, in
theory, also has so many different possible results (that is, Nash equilibria). It
has both mathematically been proven (Taylor, 1987) and experimentally been
studied (Axelrod, 1984) that, in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the
tit-for-tat super-strategy generates a mutual cooperation equilibrium under the
condition that the discount factor is high enough. The tit-for-tat rule simply
states that one should start with playing cooperation and only play cooperation
in the subsequent rounds if the other has played cooperation in the round before.
Tit-for-tat contains the idea of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; if you
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are nice to me I will be nice too, but as soon as you cheat on me, I will cheat
too. This result is important as it offers a way out of the dilemma. Under certain
conditions, mutual cooperation can be achieved.
3.3.4 The game of chicken
Similar to the famous prisoner’s dilemma story of the two captured prisoners (see
e.g. Colman, 1995; Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2004), the game of chicken
(Colman, 1995; Taylor, 1987) also gets its name from an anecdotal story in which
two cars drive at full speed towards each other. If both keep driving straight
ahead both drivers will crash; the worst case scenario that can happen. If one
of them ‘chickens out’ and deviates, the other one wins and receives the highest
payoff. The chicken gets the sucker payoff for being the chicken. In a more general
fashion, a game of chicken applies to a situation in which each player prefers
to play compete (drive) under the condition that enough others will cooperate
(yield). According to Heckathorn (1996), the game of chicken refers to situations
in which actors have a preference for collective action, but the precise direction
of that action is under debate. The game of chicken will be used in Model 4.
In table 3.4, a formal two-player game of chicken is given. It is seen that result
(1, 1) is the worst payoff for both players. Note the difference from the prisoner’s
dilemma; in a prisoner’s dilemma, the worst that can happen is that a player
picks cooperate, while its opponent plays competition. If in the game of chicken,
one player chooses compete, the opponent will prefer to play cooperate, otherwise
it will end up with the lowest payoff. This game has two pure Nash equilibria
(compete, cooperate) and (cooperate, compete). Which of the two equilibria will
be the result of the game is not forecasted.
Table 3.4: The game of chicken
Player 2
cooperate compete
Player 1 cooperate 3, 3 2, 4
compete 4, 2 1, 1
Several authors (Heckathorn, 1996; Taylor, 1987; Ward, 1987) refer to a repu-
tation for the toughness of a player as a way to resolve the game: “tough players
are often able to force the other player to bear the costs of providing some pub-
lic good all by himself and are therefore themselves able to enjoy the benefits of
free-riding upon his actions” (Ward, 1987, p. 23). It is the reputation or pre-
commitment of this tough player, or its lower level of critical risk, which enables
this player to play the more selfish choice, compete. Hence, the reasoning is to
Game theory 57
‘resolve’ the chicken game by pointing out - outside the boundaries of the game -
which of the players is the strongest (Heckathorn, 1996). The strong player can
convince the other that it will play compete which will force the other to cooper-
ate. It is recognized that this conclusion on the role of a reputation for toughness
cannot be derived from the axioms of utility theory (Ward, 1987). The chicken
game and this idea of reputation for toughness have so far mainly been used in
the field of international relations to model international crises.
Although the n-player game of chicken and the repeated game of chicken have
been defined and studied (see e.g. Taylor, 1987; Ward, 1987), those studies are
not as far evolved and developed (yet) as the (analytically proven) results of the
prisoner’s dilemma (Ward, 1987), this particularly holds true for the iterated
chicken game (Taylor, 1987). I will come back to the repeated chicken game when
it is used for application to behavior of firms in an alliance (Model 4). As with
the prisoner’s dilemma, the game of chicken will only be used in 2-player form.
3.3.5 The battle-of-the-sexes game
The third strategic game discussed here is the battle-of-the-sexes (BoS) game.
This game will be used in Model 3. Specific for a BoS game is the need for
coordination of the behavior of players. The game has three equilibria: two pure
Nash equilibria and one mixed strategy equilibrium (Rasmusen, 2005; Schelling,
1960). In a BoS game, the players have opposite rankings of the two pure Nash
equilibria. Both players want to coordinate (a collective interest), but there is
disagreement on which strategy they should adopt (individual interest) (Camerer,
2003). The typical solution offered by game theory to the multiple existence of
pure Nash equilibria is the use of mixed strategies. A different solution is offered
by Marks (2000), as seen in Section 3.3.2.
Table 3.5: Battle-of-the-sexes-game
Player 2
B S
Player 1 B 3, 2 0, 0
S 0, 0 2, 3
In a BoS game (see table 3.5), two players each prefer a different outcome of the
game, but choosing opposite alternatives is worse than ending up in the preferred
situation of the other (Marks, 2002, appendix A). Luce and Raiffa (1957) provide
the story of a man and woman who have to coordinate their activity during a
date. In a more business setting, one could think in terms of two firms which
are planning to cooperate in an alliance but have to settle the exact form of the
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cooperation. Firm one prefers organization form B (for example an equity joint
venture), while firm two would like organization form S (for example an arms’
length contract) (Just de la Pasie`res, 2005). If both choose the same organization
form, they end up in organization form S (S, S) or B (B,B) with positive payoffs.
A situation in which one would choose S and the other B, is evaluated as being
worse. Not coordinating means no agreement on cooperation, so the two firms
rather agree on any of the two forms than coordinate on different cooperation
forms. The pure Nash equilibria of the BoS game are (S, S) and (B,B). As in
the game of chicken, it is not defined in the game which of the two equilibria will
be the result. To be able to arrive at one solution in the game, one can use mixed
strategies. The mixed strategies Nash equilibrium of the BoS game will be used
in the remainder of this study and is therefore calculated here.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium for the above BoS game, player one will
randomize between strategies S and B with probability p and 1 − p, and player
two will with probability q play S (and hence with (1− q) play B). For the game
in table 3.5, this is calculated as follows:
q · 3 + (1− q) · 0 = q · 0 + (1− q) · 2
which solves as:
3q = 2− 2q
q =
2
5
and with
p · 2 + (1− p) · 0 = p · 0 + (1− p) · 3
which leads to:
2p = 3− 3p
p =
3
5
Hence, player one should play B three-fifth (p) of the time and hence S with two-
fifth (1− p) of the time. The opposite holds for player two; B with 25 and S with
3
5 . The mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the numerical BoS game as presented
above is ( 35 ,
2
5 ).
3.4 Application of game theory to alliances
Now that object of study (alliances and its dynamics) and (part of) the theoretical
lens (game theory) have been dealt with, I will discuss how a combination of the
two can be expected to work out. To what extent is game theory applicable to
the dynamics of alliances? It was concluded earlier that certain dynamic strategic
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2-player games are useful for explaining behavior of firms in dyadic alliances. This
is confirmed by the earlier research that has adopted a strategic games perspective
on alliances (as seen in Chapter 2). In spite of this set of articles, the contribution
of game theory to alliances is still limited in quantity and diversity. How can it
be explained that if game theory is indeed a good partner for alliance research
that the collection of alliance research using game theory is not as extensive and
diverse as might be expected? And secondly, if one wants to extend this literature,
which problems can one expect to meet?
To support the first question, most of the alliance studies using game the-
ory have used non-cooperative game theory, and mainly games in strategic form.
Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) ascribe this choice to the fact that most re-
searchers that have developed a more economic approach to strategy (as game
theory) have drawn on ideas from industrial organization economics which tends
to adopt a non-cooperative approach. Another explanation might be the igno-
rance of outsiders (Camerer, 1991); the two-by-two matrices as used by strategic
games are not only better known, but also less abstract and mathematically com-
plex than other branches of game theory, as cooperative game theory.
Only a limited number of alliance studies (Bloch, 2002; Song and Panayides,
2002) has so far used the coalition theory branch. Game theory has mainly
been used to model individual decisions of firms when there is no possibility of
communication and making agreements. This is well suited to study behavior of
firms in alliances, but not to explain the formation of an alliance which is better
modeled with coalition theory. Maybe, a lack of focus on the process of alliance
formation is a reason for the small number of alliance studies adopting coalition
theory. As argued in Section 2.4.3, if one wants to study alliance formation,
coalition theory seems a more natural choice. That is why Chapter 4 discusses
this branch of game theory more in depth.
With regard to the second question, adopting a game theoretical perspective
might lead to certain problems. To begin with, the theories have not been explic-
itly designed for business applications. This makes it difficult and even impossible
to simply change the terminology (for example change player into firm) and claim
that the theories say something about firms and alliance formation. A model
construction phase must take place which interprets and translates the theories
into models that refer to firms and alliances. New theorems should be constructed
which do not contradict the axiomatic base of a theory and which refer to alliance
issues.
The world of business seems so much more complex and dynamic than the
theories in game theory. Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996) point to the lack of
institutions and rules in doing business. As compared to the study of coalitions
in political science, the alliance world appears to be less restricted. There are
no formal rules (in contrast to a law in cabinet formations), it is more unclear
which firms are relevant for a game (compare with the parties in parliament as
the set of players), and how weight can be measured (the number of seats in
parliament). The challenge is to capture this ill-structured world of business into
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a comprehensive model without losing essential elements.
A consideration to leave game theory aside is the claim that it is too abstract
and that its underlying assumptions are too unrealistic. As explained at the
beginning of this chapter, in (game theoretical) models, an abstract world is
created to isolate a certain phenomenon. Underlying game theoretical models are
assumptions such as complete information, rational behavior of players, and the
unitary character of players. One might claim that these assumptions are violated
in real-life situations. With regard to complete knowledge, firms might not know
exactly in which game they are playing and moreover, they might lack information
on the preferences of their opponents. The assumption of rationality has met
with criticism, too. First, are players able to make a consistent ranking of their
preferences? And secondly, if actors are capable of defining their preferences, do
they indeed act in an optimal way? The question also is whether players as firms
are indeed unitary actors, or whether they themselves are a collection of decision
making actors who cannot speak with one voice. Several authors have discussed
problems with these assumptions (see e.g. Colman, 2003; Hargreaves Heap and
Varoufakis, 2004). Also, experimental evidence shows how people might make
different choices than theory would predict (e.g. Goeree and Holt, 2001; Plous,
1993).
In this study, I will deal with those problems in three ways. First, if one
chooses to approach alliances in a game theoretical way, one should acquiesce
in the underlying assumptions which could be violated in real-life situations and
which might not capture the complexity of a business situation. The assumptions
are inherent to modeling and, according to Aumann (1997), these assumptions
should not be attacked, but instead the theorems and conclusions resulting from
the modeling. Of course, the assumptions are part of the axiomatic base of the
theory and form the construction for the whole theory. Although completely
rejecting this axiomatic base is indeed not useful, repairing and replacing several
assumptions can make a theory better applicable and more relevant. This is also
done in this dissertation; in order to apply game theory to the field of alliances,
several assumptions need to be adjusted. To save the construction of the theory,
not all assumptions will be changed.
Secondly, game theory has been capable of developing more realistic solu-
tions for several of these assumptions in the last decades (Camerer, 1991; Goeree
and Holt, 2001). Incomplete information has been modeled in Bayesian games
(Harsanyi, 1967/1968; see also Osborne, 2004, chap. 9). Myerson (1998) devel-
oped a general theory of cooperation under uncertainty and Aumann and Maschler
(1995) also worked on incomplete information. A reply to the rationality assump-
tion has been the idea of bounded rationality (Simon, 1978). Although no formal
version of Simon’s idea has been developed, Aumann (1997) reviews some of the
approaches game theory has used to deal with rationality: evolutionary dynam-
ics (see Section 3.3.2), perturbations of rationality by allowing players to have
trembles, and the use of computer simulations (also see Rubinstein, 1982). The
models in this study will not make use of these sophistications of game theory in
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order to focus on applicability and dynamics. Taking more sophistications into
account would make the models less manageable and violate the intuition. That
does not mean that future research could not develop the models further to be
able to handle, for example, incomplete information.
Thirdly, I will provide cases of alliance situations in which the assumptions of
a model hold. The models in this study will all be enriched with illustrations and
examples of business situations in which the models apply.
In conclusion, to parry problems with the abstract approach of game theory,
I will adopt the following approach in this study. First, I will acquiesce in several
assumptions. Secondly, I will adjust other assumptions which contradict the world
of alliances. The models of Chapters 5 and 6 are explicitly designed to explain
alliances and behavior in alliances. Some barriers which lie between game theory
and alliances are resolved. Note that it is not the objective to cross all barriers as
this would be quite an ambitious research agenda and would make the models less
manageable. Thirdly, I will also explain in which kind of cases the assumptions
hold by providing examples and intuition.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the methodological choices of this study, the assump-
tions and branches of game theory, and the branch of strategic games. Moreover,
it was assessed to what extent these elements of game theory can be used to apply
the theory to the field of alliances.
In this study, models will be developed with the axiomatic-deductive approach.
The focus is on theory and model development, no empirical testing takes place.
However, since the aim of these models is to explain the dynamics of alliances,
applicability of the models is important. One way of emphasizing the relevance
of the models for the alliance field are small cases, experiments, and simulations
which are used to illustrate the models.
Furthermore, it was argued that both the theory of strategic games and coali-
tion theory are useful for developing alliance models. From the branch of strategic
games, dynamic versions of the prisoner’s dilemma, the game of chicken, and the
battle-of-the-sexes game will be used to model the partner dynamics within al-
liances (Chapter 6). Particularly in dynamics version, these games possess the
eloquence to model some of the basic social interactions between, amongst others,
firms in alliances. The branch of coalition games is discussed in the next chapter.
A problem with applying game theory might be the degree and nature of the
assumptions underlying the theory. In addition to accepting those assumptions
as part of the theory, this study will work on further development of the theory so
that the theory applies to alliance situations, and this study will present examples
and illustrations to which the theory applies. Particularly elements of coalition
theory might lead to incompatibility with the dynamics of alliances. We will meet
these problems in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Coalition theory
The prime objectives of this chapter are to present an overview of coalition theory
and to assess the applicability of the theory to the dynamics of alliances. The
chapter is divided into five sections. The first section discusses n-player cooper-
ative game theory. Section 4.2 gives an overview of coalition formation theories.
Subsequently, Section 4.3 deals with coalition partition theories, and Section 4.4
presents dynamic coalition theories. The purpose of reviewing and evaluating
these theories is to select relevant approaches. As in Chapter 3, the aim of the
chapter is not to be exhaustive, but rather to present a representative selective
review which will provide the foundation of the model chapters. Finally, a con-
clusion is presented (Section 4.5).
4.1 N -player cooperative game theory
It was argued in Chapter 2 that games in coalitional form and n-player game
theory are well suited to the study of alliance formation. In contrast to non-
cooperative games in which “... players are assumed to receive only the pay-
ments prescribed by the rules of the game and are not allowed to pay and receive
‘bribes’...” (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p. 180), cooperative game theory is able to
model the wheeling and dealing which often takes place when coalitions or al-
liances are negotiated. A natural way to proceed in this branch is to start with
cooperative game theory. This section introduces n-player cooperative game the-
ory and is based on Luce and Raiffa (1957), Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003), Rapoport
(1970), and Shubik (1985). The theory of cooperative games forms the foundation
of later work on coalitions, such as coalition formation theories (Section 4.2), and
partition function games and hedonic games (Section 4.3).
Cooperative game theory can be divided into games with transferable and non-
transferable utility. This distinction relates to whether players are assumed to be
allowed to transfer utility to one another. Transferable utility (TU) games model
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the formation of coalitions in which the players negotiate on the distribution of
the value of the coalition. This reflects the reality of social processes in a better
way. I will not discuss non-transferable utility (NTU) games, in which no utility
can be transferred between the players. In transferable utility games, players
can negotiate with side-payments (Kahan and Rapoport, 1984): exchanges made
among players in order to equalize any inequities which may arise from their
cooperation (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p. 180). These transfers via side-payments
results in a change in players’ utility (see Luce and Raiffa, 1957). Since the aim
is to apply game theory, in this thesis, side-payments represent money, policy
promises, or some other commodity that changes a player’s utility.
Let me start with the descriptive part of the theory, on which the predictive
part will be based. Formally, a cooperative game is written as (N, v). First, N is
the finite set of all players {1, 2, 3, . . . , i, . . . , n} with i as representative element.
These players can form coalitions. A coalition is defined as:
Definition 4.1 A coalition S or T is a subset of the set of players N .
In each game, 2N different coalitions can be formed. Note that the empty coalition
∅ and the grand coalition N are also considered as coalitions. Secondly, v stands
for the characteristic function. A characteristic function awards each subset of N
with a real number: v, the worth of a coalition. Several restrictions hold for the
characteristic function:
v(∅) = 0 (4.1)
which means that the value of the empty coalition is zero, and
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) (4.2)
and for at least one S, T : v(S ∪ T ) > v(S) + v(T )
for S ∩ T = ∅.
Assumption 4.2 is called super-additivity and supposes that joining forces in a
(larger) coalition yields to more value than staying separate. The game is also
essential, since there is at least one coalition which has advantage in joining forces
and hence there is ground for cooperation.
Furthermore, in the game, each player receives a payoff xi with payoff vector
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) for the whole group of players. Luce and Raiffa (1957, p. 192)
state that “we may look upon the task of n-person (characteristic function) theory
to characterize which of these n-tuples may arise in an equilibrium state ...”.
First, the payoff vectors are compared with the values from the characteristic
function, and then individually rational and feasible payoff vectors are defined. If
players are individually rational they will not accept side-payments that lead to
payoffs less than their own value vi. By definition, a payoff vector is individually
rational if xi ≥ v(i) for i ∈ N . A payoff vector is feasible if no more payoff
is spent than is available in the game. Formally, a payoff vector is feasible if∑
i∈N xi = v(N) for each i ∈ N . Payoff vectors which are both individually
rational and feasible are called imputations.
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To narrow down the number of predictions, the second step is to find different
solution concepts of which I will discuss the two most important ones: the core
and stable set. In general, the aim is to find a coalition in which no group of
players (core) or individual player (stable set) has the incentive to leave with the
prospect of a higher payoff.
Definition 4.2 An imputation x is an element of the core C if and only if:
x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ N and x(S) > v(S) for at least one S ∈ N .
In the coalitions associated with payoff vectors in the core, no group of players
has the incentive to deviate to another coalition. A disadvantage of the core is
that the set of core solutions might be empty, for example in case of constant
sum games. The demand of no group deviations is quite strict. A less stringent
solution is the stable set or Von Neumann and Morgenstern solution. To define
the stable set, the idea of domination is needed:
Definition 4.3 A imputation x is said to dominate imputation y if there is a
coalition S such that:
(1) xi > yi for all i ∈ S and
(2)
∑
i∈S xi ≤ v(S).
A payoff vector or imputation is said to dominate another payoff vector through
a coalition if all the members of the coalition do better in this dominant payoff
vector, and gain at least the value of their coalition.
Definition 4.4 A stable set S consists of imputations such that (1) no imputa-
tion in S dominates another imputation in S (internal stability), and (2) if z is an
imputation not in S, then there is at least one imputation in S which dominates
z (external stability).
I will come back to the core and the stable set when discussing hedonic games
and partition function games in Section 4.3. Further elaboration on the core and
other solutions such as the kernel are found in Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003).
To recapitulate, the theory of the characteristic function awards each player
with a value. Based on this descriptive part of cooperative n-player theory, one
finds several solution concepts such as the core and stable set. These solutions
predict payoff vectors. The general character of the theory makes it useful for
application in business science and other social sciences, as already seen in, for
example, Hendrikse (1998), Nalebuff and Brandenburger (1996), and Rapoport
(1970).
The elements which make the theory less applicable for the alliance field are
its focus on the prediction of payoff vectors and its limited number of behavioral
assumptions. Therefore, the theory of the characteristic function will not be used
in the remainder of this study. If the aim is to study the process of alliance
formation, the focus should be on coalitions and not on payoff vectors. Further-
more, to be able to explain better and more completely, more assumptions on
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the behavior of players in a coalition game would enrich the theory. What are
the considerations of firms in an alliance formation process? Which factors do
they take into account? Both disadvantages are addressed in the set of coalition
formation theories.
4.2 Coalition formation theories
Coalition formation theories aim primarily at predicting which coalition will form
(De Vries, 1999) on the basis of assumptions about the size, ideology, or the
institutional setting of a coalition. Coalition formation theories find their roots
in the theory of the characteristic function, and proceed this theory in time.
Since Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) first developed the idea of min-
imal winning coalitions, several generations of coalition formation theories have
been formed (see De Vries, 1999; Martin and Stevenson, 2001 for overviews).
In this section, I will discuss those theories in chronological order: from power-
oriented theories (Section 4.2.1) to policy-oriented theories (Section 4.2.2) which
evolved from one-dimensional to multi-dimensional approaches (Section 4.2.3). I
will also briefly mention institutional coalition theories (Section 4.2.4). The selec-
tion of theories in this section is based on the overview works of De Vries (1999)
and Martin and Stevenson (2001). Although coalition formation theories are in
principal general theories which are not designed for one specific field of applica-
tion, it is political science which has made the most use of these theories (see e.g.
Laver, 1998).
The aim of this review is to familiarize the reader with coalition formation
theories and to assess how useful those theories are for the dynamics of alliances.
This assessment is found in Section 4.2.5.
4.2.1 Power-oriented theories
Power-oriented or policy-blind theories, the first generation, assume that players
only form coalitions in order to gain power, to be part of the coalition. These
power-oriented theories are based on the theory of simple games: “... games
in which power and control rather than some form of numerical payoff are at
stake” (Van Deemen, 1989, p. 313). In a simple game, denoted by G = (N,W ),
the characteristic function only assigns numbers zero (for losing coalitions, the
set L) and one (for winning coalitions, the set W ). Simple games are mainly
used in political science, a field in which winning and losing are crucial. Within
simple games, a special kind of games is found - weighted majority games - which
include a weight for each player and a threshold or quota to win. Formally,
G = (q;w1, w2, . . . , wn), in which q is the quota needed to win and wi is the
weight of a player. The quota is determined outside the game and is assumed as
given. When a player is a firm, its weight can be interpreted as a representation
of the size of the firm in terms of (a combination of) its returns, profit, or number
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of employees. In a political setting, weight usually refers to the number of seats
in parliament held by a party. The weight of a coalition wS is the total weight
of its members: wS =
∑
i∈S wi. By definition, a coalition is winning if it reaches
the quota: if wS ≥ q, S ∈W .
Because power is the sole motivation of the players, they wish to share this
power with as few others as possible. This rationale is found in both the minimal
winning theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and the minimum size
theory (Riker, 1962; and see also Van Deemen, 1989). A minimal winning coalition
has just enough members to win, but has no superfluous members which make the
coalition oversized. The minimum size theory also requires that these minimal
winning coalitions have the smallest possible weight to remain winning.
The formal definition of a minimal winning coalition given a simple game is:
Definition 4.5 Let G = (N,W ).
S is a minimal winning coalition iff1 S ∈ W and ∀ T it holds that if T ⊂ S
then T ∈ L.
This definition shows that any subset of a minimal winning coalition is losing.
The minimal winning theory predicts that minimal winning coalitionsMwinn will
form.
The theory of minimum size uses weighted majority games, as defined above.
The minimum size theory forecasts that coalitions of minimum size W size will
form:
Definition 4.6 Let G = [q;w1, w2, . . . , wn].
S is a minimum size coalition iff S ∈W and w(S) < w(T ) ∀T ∈W .
Any other winning coalition has more weight than the minimum size coalition(s).
To take an example, imagine a group of four firms {1, 2, 3, 4} which each want
to produce product or service x with resource R. R and q may, for example,
be flour and bread, or expertise to produce a service. In line with a weighted
majority game, I will interpret resources R as weight in the game and q as the
quota needed of R to be able to produce. The game looks as follows (11; 5, 2, 8, 6),
which indicates that to be able to produce the product - in other words, to win -
one needs at least eleven amounts of R. Since no firm on its own has enough of
R to win, alliances will be formed. The four firms can form the following (2N=)
sixteen alliances: {∅, {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4},
{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. The set of winning coalitions W
is {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {3, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} and their
weights are in order (13, 11, 14, 15, 13, 16, 19, 21). The two-player coalitions are
minimal winning coalitions, because the larger ones could lose a member without
becoming losing coalitions. For example, coalition {1, 2, 3} can do without player
two - the coalition would still win. From this set Mmin = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {3, 4}},
1Iff means if and only if.
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alliance {1, 4} is part of the minimum size setW size, because {1, 4} has the lowest
weight; eleven.
Further illustrations and application of the minimal winning and minimum size
theory are found in De Vries (1999). Model 1 will use the rationale of the minimal
winning theory when predicting alliance formation. Other power-oriented theories
are found in Leierson (1968) (bargaining proposition), Peleg (1980) (dominant
player theory), and Van Deemen (1991) (power excess theory).
4.2.2 Policy-oriented theories
The second generation of coalition formation theories, policy-oriented theories,
assumes that players strive not only for power, but also to achieve a certain
goal. Policy-oriented theories need more information as input: besides the size
of players, these theories require information about what the players stand for -
this is called the position of a player. In the following section and in the following
chapter, I will discuss more thoroughly the interpretation of a player’s position
in the alliance field. Policy-oriented theories have developed over the years. The
earliest theories such as the conflict of interest theory (Axelrod, 1970) and minimal
range theory (see De Swaan, 1973) assume players have one-dimensional policy
positions. Later, researchers constructed multi-dimensional theories based on
spatial modeling. The earliest one-dimensional theories are the subject of this
section, and the spatial multi-dimensional models will be discussed in the following
section.
One-dimensional coalition formation theories place each player’s policy posi-
tion on a line to construct a vector of policy positions for the whole set of players:
(x1, x2, . . . , xn). The general idea of one-dimensional theories is to minimize the
diversity of policy positions among the players in a coalition; the smaller the con-
flict of interest or variety in a coalition, the larger the chance of cooperation will
be.
Axelrod’s conflict of interest theory (1970) forecasts coalitions that are closed
on the dimension at stake. A closed coalition has no players in between the posi-
tions of the coalition members. Axelrod does not consider the exact position of
the players, but is only interested in whether the coalition is open or closed. A
formal description of this theory is found in Van Deemen (1997). An important
element in policy games GΘ is the symbol Θ, which denotes the order of players;
xiΘxj means that xi is to the left of xj on the line. The formal elaboration con-
tinues with a policy game GΘ in which:
(1) A player k is located between i and j if xiΘxk and xkΘxj or xjΘxk and
xkΘxi, so the order of the players from left to right is either i, k, j or j, k, i.
(2) Two players i and j are neighbors if there is no other player k between i and
j.
(3) A coalition S is closed if for all i ∈ S, there is a j ∈ S such that i and j are
neighbors. In other words, there are no members of S which are not neighbors.
(4) A coalition which is not closed is said to be open (Van Deemen, 1997).
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Based on this, Axelrod (1970) predicts the set of minimal connected coalitions
WMC in which each member is needed to keep the coalition winning and closed.
There are no non-members between the members of the minimal connected coali-
tion on the line. In definition:
Definition 4.7 Let GΘ be a policy game.
S is a minimal connected coalition if for each i ∈ S, S − i is either losing or
open.
The minimal range theory of Leierson (1966; De Swaan, 1973; De Vries, 1999)
forecasts the coalition with the smallest range between the members with the
most extreme positions, even if this coalition has some other player in between
its members. Note the difference with Axelrod’s conflict of interest theory. The
range of a coalition is a vital concept in this theory, De Swaan (1973) defines range
as the distance between the two members of a coalition with the most extreme
positions. Note that distance here is measured in terms of the number of members
in the coalition. The extreme member on the left LS in coalition S with position
xSL has no left neighbor in S; and the extreme member on the right side RS in
coalition S with position xSR has no right neighbor in S. More formally:
for all i ∈ S, i 6= RS it holds that xiΘxSR,
and there is no j ∈ S, j 6= LS such that xjΘxSL
Now, the range DS of a coalition is defined as:
DS = DIS(xSL, x
S
R)
Minimal range theory assumes that each coalition has two extreme members. The
range of a coalition indicates the distance DIS between these extreme members;
the number of players in between the two extreme members, including the two
extreme members themselves. The theory forecasts only those coalitions will form
which are winning and which have a minimal range: WMR. From all winning
coalitions, the coalition with the smallest D is chosen. Formally:
Definition 4.8 Let GΘ be a policy game.
S is a minimal range coalition if S, T ∈W,S 6= T,DT < DS for any T .
To give an illustrative example of these two theories, let us continue with the
example presented in Section 4.2.1. The game there was (11; 5, 2, 8, 6), and now
a one-dimensional positioning of the players is added: x1Θx2Θx3Θx4. Player
one is the left-most player and player four is the right-most player. To return
to the example of making bread and needing flour-alliances, one could think in
terms of these positions as how much value a bakery attaches to the ecological
aspect of baking bread. A left-oriented bakery could represent one which is keen
to limit the ecological impact of baking. Alternatively, the position could refer to
the location of a bakery (how far to the east or west it is situated, for example);
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bakeries prefer to cooperate with other bakeries in close proximity. To determine
the minimal connected coalition WMC , we should look at the set of winning
coalitions and select those winning coalitions that are minimally connected, that
is to say that the loss of one member would make them open or losing. For
example, coalition {1, 3} is an open coalition because player two is in between
firm one and three. Coalition {1, 2, 3} is closed and winning, but the loss of
one member would not make it losing; losing player two would leave us with the
winning coalition {1, 3}. Hence, this coalition is not minimal range as defined in
definition 4.8. This leaves us with one coalition which is closed, and minimally
connected: {3, 4}. To find minimal range coalitions WMR, the winning coalition
with the smallest range is needed. There are three winning coalitions which have
a range of two players: {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {3, 4}}, which is the minimal range below
which the coalition would turn losing. Note that this prediction coincides with
the minimal winning coalitions.
In De Swaan (1973), De Vries (1999), and Van Deemen (1997) one finds further
elaboration, application, and testing of these and other one-dimensional policy
coalition theories.
4.2.3 Spatial modeling in coalition theories
A further step for coalition formation theory is to base coalition predictions on
multi-dimensional spatial models. Here, the main idea is that players will cooper-
ate with ‘their closest neighbor’ in space (De Vries, 1999). How exactly a player’s
closest neighbor is determined and how a stable solution concept can be found
depends on the specific theory. In her overview work, De Vries discusses and
tests five models: the political heart solution (Schofield, 1995), proto-coalition
formation theory (Grofman, 1982)2, winset theory (Laver and Shepsle, 1996), the
competitive solution (McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer, 1978), and the maxi-
mal satisfaction solution (De Vries, 1999). More recent is the multi-dimensional
conflict theory of Boekhoorn, Van Deemen, and Hosli (2006). These theories
continue the line of reasoning of the one-dimensional theories: minimize policy
difference between players. The main difference between one-dimensional and
multi-dimensional theories is the method used to measure the distance between
players’ positions. The former uses an ordinal level of measurement, while the
metric level of measurement used in multi-dimensional theories makes it possible
to calculate a distance between players. And of course, the two approaches also
differ on the number of dimensions used; one versus more than one.
Underlying multi-dimensional coalition theories is the theory of spatial mod-
eling (Black, 1958; Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Hotelling, 1929).
Central to spatial models is the assumption that players have a position in a
multi-dimensional Euclidean space3 Rm with m dimensions. This leads to a vec-
2As this theory also has a dynamic approach I will discuss it later in Section 4.4.1.
3The Euclidean standard is the best known and mostly used standard, but for alternative
approaches see De Vries (1999).
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tor of positions for each player i: xi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xim): the score of the player
on each dimension. A Euclidean space offers a framework for visualizing and an-
alyzing according to a standard norm: the Euclidean norm. One can calculate
Euclidean distance between each two positions:
d(xi, xj) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
(xik − xjk)2. (4.3)
The distance between position xi and xj is calculated by comparing each score
on each dimension, from k to m.
The interpretation of a position in a multi-dimensional space depends on the
empirical meaning of the application. In political science, one usually refers to
policy positions, that is, whether a political party is oriented towards the left or
right of the political spectrum. Boone, Carroll, and Witteloostuijn (2002) and
Pe´li and Nooteboom (1999) use spatial modeling in a more economic or business-
oriented way. Their models explain the co-existence of specialists and generalists
in markets. In the economic models of Hotelling (1929) customers choose a shop
depending on price and the geographical position of the shop. In Chapter 5, I will
develop different possible interpretations for the position of firms in an alliances
setting. Both Model 1 and Model 2 adopt the theory of spatial modeling.
4.2.4 Institutional coalition games
Martin and Stevenson (2001) consider the emphasis on institutions in coalition
research in the early 1980’s to be the next wave of coalition research. Institu-
tional coalition formation theories also forecast coalitions, but instead of power
or policy, they assume other explanatory variables. The focus is on institutions
which determine the rules and conditions under which coalitions will form. It is
argued that these have an impact on the final composition of a coalition. The
explanation for coalition formation is not so much found in the characteristics
of the game - such as number of players, weight, and positions of players - but
in external factors which influence the game. De Vries (1999, p. 80) concludes
that even theories that combine institutional elements and behavioral assump-
tions have not led to a comprehensive theory of coalition formation. Martin and
Stevenson (2001) present a list of hypotheses resulting from those theories. In the
political setting, it is, for example, expected that coalitions will be more likely to
form if a player is a member of the incumbent coalition, or if the player is the
formateur.
These institutional coalition theories are less formal and are not embedded in
the rational choice and game theory tradition. They adopt a different approach.
I agree with De Vries (1999) that most of these theories lack behavioral assump-
tions from within the game and therefore do not belong in the game tradition
as outlined above. The general idea is that institutions and rules external to a
game affect the formation of a coalition. The majority of institutional coalition
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theories has been formulated in political science. Although alliance formation
also takes place in an institutional setting, these institutions are less formal and
rule-based, though still important. Here, economic circumstances and the legal
system - particularly compliance with competition law - are all relevant issues or
institutions. In contrast to political coalition formation, alliance formation seems
less influenced by the institutional setting and is more dependent on the specific
partners and their fit. There is no standard procedure for forming an alliance.
The institutional approach to alliance formation will be ignored for the time being
because of its low relevance and its lack of formalization and developed theories.
However, for future research, an institutional view on alliance formation may be
worth exploring.
4.2.5 Research gaps
To conclude, while the earliest, power-oriented, theories were more general in na-
ture and also more simple, the field was later filled with more comprehensive and
more complex theories. These latter theories have led to a better empirical per-
formance in tests with data from national and local political coalition formations
(Ba¨ck, 2003; De Swaan, 1973; De Vries, 1999; Martin and Stevenson, 2001). In
spite of the truth in Luebbert’s 1983 critique that “none of [the coalition theo-
ries] predicts with statistical significance; that is, none offers greater accuracy in
predicting than could be expected strictly on a chance basis” (Luebbert, 1983, p.
239), the development of these theories has enhanced empirical performance since
then. With political data, it appeared that policy theories perform better than
power theories, multi-dimensional theories forecast better than one-dimensional
theories, and adding institutional factors to size and ideology assumptions also
improves performance (De Vries, 1999; Martin and Stevenson, 2001). A disadvan-
tage is that most theories have a set prediction, so that no unambiguous coalition
prediction is reached (De Vries, 1999; Grofman, Straffin, and Noviello, 1996).
One further consequence of the above outline of the development of coalition
formation theories is that the theories have become more specifically for appli-
cations in the field of political science. While cooperative game theory is quite
general in its nature, the development of coalition formation theories based on
this theory has given rise to theories with more behavioral assumptions on, for
example, size and position. This made them more suitable for application in social
science. However, this development has mainly taken place in the field of political
science. This has led to a valuable set of theories which is growing ever more
capable of explaining political coalition formation, but makes coalition formation
theories less useful for applications in other fields, particularly where our field of
application is considered: the field of alliances. Therefore, the following research
gap holds:
Research gap 4.1 Coalition formation theories have incompatibilities with the
field of alliances.
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The following three aspects of coalition theory might be incompatible with the
field of alliances:
• static approach
• assumption of similarity
• prediction of winning coalitions (theory of simple games)
First, the static approach of the coalition theories is a drawback. The theories
all forecast which coalition will be formed, but almost none of them studies the
process of forming a coalition. Although the static nature of the main body of
current coalition theory has its value, the theories are not capable of explaining
how coalitions are formed, evolve, and are terminated. This is not only a problem
in the field of coalition theory, but also leads to application problems. Static
theory is less applicable to dynamic phenomena, such as alliances. As explained
earlier, alliances among firms are dynamic processes. Their formation takes weeks,
months, or sometimes years. Moreover, the process is a crucial factor in form-
ing, managing, and terminating an alliance. It has been acknowledged that the
dynamics of alliances is an understudied area (Section 2.3.3). Moreover, several
authors in the field of coalition theory have plead for a more dynamic approach as
the new way forward for coalition formation research (Arnold and Schwalbe, 2002;
Laver and Schofield, 1990; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Tohme´ and Sandholm, 1999;
Van Deemen, 1997; Wu, 1977). This static approach also holds for characteristic
function theory. Therefore, another important research gap is:
Research gap 4.2 Coalition formation theories lack a dynamic approach to coali-
tion formation.
Some dynamic coalition theories are already to be found in the literature and will
be discussed in Section 4.4.
Furthermore, for political applications, coalition theory based on spatial mod-
eling has predicted that players cooperate with partners that are similar. The
more similar a partner is, in other words the closer in space, the higher the utility
for that player (De Vries, 1999). However, as seen in Chapter 2, alliances of-
ten form due to complementarity (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 2001).
Partners look for complementary partners, particularly where they are motivated
by acquiring new resources. This complicates the foreword relationship between
distance and preference in the current models. To make spatial coalition theory
more relevant for application in alliance formation, the preferences should be de-
fined such that complementarity between alliance partners is preferred, which is
done in Model 1.
Finally, the use of simple games (Van Deemen, 1989) is an element of the the-
oretical development which makes the theories less suitable for business alliances.
Some coalition theories are based on this theory of simple games, and although
it suits the political world of winning and losing, it is less useful for the world
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of business. In business science, one often sees that more than one alliance is
formed. Most coalition formation theories predict one winning coalition rather
than a combination of different coalitions. In the following section, I will discuss
two theories that predict several possible coalitions: partition function games and
hedonic games.
4.3 Partitions
A partition is the distribution of all the players in a game across non-overlapping
coalitions. A theory which forecasts coalitions predicts, from the set of players
involved in the game, one coalition: a subset of players that will cooperate. No
prediction is made concerning with whom the remaining players - which will not
take part in this coalition - will cooperate. The prediction of just one coalition
makes it difficult to apply the theory to alliances, where several alliances are
often formed. To be able to model the formation of several alliances, I will use
a theory which adopts partitions. In partition theory, from the set of players,
a distribution of all the players across coalitions (a partition) is predicted. In
this way, a prediction about the cooperative behavior of all the players is made.
In game theoretical terms, such partitions are often labeled coalition structures.
However, I will avoid this term because it creates ambiguity in the alliance domain
since alliance structure refers to the type of governance in an alliance. Here, I
will go on to discuss two well-elaborated theories that use partitions: partition
function games (Section 4.3.1) and hedonic games (Section 4.3.2). After this
discussion, a brief conclusion will assess the potential contribution of the two
partition theories to the alliance field (Section 4.3.3). Note that other theories
also predict partitions such as the Kernel and bargaining theory (Rapoport, 1970).
4.3.1 Partition function games
The theory of partition function games formulated by Lucas and Maceli (1978) is
an alternative to the ‘standard’ characteristic function as discussed in Section 4.1.
The interest in partition function games has recently increased, see for example
Cornet (1998), Funaki and Yamato (1999), and Yi (1997).
Formally, a partition function game contains N players. In partition function
games, it is assumed that each coalition Pi is an element of a partition P , which is
an arbitrary distribution of the players across different non-overlapping coalitions.
Formally:
P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pk}
where P1 ∪ P2 ∪ . . . ∪ Pk = N
and Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , k and i 6= j
Let
∏
be the set of all partitions of N .
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Lucas and Maceli introduce two functions attached to partitions and the set
of all partitions
∏
: the payoff function4 and the partition function. A payoff
function Fp : N → R assigns a real number to each player i, denoting its payoff
in partition P . This produces a payoff xp(i) for each player in P . The second
function, the partition function
F :
∏
→ {Fp : P ∈
∏
}
assigns to each P in
∏
a payoff function. So, the payoff function of a partition
gives each player in that partition a payoff and the partition function gives each
partition a payoff function, which results in a payoff for each player in each parti-
tion. How exactly these two functions look is exogenous to the game. A partition
function game G is defined as G = (N,F ), where N is the set of players and F is
a partition function.
An (N,F ) game defines the value of a player v(i) as follows:
v(i) = minP∈Π {i}∈P xP (i)
The value of each player i is found by comparing the payoffs in all the different
partitions with coalition {i} and, subsequently, by selecting the lowest payoff for
player i. This is called the security level of i: it is the worst case scenario for i,
when i is in a solo coalition.
The payoffs of the players are gathered in payoff vectors. As in the theory of
characteristic functions, the set of payoff vectors will be made smaller by requiring
certain rationality assumptions. Here, a payoff vector is individually rational if:
xp(i) ≥ v(i) for all i inN (4.4)
This means that for each player there must be at least as much payoff in this
partition as its value v(i). An individually rational payoff vector is called an
imputation, and the set of individually rational payoff vectors is denoted by A.
To further limit the number of options in the solution set, I will apply the
stable set and the core, as already seen in Section 4.1. Both are set predictions.
To find the stable set and core in partition function games, domination is defined
as follows:
Definition 4.9 A vector xp dominates vector yr iff:
(1) there exists a coalition S such that:
xp(i) >S yr(i) for all i ∈ S, S ∈ P
(2) for the players not in S, hence in S′, the following applies:
xp(i) ≤S′ yr(i) for all i ∈ S′.
4Lucas and Maceli use the term outcome function. I prefer to use the term payoff function,
since the intended function is a function from the set of players to the set of real numbers. This
denotes a payoff, an outcome is a result of a game.
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That is, we refer to domination if each player i in S obtains a higher payoff in
partition P than in partition R. Furthermore, the players not in the coalition are
at least as good in the dominated partition R as in the dominant partition P or
they are better off in R5. If x dominates y, xDomy is written.
With this definition of domination, internal and external stability and, sub-
sequently, the stable set can be defined. As already seen, a stable set is a set of
payoff vectors x which is both internally and externally stable.
Definition 4.10 In a stable set V ∈ A:
(1) y Dom x for no x, y ∈ V
(2) for every y ∈ A− V there is an x ∈ V such that xDom y.
The first demand refers to internal stability, while the second one implies external
stability. In the stable set, there is no partition which dominates any other in the
set and for every alternative outside the set, an alternative in the set is better
and dominates the outside partition.
For the core solution, I use a different definition to the one in Section 4.1, but
in line with Lucas and Maceli:
Definition 4.11 The core C is:
C = A−DomA.
where Dom A is the set of all dominated payoff vectors in A. Any partition which
is in the core solution dominates solutions not in the core.
4.3.2 Hedonic games
Hedonic games have also become increasingly popular in recent years and have
been studied by, amongst others, Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez (2001), Barbera
and Gerber (2003), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), and Burani and Zwicker
(2003). Most work on hedonic games has so far mainly been focused on the
conditions necessary for stable coalition outcomes. The literature contains no
applications in economic or social sciences yet. In short, a hedonic approach to
coalition formation assumes that the utility of a player is solely dependent on
whom a player is in a coalition with (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002). Each
player has preferences over potential partners; some (combinations of) partners
are more preferred than others. A player prefers the coalition which gives the
most utility, and thus it will have to try to form a coalition with its most preferred
partners.
A hedonic gameG is defined by the pair (N, (i)i∈N ). Each player i is assumed
to have a complete and transitive preference i on {S ∈ 2N : i ∈ S}. In other
words, each player has a preference over all the coalitions of which it is a member.
First in the preference ranking of a player is the coalition a player prefers to
5See Lucas and Maceli (1978, p. 198-9) for alternative and less stringent definitions of
domination. The definition used here implies all other definitions Lucas and Maceli provide.
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be in the most, then follows the second choice, etc. In a complete preference,
a player can rank all coalitions, it holds that for all S, T ∈ 2N, S 6= T for all
i ∈ N either S i T or T i S. The condition of transitivity is fulfilled if for
all S, T,Q ∈ 2N, S 6= T 6=Q, for all i ∈ N if S i T and T i Q implies S i Q.
Player i can have strict preferences i: S i T ⇔ S i T and not T i S. An
indifference relation is denoted with ∼i and defined as S ∼i T ⇔ S i T and
T i S. The theory does not specify how the preferences of a player are formed;
this is assumed to be an exogenous variable.
Hedonic games assume that players will form coalitions on the basis of these
preferences. As in partition function games, hedonic games have coalitions and
non-overlapping partitions P . The theory resolves the puzzle of finding the op-
timal partition given the preferences of the individual players, and in that sense
differs from partition function theory which is oriented towards finding optimal
payoff vectors for partitions. In such an optimal partition no player needs to
change to another coalition, since this will not improve its position. Several solu-
tion concepts for hedonic games are available (see Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez,
2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002; Burani and Zwicker, 2003), I will discuss
the core and the stable set here. Before that, I would like to emphasize that
both solution concepts are set predictions, and do not necessarily predict unique
solutions.
In the partitions in the core, no set of players (coalition) has the incentive to
deviate from the situation:
Definition 4.12 A partition P is in the core if it holds that:
there is no T ∈ N,T 6= ∅ such that T i SP (i)
for all i ∈ T . Hereby, SP (i) is the coalition S in partition P of which i is a
member.
No coalition T can block the partition P in the sense that the players in T can
benefit from deviating to T . There is no risk with a core partition that a group
of players might start a coalition outside the stable partition, because there is no
other coalition which rewards all of these players with a greater payoff.
In the (Nash) stable partition, no individual player has the incentive to change
to a solo-coalition; again this would not increase its utility.
Definition 4.13 A partition P is Nash stable if
for all i ∈ S it holds that SP (i) i Sk ∪ {i} for all Sk ∈ P ∪ {∅}.
Player i is rather in coalition S of partition P (SP (i)) than in any coalition Sk∪{i}.
Any partition which is in the stable set cannot be threatened by a player leaving
as all players are in the stable set partitions.
Note the difference between the core and Nash solution; the former takes devi-
ations of a group of players into account while the latter only considers individual
deviations. It must also be noted that Nash stable solutions are also core stable
solutions, but not all core stable solutions are Nash stable solutions. Furthermore,
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the notion of stable partitions may yield the prediction of a partition consisting
only of singleton players, hence a partition in which there is no coalition with two
or more firms.
4.3.3 Conclusion
To conclude, both partition function games and hedonic games overcome the
criticism that coalition formation theories only predict one coalition instead of a
distribution of players across coalitions (partition) and this makes them better
suited for alliance applications. Partitions match better with alliance formation,
since in the field of alliances, several alliances are often formed in a market or
industry. Examples of such situations are given in Chapter 5. In that sense,
partition function games and hedonic games are valuable for this study. However,
there is a difference between the two theories. Partition function games build on
the theory of characteristic functions and therefore predict payoff vectors. Hedonic
games merely take possible coalitions and the preferences of players over these
coalitions into account and predict partitions. As the aim is to model alliance
formation, a prediction is needed that forecasts which firms will cooperate and
not how much this will reward them. That makes the theory of hedonic games
more suitable for the purpose of this study. I will use this theory in Model 1.
4.4 Dynamic coalition theories
One of the conclusions of Section 4.2.5 was that most coalition formation theories
lack a dynamic element. It remains theoretically unclear how a coalition forms.
A review of the literature on coalition games revealed some theories with dynamic
elements which will be presented in this section.
Two classes of dynamic coalition theories can be specified. The first group of
theories studies (the dynamics of) the composition of the coalition. During the
formation process, changes take place in the coalition(s) until one final coalition
has formed. These theories will be discussed in Section 4.4.1. The second group
of theories seems to focus only on the negotiations within one such temporary
coalition, that is, the side-payments that are transferred. Section 4.4.2 elaborates
further on this set of theories.
This division between focussing on coalition composition and negotiations con-
cerning payoff coincides with the difference between coalition formation games and
the theory of cooperative game theory with the characteristic function. While the
former predicts coalitions, the latter predicts payoff vectors. It seems natural
that dynamic developments have evolved in parallel, but quite independently, in
both streams. As already argued, when studying the formation of alliances, it is
better to use coalition formation theories (as these theories have more behavioral
assumptions and predict coalitions instead of payoff vectors) than characteristic
function games. Similarly, the theories mentioned in Section 4.4.1 are more rel-
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evant than those of Section 4.4.2. However, for the sake of completeness, I will
discuss both streams of dynamic theories.
In Section 4.4.3, I will discuss dynamic coalition theories which fall into neither
group. Section 4.4.4 ends this section with several research gaps.
4.4.1 Dynamics on the composition of the coalition
Riker (1962) and Riker and Ordeshook (1973) present a theory in which they
distinguish between several temporarily or proto-coalitions which form before the
winning coalition is formed in the final stage of the game. The game has phases
which are differentiated by the proto-coalitions which form during the game. In
other words, each new distribution of the players across proto-coalitions denotes
a new phase. In phase one, the game consists of n one-player proto-coalitions. In
the final phase, r, one winning coalition has formed or two blocking coalitions.
By assuming that a minimal winning or minimum size coalition will form, one
can deduce how such a coalition can be reached. Riker shows how this works in
case of a three player game with a minimum size coalition. Suppose that three
proto-coalitions have formed in phase r − 1: P , Q, and R. None of these is a
winning coalition, but a merger of two of them would result in a winning coalition
and hence the end of the game. {QR} is the only minimum size coalition and
{PQ} is the largest in size, and this makes the values of the three as follows:
{QR} > {PR} > {PQ}. This implies that R is the most favored proto-coalition,
above Q and P . In this way, the players can see their position and determine a
strategy to become more favored. The more players, the more complicated this
process becomes.
The theory of Laver and Underhill (1982) builds on this idea of different phases
with proto-coalitions. They propose that a new proto-coalition will form if the
power of the new proto-coalition is greater relative to its weight than in other
proto-coalitions. In other words, an increase in power is the reason players change
from one proto-coalition to another. This is similar to the idea of Riker, who
assumes that changes take place if players become more favorable.
Grofman (1982) and Grofman et al. (1996) develop both a dynamic and
spatial coalition model. The general idea is that closest players cooperate until a
winning coalition has been formed. Each player has a weight and a position in
multi-dimensional space6. A quota q is needed to win. Given the configuration of
players in space, player i is allowed - decided outside the model - to make a first
proposal and i wants to cooperate with j, as j is closest to i. Closeness is defined
as a combination of distance and relative weight. Note that this implies that
closeness is not symmetrical, since weight wi plays a role. The formal measure
Grofman adopts for closeness is called subjective distance (SD) in De Vries (1999):
6I adopt here terminology in line with the theories presented earlier. Grofman however refers
to political parties with a location.
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SD(i, j) = d(i, j) ∗ wj
wi + wj
(4.5)
in which the subjective distance from i to j is calculated and in which d denotes
Euclidean distance as seen in Section 4.2.3.
Now j must decide if it wants to form a proto-coalition with i: is i the closest
player for j? If this is the case, {ij} forms. Unless {ij} is winning, the game
continues with {ij} as a new player with a new position, which is adjusted for
the weight they have in the proto-coalition. However, if for player j, i is not
the closest, j will reject the offer. Player i will subsequently ask its next-closest
neighbor until another player agrees to cooperate and a winning coalition can
form. If a proposer appears unable to form a winning coalition, the initiative
moves to a new proposer. Grofman proves that this process eventually leads to
the formation of a winning coalition. Grofman considers this model to be an
extension of Axelrod’s ideas (1970, see Section 4.2.2) and extends the idea of
connectedness to multi-dimensional spaces. It appears that the more dimensions
are included in the model, the smaller the chance that the predicted coalition will
be a connected one.
Besides these theories which forecast one (winning) coalition, the landscape
theory of Axelrod and Bennett (1993) forecasts partitions7. Their theory assumes
each player to have an (exogenously given) symmetrical propensity to cooperate
with another player. In other words, i likes j just as much as j likes i. Note
the difference with Grofmans’s asymmetrical distance measure. Based on this
propensity, each partition frustrates a player to a certain extent. If a player is in
a coalition with players it is prone to cooperate with, it will have little frustration,
and vice versa. The measure of frustration also takes into account the weight of
the player; conflict with a small player is less relevant. In this way, the frustration
for a whole partition (its energy) can be calculated. A partition with low energy
means that players cooperate which have a propensity to cooperate with each
other. A landscape is a graph that shows how much energy the different partitions
in the game have. The system will evolve from one partition to another until an
optimal, low energy level is reached. Where the systems ends depends on where
the process has started. Note the similarities with hedonic games (Section 4.3.2)
in which preferences or propensity to cooperate also form the basis of the theory8.
In Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and Bruderer (1995) this theory is applied
to standard setting alliances.
Brams, Jones, and Kilgour (2002) aim specifically at modeling the process
of coalition formation. They take an algorithmic - rather than an axiomatic -
approach; the model specifies rules for the players sequentially forming coalitions,
rather than predicting a stable solution. The central assumption is that players
have preferences about the other players which denote the desirability of coalition
7In line with the rest of this dissertation, I will adopt the term partition although Axelrod
and Bennett use configuration of players.
8In contrast to other theories in which players have a preference over payoff vectors.
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partners. Two different procedures are considered: the fallback and build-up
procedure. In the fallback procedure, players go lower and lower in their preference
ranking until a coalition can be formed which is a majority coalition with mutually
desirable players. The build-up coalition process differs in the kind of preferences
assumed; players are assumed to have cardinal preferences. Numbers denote
players’ perceptions of how much a potential partner is preferred. It is assumed
that all players have similar perceptions of these numbers. Roughly speaking, in
the build-up procedure, the two closest players form a coalition and, subsequently,
continue as a sub-coalition. This process continues until a majority coalition can
be formed. The authors compare the connectedness of coalitions resulting from
the two procedures and conclude that disconnected coalitions can form under the
fallback procedure, but not under the build-up procedure. The authors point
to the difference of predicting a coalition (as in the landscape theory) versus
predicting a process (Brams et al., 2002).
4.4.2 Dynamics on payoff negotiations
The second group of dynamic coalition theories can best be characterized as ne-
gotiation or bargaining theories. These theories concern the process of coalition
bargaining on the subject of payoff in the coalition. Hence, the focus is on the
changes in payoff distribution within one partition. Each theory has its own ap-
proach to model this process, some by means of proposals which can be accepted
or rejected and others by making side-payments to other players. Since those
theories do not forecast which players will cooperate, but focus on the distribu-
tion of payoff across coalitions, they are less relevant to studying the formation of
alliances. Nevertheless, the early dynamic approach of these theories mean that
they are worth a brief examination.
Examples of dynamic bargaining models are Bloch (1996), Rubinstein (1982),
Seidman and Winter (1998), and see Sutton (1986) for an overview. Rubinstein’s
model serves as a seminal model for many subsequent approaches to (dynamic)
negotiations. It deals with the dynamics of bargaining over the share of a pie
among two players. The players take turns in making a proposal for the division,
in which the share of the pie is a player’s payoff. The opposing player responds to
a proposal by saying yes or no. Payoffs are discounted, so the longer the process
takes, the less payoff the players will gain for the pie. Although Chatterjee, Dutta,
and Sengupta (1993) extended this model to an n-player version, those bargaining
models do not really explain the dynamics of coalition negotiations; the focus is
more on the efficient distribution of payoff across a set of players. In Chatterjee
et al. (1993), an inefficient equilibrium delays its formation and does not lead to
the grand coalition. Bloch (1996) takes the distribution of payoff as fixed, and
models the reaction of external players to the coalition. This makes his approach
less useful. Seidman and Winter (1998) can also be placed in the tradition of
Rubinstein in that their approach includes the idea of proposals in negotiations.
The model deals with more than two players and also contains a discount factor.
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The main aim of the article is to deduce when the procedure evolves in one step
and when the coalition forms gradually.
The article of Brams and Kaplan (2004) adopts a normative approach. Their
aim is to identify a fair distribution of cabinet posts in a coalition, and they are
less concerned with explaining the negotiations process. Although there is nothing
wrong with a more normative approach, it is not useful for offering a theoretical
explanation of a coalition formation process. Brams and Kaplan provide a model
for how good coalition formation should work rather than explaining coalition
formation.
A basic explanatory approach is the transfer scheme theory (Stearns, 1968).
In this theory, negotiations are regarded as ‘a sequence of proposals’ and this
process evolves through side-payments from one player to another. The central
assumption here is that a coalition S intends to cooperate and the players have
to agree on a distribution of payoff: how much will each of them gain to make
sure that all players in S agree to cooperate in S? The process of negotiating
elapses by changes in the payoff vector of a coalition. A change takes place
if one player (i) decides to give another player (j) a side-payment of size α.
With such side-payments, the payoff vector of the first phase, x1, changes into
x2 = (x1(i)− α1, x1(j) + α1, x1(k)), where k 6= i, j. Placing restrictions on these
side-payments means that the players can eventually reach an agreement which
satisfies them all. Different authors have discussed such restrictions (see Kahan
and Rapoport, 1984; Stearns, 1968; Wu, 1977).
Let me finally mention a model which introduces psychological elements into a
formal model: Komorita and Chertkoff (1973). Their model studies the dynamics
of coalition negotiations. Here, the interesting aspect is the expectations players
have about their payoff. Each player has a minimum, an average, and a maximum
expectation. It is assumed that the size of the player influences its expectations.
Furthermore, the pressure on the negotiations determines if the negotiators make
an opening offer close to their minimum or maximum expectations. In this way,
situational variables are assumed to play a role. Other players are then seduced
into joining the alliance with offers of payoff. Of course, the better the offer the
more likely that this player will indeed be seduced.
4.4.3 Other dynamic coalition theories
Although Arnold and Schwalbe write that “reaching a certain allocation ... in
a TU game requires the completion of two a priori unrelated processes on the
part of the players: coalition formation and bargaining about how to split the
surplus within each of the coalitions” (Arnold and Schwalbe, 2002, p. 363), most
of the current dynamic coalition theories include just one of the two processes.
One group of theories studies which players will form coalitions while another
group models how the ‘stakes’ in a coalition are distributed. In this section, I
will however review some more recent work on dynamic coalition formation which
does include both processes: Perry and Reny (1994), Diermeier, Eraslan, and
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Merlo (2003), and Arnold and Schwalbe (2002).
Perry and Reny’s model (1994) seems to be an exception to the categories
found in the literature. Their model includes both changes over time concern-
ing the composition of the coalition, and negotiations over the distribution of
the coalition. Their model is best characterized as a continuous time, bargaining
model in which players propose, accept, and ‘consume’ coalitions and their dis-
tribution. At any time t, a player i can propose a coalition9 S with a suggested
allocation (xj)j∈S of that coalition’s value among its members. If another pro-
posal is put forward, then the preceding proposal expires; only one proposal at a
time can be on the table. If all members accept a proposal (x, S), that proposal
becomes binding. The members of the binding proposal can nevertheless stay
in the game and bargain for a better proposal, or leave the game and consume
the coalition and its value. If one member of a coalition decides to consume, all
other coalition members must also leave. The remaining players can continue to
propose and accept proposals. That implies that during the game a number of
binding proposals can be on the table - coalitions with players which have not left
the game yet.
To model the continuous time, an  is introduced: at (t− , t) and (t, t+ ) a
player must remain silent, that is to say, it cannot propose, accept a proposal, or
leave and consume.  refers to ‘just before’ or ’just after’:  > 0, but small. In
this way “... it is possible to give each player the ability to reject any candidate
equilibrium without simultaneously empowering each player to dictate the out-
come by employing a strategy that undermined any proposal incompatible with
it” (Perry and Reny, 1994, p. 811). In other words, a true and natural dynamic
process is found in which bargaining takes place; events during the process such
as proposing, accepting, and leaving cannot take place at exactly the same time.
Perry and Reny (1994) demonstrate how their solution concept (stationary sub-
game perfect equilibrium) coincides with the core solution such that a natural
way of implementing the core is reached.
Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) propose a more econometric-oriented
bargaining model in which institutional factors of government formation are used,
amongst others. They introduce a set of players with weights and preferences and
a formateur party which suggests a proto-coalition. Given conditions such as the
state of the world, the time horizon to the following election, and (institutional
factors affecting) the expected duration of a government, a formateur proposes
a proto-coalition which can be accepted or rejected by the coalition members.
Unless all parties accept, and a government is formed, a new formateur can make
a different proposition. Each player will make a trade-off between its costs (the
degree of impatience and the time it takes to form the coalition) and the benefits
(the expected duration of a coalition). Confronting their model with empirical
data from nine democracies shows that the model performs quite well. The model
also enables them to conclude which institutional setting causes a long government
9Player i does not have to be a member of S.
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duration.
The model of Arnold and Schwalbe (2002) demonstrates a dynamic approach
to reaching the core in TU games without the assumption of super-additivity.
The model discerns coalitions embedded in partitions, and players with a strategy
consisting of a choice for a coalition and a demand for payoff. At time t, each
player requires a payoff and a coalition. If all these demands are feasible, all
parties’ demands will be met. The state of the game is given by a partition and an
allocation of payoff. Subsequently, a random probability determines which player
can revise its demand. A player will only revise its demand if this increases its
payoff. A revised demand implies that a player can change its payoff demand or
move to a different coalition in the existing partition; in other words, a player can
only join a coalition that has already been formed (or go solo). This process ends
if no player wants to revise its strategy any more. Given the Markov chain, a
probability expectation can be made for the moves which denotes the best-reply
process of the game. The core of the game is defined as the state which is feasible
and which cannot be blocked by any other coalition (see also Section 4.1).
Although this approach of Arnold and Schwalbe (2002) so far shows a true
process, there is no guarantee that it will lead to the core solution and that the
process will therefore be a stable, optimal process. Since partitions remain the
same during the process, it may happen that a coalition which is sub-optimal and
which can be blocked by a coalition in the core solution is nevertheless continued.
Player are assumed to switch only if their payoff increases as a result of the switch.
An extension to the model is developed to allow ‘experimenting’. In that event,
players can switch to a coalition which does not immediately increase its payoff
on condition that a better coalition (which blocks the current one) exists in the
game. With this extension to the model, the authors prove that if the core is
non-empty, the best-reply process with experimenting will converge to a stable
set with a probability of one if time tends towards infinity. This result is valuable
since it demonstrates a possible process to reach the core solution in a game. This
model also allows for the process to go through changes in coalition composition
and payoff at the same time. Although the fixed partitions are a disadvantage,
their experimenting solution seems to work. Another improvement could be to
allow groups of players to switch together.
4.4.4 Research gaps
This section has outlined two classes of dynamic coalition theories: a group of
theories that mainly studies the changes in the composition of coalitions during
the formation process and a group that focuses on negotiations within a coalition.
Because of the prediction of payoff vector, the latter was considered less useful
for the alliance field. Besides these two groups, several theories were mentioned
which incorporate dynamics in both bargaining and coalition composition. In this
section, I will discuss the value of the dynamic theories presented.
The main remark on the usefulness of the dynamic coalition theories is that
Coalition theory 85
these models need to be developed further in order to allow their application in
the field of alliances. Section 4.2.5 has already defined some of the elements of
the theory which would require improvement. An addition to these incompatibil-
ities is that in many theories adopting dynamics and partitions, the preferences of
players play a crucial role, but those preferences are usually assumed to be exoge-
nous (Druckman and Lupia, 2003) (see for example hedonic games and landscape
theory)10. When using such theories to explain alliance formation, little can be
said: how are preferences of firms determined? And how can these models be
empirically tested (Axelrod et al., 1995; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003)? To be able
to provide a more complete model of alliance formation, it is desirable to include
preference formation in the model, as will be done in Model 1 and 2.
An additional conclusion on the dynamic coalition theories is that they have
mainly interpreted coalition dynamics as studying the process undergone to reach
a coalition. As static approaches only predict a solution but not the way this
solution is reached, a process approach is already a way forward. Such an approach
will be developed in Model 1. However, to reach a more comprehensive view on
alliance formation, it would be better to also include other dynamic aspects as
well. Here, I will sum up the dynamic elements which are taken into account in
this dissertation:
• different procedures of coalition formation
• past and future of a coalition
• dynamic spatial positions
Note that these issues are sub-issues of the need for a more dynamic approach to
coalition formation.
Some of the dynamic coalition models found in the literature make use of a
particular procedure to form a coalition. For example, Grofman (1982, Section
4.4.1) takes a step-by-step approach: first two players form a proto-coalition, and
then other players can join one by one. But this raises the question of the effect
such a procedure has for the result of the coalition formation. Does it matter
which procedure is adopted in a model? Do different procedures lead to different
outcomes in the same setting? This leads to the following research gap, which
will be studied in Model 2:
Research gap 4.3 Coalition theories have so far not taken into account the va-
riety of procedures used to form a coalition.
Another limitation of the current literature is that it looks at the formation of
the coalition in isolation. The formation process has a beginning and an end, but
no attention is given to what has happened prior, during, or after the coalition. As
mentioned earlier, the study of the process of formation is already a step forward,
10Exceptions are Boekhoorn, Van Deemen, and Hosli (2006) and Van Deemen (1997; chap.
7).
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but, the coalition formation process remains an isolated phenomenon. The models
do not show how the past and future of this process might play a role11. What is
the influence of pre-coalition interactions among players on the coalition and the
behavior of players in the coalition? And how can future cooperative behavior be
taken into account? How do players anticipate future cooperative relations? The
role of past interaction will be studied in Model 3. The role of the future will be
ignored for the moment.
Research gap 4.4 Game theory has not taken into account the influence of pre-
coalition games.
Coalition models have also neglected what happens during coalitions. How-
ever, to study what happens once a coalition has formed is important, since this
shows how cooperation proceeds once it has begun. Given the potential for failure
in any cooperative arrangement, this phase can shed light on the course of the
coalition and may explain premature failure. How can the life of a coalition be
modeled? In contrast to the theoretical study of coalitions with game theory, the
evolution of an alliance has been studied with the use of game theory. As seen in
Section 2.2.5, game theoretical social dilemmas have adopted this kind of partner
dynamics. Model 4 builds further on this issue.
As seen in Section 4.2.3, spatial coalition models assume that players have
a position in a space. So far, those models have assumed that these positions
are fixed. However, in real-life situations one can think in terms of these posi-
tions being subject to change. A political party does not determine its policy
position for once and for all. Rather, changes take place in their positioning. In
the field of business too, firms are dynamic in their positions. Resource profiles
change, strategies are adjusted, and alliance positions vary. One important rea-
son for changes is the need for cooperation. Often, cooperation involves making
compromises and demands changes in a player’s position. The dynamic positions
of players involved in coalition formation has so far been neglected in coalition
research. Therefore:
Research gap 4.5 Spatial coalition theories have so far not taken into account
dynamic positions.
With this in mind, Model 2 has been developed in which players move their
position during the game.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the branch of coalition theory was discussed in depth. I have pre-
sented n-player cooperative game theory, coalition formation theories, the theory
of partitions, and dynamic coalition theories. This chapter has assessed to what
extent those theories are applicable to the alliance field.
11An exception to this is the model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1988).
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It can be concluded that the theory of partitions and dynamic coalition theories
are the most useful for the study of alliances. Partitions model the formation of
several coalitions, which is a better representation of the reality of alliances than
predicting one (winning) coalition. Dynamic coalition theories meet the need for
dynamic theory in the alliance field. The dynamic elements of the theory which
need further elaboration are the procedures of coalition formation, the past and
future of coalitions, and allowing for dynamic positions. Furthermore, exogenous
preferences and the assumption of similar partners may be adjusted to make the
theory more applicable.
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Chapter 5
Modeling the dynamics of
alliance formation
This chapter begins with an introduction to the two model chapters. I will go on
to presents two models which explain the dynamics of alliance formation. The
Alliance Formation Model (Model 1, Section 5.2) connects strategy, resource defi-
ciencies, partner selection, and alliance formation. The Procedure Model (Model
2, Section 5.3) studies negotiations within multi-partner alliances. The focus is
on the various procedures employed in multi-partner alliances and the flexibility
of firms when negotiating. The chapter ends with a conclusion of the two models
in Section 5.4.
5.1 Introduction to Chapter 5 and 6
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the literature on strategic alliances and game theory
was reviewed and, subsequently, several research gaps were defined. Together,
these gaps form a comprehensive research agenda. To summarize this agenda,
the following important research aims were put forward:
• Dynamics of alliances:
– study how alliances are formed (research gap 2.2)
– study partner dynamics within an alliance (research gap 2.1 and 2.4)
• Game theory:
– repair incompatibilities of game theory with alliances (research gap
4.1)
– develop a dynamic approach to coalition formation (research gap 4.2)
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The models in this study were developed on the basis of this research agenda.
The four models will be presented in Chapters 5 and 6.
The models are presented in two separate chapters for two reasons. The first
criterion is the object of study of the models. As described earlier, a distinction is
drawn between dynamics of and within alliances. The models in Chapter 5 focus
on the dynamics of alliances as they explain the formation of alliances, while the
models of Chapter 6 are concerned with dynamics within alliances. A second and
related criterion is that the models in Chapter 5 build on n-player coalition games
(as presented in Chapter 4), while the next chapter adopts a two-player strategic
games approach (see Chapter 3). Table 5.1 summarizes this.
As a consequence of the two different objects of study and of the adopted game
theory, a difference in style between the two chapters can be observed. Chapter
5 is more formal, in line with coalition theory. The models are presented, in
line with the axiomatic methodology, as systems of primitive terms, assumptions,
definitions, and theorems. The models in Chapter 6 use strategic games and are, in
line with earlier game theoretical alliance studies (see Section 2.2.5), less formal.
These models are built on earlier applied research and can be characterized as
verbal lines of reasoning.
As explained in Chapter 2, a distinction is made between propositions and
conclusions as outcomes of a model. Propositions are the main findings of a
model presented such that they are interpretable for the field of alliances. They
are stated as propositions because there is no empirical evidence. Conclusions
are propositions with more empirical or computational confirmation. Both will
be used in the conclusion of each model.
Table 5.1: Overview models
Chapter 5 Chapter 6
Object of Dynamics of Partner dynamics
study alliance formation within an alliance
Game theory N -player coalition theory Two-player strategic games
5.2 Model 1: The Alliance Formation Model
5.2.1 Introduction
The Alliance Formation Model studies the process of alliance formation in resource-
driven alliances1. Different stages in the formation are combined here: (1) the
1This section is based on De Ridder, Van Deemen, and Bell, 2007.
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influence of strategy on resource needs, (2) the relation between resource needs
and partner preference, and (3) the role of firms’ partner preferences in alliance
formation. The central question is how firms can find partners that fulfill their
needs, but also want to cooperate with them. In other words, the central problem
is an intriguing puzzle of how to reach a solution in a game such that alliances
are formed with mutually desirable partners. With this model, two main contri-
butions are aimed at.
The first contribution the models aims to make is to show how one can apply
coalition theory to the field of alliances, an unexplored area of research. In order
to do this, several aspects of coalition theory will be adjusted accordingly. The
incompatibilities between the field of alliances and game theory / coalition theory
are subject of research gap 4.1. More specifically, these incompatibilities are
related to the static approach of coalition theory, the assumption of similarity,
the prediction of winning coalitions, and exogenous preferences.
First, a dynamic coalition model is presented which studies the process of
coalition formation and contrasts the many static models (research gap 4.2).
Secondly, this model aims to show how one can model complementarity as
criterion for partner selection. Although the common assumption in game theo-
retical spatial modeling (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984, Section 4.2.3)
that cooperation will take place between similar partners (De Vries, 1999) might
fit, for example, efficiency alliances, complementarity is more common in resource-
driven alliances (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 2001). Hence, to model
a resource-driven alliance formation process, the challenge is to model comple-
mentarity.
The third incompatibility is related to the many coalition formation models
which forecast one (winning) coalition (e.g. Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Riker, 1962;
Van Deemen, 1997). This is in conflict with the world of alliances in which winning
plays no role and several alliances are formed. Therefore, the theory of hedonic
games (Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002;
Burani and Zwicker, 2003), which works with partitions, is adopted.
Finally, as argued in Section 4.4.4, models will be richer and easier to test
if preference formation is endogenous. However, most game theoretical models
assume preferences to be exogenous (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, and
Bruderer, 1995; Druckman and Lupia, 2003). This also holds for the theory of
hedonic games. The Alliance Formation Model will extend the theory of hedonic
games and shows how players’ preferences - in this case firms preferring certain
alliances - are formed. All these issues are innovations for coalition theory which
will enable the theory to be applied to the field of alliances.
The second contribution of this model will be to contrast the more traditional
alliance theories (e.g. Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Das and Teng, 2000; Hennart,
1988) and to shift the focus from why alliances are formed to how alliances are
formed. Rather than asking why firms form alliances and whom they prefer, the
question which will concern us is: how can alliances be formed which satisfy the
motivations and preferences of all firms? This is the extra step: aggregating to
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the multi-actor level which has so far been lacking in alliance theory (Das and
Teng, 2002a; Reuer, 2000; Styles and Hersch, 2005), and this meets research gap
2.2.
Figure 5.1: Main idea of the Alliance Formation Model
To summarize, the model assumes a group of firms with an exogenous strategy
profile that is placed in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space. The strategy profile
determines which resources a firm strives for. In this way, a profile of the resources
needed is created in another multi-dimensional Euclidean space. These resource
needs form the preferences the players have over alliances. A firm will prefer
the alliance that meets its resource needs the best. These aspects of the model
are quite generally accepted principles from alliance theory which are formalized
here in order to be able to make an extra step: alliance formation. In model
terminology, given the preferences of all the firms in the model, the theory of
hedonic games (Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2002) can provide stable solutions
that satisfy these alliance preferences. The utility of players depends only on who
their partners in the alliance are. The model will not only forecast the formation
of single coalitions or alliances, but will forecast a partition in which all the players
are divided into non-overlapping alliances.
Figure 5.1 shows the main idea of the model. This model formalizes several
aspects from alliance literature. The left box shows the elements from alliance
literature and the right box shows how these aspects are formalized. It is this for-
malization that enables the final step in the model (below the arrow): a prediction
of which groups of alliances will be formed. Additionally, a case illustration is
provided.
In this section, the model is presented in the same steps as in the figure. The
first step is an explanation of the rationale underlying the model in words based on
ideas from alliance literature (Section 5.2.2). Subsequently, in Section 5.2.3, the
mathematical version of the model is defined. Section 5.2.4 shows an illustration
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of the model with an analysis of the case of the home tap system and Section
5.2.5 presents the conclusions of the model.
5.2.2 The underlying principles of the Alliance Formation
Model
In this section, I will introduce the principles underlying the model by using
insights from alliance literature. Since the focus is on resource-driven alliances, I
will draw mainly on the resource-based view (e.g. Das and Teng, 2000; Peteraf,
1993; see also Section 2.2.2). Resource-driven alliances are often found in real-life
and the fact that these alliances usually contain complementary partners implies a
model challenge as complementarity has not been modeled in spatial game theory
so far. I will subsequently discuss strategy, resource profile, the need for alliance
formation, and partner preferences.
The term strategy is used in many different contexts and is defined in a multi-
tude of ways (see, for example, Barney, 2002 for a non-exhaustive list). Here, it is
assumed that firms develop strategies that identify their long-term objectives and
ambitions as well as a plan as to how to attain them. In the model, strategy is
treated as an exogenous variable. Hence, there is no argument about why a firm
has a certain strategy. New strategic goals can be developed for many different
reasons, such as changing economic circumstances, lack or abundance of a certain
resource. The possibility of alliances can also lead to a new strategy. An essential
ingredient of a strategy is that firms need to possess - or have access to - the right
set of resources to achieve their ambitions. Let us focus on those resources.
According to the resource-based view, each firm consists of a portfolio of re-
sources also labeled the firm’s resource profile (Furrer, Sudharsan, and Thomas,
2001). To recap from Section 2.2.2, resources are all the assets, capabilities, pro-
cesses, information and knowledge controlled by the firm (Ireland, Hitt, Vaidya-
nath, 2002). These resources are a source of potential competitive advantage to
firms, an advantage that will be larger if the resources are valuable, scarce, diffi-
cult to imitate, and if there are no, or a limited amount of, substitutes (Barney,
1991, Peteraf, 1993). When comparing tangible and intangible resources (Amit
and Schoemaker, 1993), intangible resources are in general the most valuable for
a firm. Although intangible resources can be transferable and location specific
to varying degrees, it is assumed here that intangible resources are transferable
between companies (that is, can be absorbed by another company) as well as from
on physical location to another.
Since a firm’s strategy is always directed towards future goals which can change
over time, a firm must adapt its portfolio of resources accordingly. Firms cannot
afford to stick to one unchanging resource profile, without developing it in line with
its changing strategy and environment. The firm’s strategic objectives guide the
required changes in its resource profile. Of course, it must be acknowledged that in
many cases the firm’s strategy is determined by its existing resource profile. Why
will the strategy of Heineken, for example, be related to producing and selling
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beer? This is mainly because over time the firm has developed a portfolio of
resources (knowledge, infrastructure, supply chain, skilled employees, credibility,
brand name, etc.) in this area. Resource profiles are less easily changed, partly
as the new resources have to be built up, while keeping the existing resources up
to standard.
Each strategy requires its own specific resource profile. Firms have a distinct
view on which resources are needed to achieve a certain strategy (Barney, 2002).
If a firm changes its strategic objectives, it will also need a new resource portfolio.
The gap between the existing resource portfolio and the future resource portfolio
will increase according to the difference between the current and the new strategic
objectives.
To bridge the gap, firms can choose between three main routes: (1) internal
development, (2) setting up alliances, or (3) taking over another company with a
relevant complementary resource profile. The bigger the gap, the more difficult it
will be to develop the new resource profile internally within a reasonable amount
of time, and in such cases, an alliance or an acquisition is preferable. Alliances are
the ideal mechanisms to learn and obtain the - in particular - intangible resources
from other firms (see a.o. Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996; Hennart, 1988;
Kogut, 1988). For instance, Heineken and Krups established an alliance to create
an innovative tap system by combining the beer market expertise of Heineken
with the appliances market expertise of Krups. Acquisitions or mergers are more
suitable if all the resources (tangible as well as intangible) of another firm are
needed to create a new resource portfolio. For example, AOL and Time Warner
decided to combine their companies into a co-managed merged firm to be able
to deal with the demands of the internet era. Quite often, only a subset of the
target firm’s resource portfolio is required, which leads to redundancy or overlap
in resource portfolios in cases where the whole firm is acquired. In that case, an
alliance is a better alternative as it enables cooperation using specific resources.
So, it is argued that in order to achieve the desired resource profile, an alliance
is an effective route (1) if certain new resources are needed, (2) if especially if
these resources are intangible resources, since these are more difficult to produce
internally, and (3) if those resources are complementary to a firm’s own resources.
This kind of cooperation is found in, for example, R&D alliances or alliances in
which knowledge, capabilities, and/or market entrance play a role. Such alliances
can involve both horizontal and vertical cooperation. For example, Heineken and
Krups cooperated to produce the Beer Tender so that Heineken could complement
Krups’ knowledge and experience of appliances in the West-European market.
Heineken provided knowledge, technology, and market share in the beer sector.
This line of reasoning applies to resource-driven alliances, but to a lesser extent
to, for instance, alliances set up for efficiency reasons. In such alliances, firms
are expected to look for partners with whom they can achieve scale advantages.
Since similarity is a condition for scale, firms with comparable or similar skills and
product portfolios are preferred. In that case, the coordination and transaction
costs are lower than in the case of companies with distinct skills or products.
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It will also be easier (and hence cheaper) to communicate and cooperate with a
company that is more or less the same. Often, alliances established for efficiency
reasons are between companies with comparable resource profiles. For example,
alliances in the airline industry (such as between KLM and Northwest Airlines)
are usually set up for efficiency reasons. The model can be adjusted for this kind
of alliance by changing the preference equations. The remainder of the model
would stay the same, only preferences would be calculated in differently.
In resource-driven alliances, the ideal partner will be the one which has exactly
those resources required by a firm. But for an alliance to be formed, all partners
must be able to find a ‘win-win’ balance in the relationship. This implies that
an alliance will only be viable if all members need to cooperate, combined with a
mutual dependency in terms of resources (Das and Teng, 2003). In fact, to be an
attractive partner, a firm has to offer some valuable resources itself. Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven (1996) point to this paradox: firms need relevant and valuable
resources to gain relevant and valuable resources.
Finally, one more principle is discussed from the field of game theory; the
minimal winning principle (Rapoport, 1970; Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), as seen earlier in Section 4.2.1. The principle states that a coalition should
consist of the smallest number of members needed in order for the coalition to
be winning. Although alliances are not strictly winning or losing, the concepts of
oversized and large enough can be used. The idea is that, on the one hand, large
alliances are a disadvantage: they are more difficult to manage and require more
coordination, the identification and realization of common interests is harder,
recognition problems increase, and a firm’s own resources must be shared with
more partners (Parkhe, 1993). On the other hand, such oversized alliances are, in
some cases, such as where the need arises for the standardization of technology,
desirable because in such cases the greater the number of partners, the greater
the benefits derived. Also, alliances need enough members to posses sufficient
resources to be able to operate. Hence, a balance must be found in terms of size
of the alliance. This balance can vary from one alliance to another, depending on
the objective of the alliance.
5.2.3 The Alliance Formation Model
In this section, a formalization of the principles is presented and thus a foun-
dation is laid for the application of the theory of hedonic games. Although the
principles of alliance theory are more or less generally accepted, a formalization
of these principles has not yet been provided. This formalization consists of four
general steps, which are discussed in the following four subsections: strategic
aims, resource profiles and relation with strategy, partner preference, and alliance
formation.
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Strategic aims
The game consists of a set of players, here firms, denoted by N , and it is assumed
that N > 2 and that every firm has already formulated its own strategy. As
defined in the previous section, a strategy constitutes the future direction a firm
wants to take and how it intends to achieve this. Strategic issues relevant to a firm
are, for example, specializing or diversifying with regard to its products or services,
aiming at a high rate of growth, being a quick mover, investing in products or
technologies (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), or determining the geographic scope
of its activities. In general, strategic issues will be presented in this model as
issues on which a firm takes a stand. For example, with regard to the issue of
determining the geographic scope, some companies strive for a large market share
in one country, while others prefer market share in as many countries as possible.
The strategic issue involved is the number of countries, or, in a more abstract
sense, the degree of internationalization. In this way, each firm positions itself on
each issue. Together, the positions on each issue constitute the overall strategic
position of a firm.
These strategic issues for a firm are modeled as dimensions in a multidimen-
sional Euclidean space (Section 4.2.3). It is assumed that each firm faces the same
set of strategic issues, but with different relevance. Clearly this assumption can
be used without loss of information, since a strategic issue which is not relevant
for a firm can be fixed at zero. In this way, the overall strategic position of a
firm is a vector of scores the player has on each dimension. Depending on the
empirical meaning of the application one or more dimensions can be used. The
empirical domain also determines which dimensions are used and what the scores
of the players on these dimensions are.
Here, let me introduce a strategy space, denoted by Sm, in which each firm has
a position which denotes its strategy profile. For firm A, this is SA. The strategy
space consists of m dimensions, in which m ≥ 1. As explained previously, each
dimension denotes an issue in the overall strategy of a firm. The vector that forms
a firm’s strategy consists of the positions taken by the firm on the various issues.
Sm is the nonnegative orthant of the space because firms do not have a negative
strategy. The assumption of Euclidean space implies that the distance between
two positions SA and SB in space is measured by the standard norm of Euclidian
distance dAB (see formula 4.3 on page 71).
Resource profiles and the relation with strategy
Similar to a strategy space Sm, a resource space, denoted by Rn, is introduced.
Again, this is a multi-dimensional space for which the Euclidean distance measure
holds. The n dimensions that span the resource space stand for the possible
resources of a firm. In addition, θA is the overall current position of a firm A in
Rn which confers to the bundle of resources that are available to that firm. θA is
called the resource profile of firm A. For the resource space, only the non-negative
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orthant of the space is taken into account; it is assumed firms either have a certain
amount of a resource or do not have it, in which case they score zero. Negative
amounts of resources are not allowed.
A basic assumption in the model is that there is a link between the strategy
position SA of a firm (A) in the strategy space Sm and its preferred position θ′A
in the resource space. More specifically, it is assumed that the preferred position
in the resource space can partly be predicted by the firm’s position in the strategy
space. As argued previously, strategy is assumed to guide the resource needs for
a firm. The strategic choices made will partly determine where in the resource
space a firm would like to be, but several other elements play a role too.
In technical terms, the position of a firm in strategy space has influence on the
resource profile it wants. To model this idea, a mapping is used, F : Sm+ε→ Rn,
which assigns to each strategy position Si in its domain Sm together with an error
term ε (representing undetermined choice) a vector θ′i = F (Si) that denotes its
wanted resource profile. For example, in a one-dimensional case, a firm that has
strategically decided to concentrate fully on the Japanese market will in the future
have a lower market share in the European Union than it currently holds. But
this firm would also prefer to achieve a position in the resource space with more
access to the Japanese market.
An important assumption is that the firms’ resource profiles are common
knowledge to all firms. It is important to note this assumption of complete in-
formation, which underlies all models in this dissertation. Particularly for the
models in this chapter, this assumption may seem extreme. The models in Chap-
ter 6 only included two players and less information is needed to play the game.
In this chapter, players are supposed to know each players’ strategy and resource
profile (this model) or ideal alliance position and bargaining flexibility (Model 2).
Although the models often do not require highly specific or confidential knowl-
edge, there are several means for a firm to gain knowledge about other firms. First,
there are patents which play a role in the domain of knowledge and technical ori-
ented alliances. Of course, some public information is known to all players (from
annual reports and websites). Furthermore, firms make use of due diligence and
direct contacts in the process of alliance formation. It is expected that the models
will apply more easily to smaller and less dynamic markets with a small number of
participants. Here, information is more ordered and can be acquired more easily.
In this kind of markets and under these conditions, the assumption that firms
have complete knowledge is more reasonable.
Nevertheless, the assumption of complete knowledge remains a severe one
which can be difficult to meet in real-life situations. The assumption is however
needed to use the theory underlying the models. Although game theory can handle
games with incomplete information (see Harsanyi, 1967/1968), cooperative game
theory has worked less with incomplete information and my starting point is, for
the sake of convenience, therefore complete information. If this assumption were
relaxed, the models would become more complex. In line with previous incomplete
information models, we would have to work with beliefs of players. A player has a
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certain belief about the other players which consists of a probability distribution
over different states of the game and of the players. Since these kind of models are
already complicated even with two players, the complexity with n players would
increase dramatically and is beyond the aim and scope of this dissertation.
To sum up, I have introduced a strategy space and a resource space. Each
firm has an exogenous position in the strategy space, which determines its most
wanted position in the resource space. Both spaces use the Euclidean norm.
Partner preference
The assumption underlying the model is that firms will look for complementary
alliance partners in order to compensate for their resources deficiencies. The
partner selection phase is dealt with in this section: how does the model determine
which partners a firm prefers and how is this calculated? In general, firms form
alliances to achieve their desired resource profile and hence move closer to their
desired position. However, a firm prefers a partner that is not only close to its
preferred position, but also distant from its own current position so that the
partner does not replicate resources the firm already has. These assumptions are
more complicated than the general assumption in coalition theory that the closest
neighbor is the best partner (De Vries, 1999). Hence, new formalizations must
be developed to capture these more complicated alliance partners preferences and
I therefore introduce a new concept: adjusted distance (AD). Note that this
partner preference phase calculates which partners are ideal for a firm. Hence,
whether a partner wants to cooperate with the firm and is willing to share its
resources is not yet relevant, this is analyzed in the alliance formation phase.
The closer a firm B with θB is to the preferred resource position of firm A with
θA′ , the more A will prefer firm B as a partner in an alliance. A comparison is
made between what A wants and what the other already has. If firm B currently
possesses more of what A wants than C, then B is a more desirable match than C
from A’s perspective. Furthermore, the further a firm B with θB is to the current
position of A (θA), the more A will prefer B as partner. Here, a comparison is
made between what A has and what the other player has. If the current resource
profile of B is different from A’s resource profile, B is valuable because it can
complement A. This guarantees that a partner cannot only help with additional
resources, but really offers those particular resources which a firm is lacking.
These two principles come together in the concept of AD, adjusted distance.
Each firm i has an adjusted distance AD(i, j) to each other firm j. The smaller
this AD(i, j), the more firm i will prefer firm j. Formally:
AD(i, j) = dθ′i,θj +
1
dθi,θj
(5.1)
In the first part (dθ′i,θj ), this formula reflects the distance between a firm’s own
desired position and the current position of a potential partner, which is preferred
to be as close as possible. The second part ( 1dθi,θj
) calculates the distance between
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two firms’ current positions. Here, it holds that the further, the more preferred.
So, the inverse of the distance is taken so that a large distance is valued more
than closeness2. Note that AD is not a symmetric concept: AD(i, j) 6= AD(j, i).
The preferences are complete and transitive (see page 77).
In this way, each firm will compare each other firm through AD and, based
on these calculations, utility can be determined. This utility reflects how much a
potential partner will be valued by a firm; the more utility, the better the match
with this potential partner. Utility is calculated through a utility function in
which utility decreases with the square of the AD. So, the larger the AD, the less
preferred a firm becomes. Formally, the function is u(i, j) : N → R such that
u(i, j) = (λ− (AD(i, j))2) (5.2)
In this function, λ is a kind of threshold. To interpret the function, let us consider
several scenarios. If the AD(i, j) is zero, then the utility of j for i is λ; the highest
utility. If the AD(i, j) is
√
λ, then the utility of j for i is λ − (√λ)2 = 0; the
lowest utility. λ is determined exogenously.
In line with the theory of hedonic games, preferences have to be determined
over alliances and not over single firms. So far, only preferences over firms have
been considered. An alliance is denoted by S or T and refers to any subset
of N , which includes alliances with no members (hence, no alliance) and with
all firms. In order to form preferences over alliances for a firm i, the model
aggregates the utility for all the members in an alliance for firm i and corrects
for the number of firms in an alliance S. As noted in Section 5.2.2 that an
alliance is a balance between enough members and avoiding oversized alliances.
This correction takes place through a new concept introduced here: Correct Size
CSS which is a function of #S, the number of members in an alliance S. To
put it simply, with CSS the size of the alliance is valued. This function looks
like this F : #S → CSS and CSS ∈ R. The exact function is dependent on
the preferences of firms in the concrete setting. In a standard setting alliance,
oversized coalitions will be appreciated and CSS will be small. In co-development
alliances, complexity increases if more firms are involved in an alliance. Here, a
larger CSS is expected.
This leads to the following preference formation:
T i S if
∑
all j∈T u(i, j)
CST
>
∑
all k∈S u(i, k)
CSS
(5.3)
A firm prefers one alliance over another when the utility divided by the size
correction is the highest. A firm is indifferent between alliance T and S if the
2Of course, it can happen that a distance between two positions is zero. In that case, one
cannot calculate the AD, since dividing by zero is not possible. A rather inelegant solution for
this, is to use a number which is a fraction larger than zero, such as 0.01 in case of rounding on
two digits after the comma.
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following holds:
T ≈i S if
∑
all j∈T u(i, j)
CST
=
∑
all k∈S u(i, k)
CSS
(5.4)
Here, T and S are alliances of which firm i is a member, j and k are arbitrary
members of T and S but not i, and ≈ denotes indifference.
Note that these principles of preference formation can be altered by taking
different theoretical considerations into account in the model. Here, the resource-
based view is used as the guiding theoretical framework. Another theory, for
example, transaction cost economics, would arrive at different calculations. The
basics of the model can be unified with assumptions and results from different
alliance theories leading to different overall models with different predictions.
In the way sketched above, it is possible to arrive at firm preferences for
alliances endogenously and, by doing so, to construct preference profiles. Such a
preference profile is an ordered list (a vector) of all the alliances to which a firm
may belong. First in the list is the alliance that the firm prefers most. In terms of
the model, this means that each firm has a list of alliances from its most preferred
to its least preferred, based on its resource deficiencies. This leaves the solution
open: which alliances will be formed based on the firms’ preferences for alliances?
This is a topic which has not been picked up in the alliance literature yet. The
aggregating multi-actor level has so far remained understudied. This dissertation
will address this and the next section will finalize the model by incorporating the
theory of hedonic games.
Alliance formation
The theory of hedonic games (Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2001; Bogomolnaia
and Jackson, 2002; Burani and Zwicker, 2003) was introduced in depth in Section
4.3.2, and here I will recap on several elements (such as partition) and focus on
the theory’s application to alliances.
Hedonic games work with partitions (P ). As said earlier, partitions enable
us to model situations in which winning and losing are not part of the game. A
partition is a distribution of firms across several non-overlapping alliances. An
example is found in the list of symbols and a more formal explanation of the
concept partition is found in Section 4.3. The concept of a partition enables us
to model the formation of alliances among groups of firms, rather than employ-
ing an approach in which only one (winning) alliance is predicted. This model
simulates more closely what happens in most industries and markets, where not
just one alliance, but typically several alliances will form. The theory can only
predict partitions in which partners are in one alliance only, meaning that al-
liances cannot overlap. This may seem an unrealistic assumption, but there are
a number of examples of markets in which firms which cooperate in an alliance
do not participate in any competing alliance with other firms. Examples of this
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are standard-setting alliances, where firms often only participate in one alliance.
A further example is co-marketing or co-development alliances, in which partner-
ships are also usually exclusive. In the illustration of this model, the Beer Tender
and Perfect Draft are also alliances which have no overlapping members.
An essential principle of hedonic games is that each player has a preference
over the set of coalitions to which it may belong. While these preferences are
usually exogenous to the model, the previous section showed how preferences
are formed endogenously in our model. These preference profiles determine the
outcome of a game: players will try to form a coalition which is high in their
preference ordering. But since each player is aiming at its favored coalition, a
theory is needed that can predict what the result of this interaction will be.
The purpose of hedonic games is to explain and predict which partitions are
stable. Stable here refers to the idea that no individual player or no group of
players has an incentive to form another coalition. Stable alliances do not imply
a lack of opportunism, a quiet environment and industry, or the presence of trust,
and nor does stability here refers to the definition given on page 14. In this model,
stability is solely defined as an alliance in which no firm or group of firms has the
incentive to leave; given their preference profiles no firm can improve its position
by changing to another alliance. Several solution concepts for hedonic games are
available. In line with Section 4.3.2, I will discuss the core and the stable set here,
with the remark that the formal version of the core and stable set are found in
Section 4.3.2.
A core stable partition is defined as a partition in which no alliance (group of
firms) has the incentive to change the partition, because no alliance can improve
its position by changing the partition. For a formal version, see equation 4.12
on page 77. It is rather unfortunate that without further restrictions on the firm
preferences for alliances, the core of hedonic games will often be empty. That
is, core stable partition are realizable only under rather severe conditions. I will
discuss one such condition here: the top-coalition property.
From the research of Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez (2001) it appeared that
the top-coalition property can guarantee the existence of the core. With this
property, hereafter called top-alliance property, a sufficient condition for the core
solution is found. In short, a top-alliance property requires that all firms have to
agree on the best alliance in order for the core solution to exist. More formally
defined and adapted from the work of Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez (2001), this
means the following:
Definition 5.1 Given a non-empty set of players V ⊆ N , a non-empty subset
S ⊆ V (i.e. an alliance) is a top-alliance of V if and only if for any firm i in S
and any sub-alliance T in V with i in T we have S ≥i T .
Hence, every firm in S sees S as the best alliance in V compared to all possible
alliances T in V . An alliance formation game satisfies the top-alliance property if
for any V in N there exists a top-alliance of V . In other words, the top-alliance
property “imposes a commonality of preferences among the players” (Banerjee,
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Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2001, p. 137); there is agreement among the players on the
best (the top) alliance.
An alternative solution is the Nash stable partition in which no individual
player has the incentive to change to another alliance; if it does so, its payoff will
not increase. In a Nash stable situation, no member of any alliance can improve
its position by leaving its alliance. The formal version of this solution is found in
equation 4.13 on page 77. Note the difference with a core stable partition: while
the core solution takes deviations of a group of players (an alliance) into account,
the Nash stable solution only considers individual deviations.
As Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) show, the set of Nash stable partitions,
the Nash solution, may also be empty. The sufficient conditions under which
this set is not empty are the condition of additive separability of preferences and
symmetry. Put simply, the condition of additive separability demands that a firm
prefers being in alliance A to being member of alliance B if the total utility it
gets from A is higher than in B. Symmetry refers to a situation in which firms
have the same utility for each other; firm A should like B as partner to the same
degree as B likes A as partner.
To define more precisely, adjusted versions of Bogomolnaia and Jackson’s for-
mal definitions (2002) are used.
Definition 5.2 A firm i’s preferences are additive separable if there exists a
function ui : N → R, such that for all alliances with i as member it holds that:
S1 i S2 iff
∑
j∈S1 u(i, j) ≥
∑
j∈S2 u(i, j).
The condition of additive separable preferences implies that in an alliance game,
(1) each player gives all the players in the game a utility u(i, j) and (2) a player
prefers an alliance if the aggregated value of the alliance is the highest. The for-
malization of partner preference of this model only fulfills the first property of
additive separable preferences. The second part does not hold, since this model
compensates for the number of firms in an alliance. In this way, it is conceiv-
able that an alliance which generates less utility for a firm than another may be
preferred due to CS.
Furthermore, a firm’s preferences are symmetric “if the firms have the same
reciprocal values for each other” (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002, p. 203). For-
mally:
Definition 5.3 A firm’s preferences are symmetric if u(i, j) = u(j, i) for all i, j.
This property implies that firms i and j have the same utility for each other. If
this property holds, the Nash solution will not be empty. Again, the application
of hedonic games in this model does not fulfill this condition. It has already been
noted that AD, underlying the utility function, is not symmetric; a firm i can
have a different AD to j than j to i.
Whether core or Nash stable alliances can be achieved depends solely on the
preferences firms have. As we have seen, certain specifications on preferences
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(top-alliance, additive separable, and symmetry conditions) can guarantee the
existence of the solutions. If preferences are as described by these conditions, a
core or Nash-stable solution exists. However, a firm cannot intervene to make
the core or Nash stable solution exist. Only the preferences of all firms play a
role. Nevertheless, if the core or Nash stable solution exists, it is the firms’ task
to reach it.
It is expected that the core stable partition will not occur frequently in real-life
situations. However, in cases where it does exist, its alliances are expected to be
potentially successful. This is because the core partition is the best available for
every alliance and every firm involved. No improvements by any firm or group of
firms can be made. Core-stability also implies that negotiation costs will be low.
In fact, the formation is only needed to exchange information, to produce a game
of complete information. When the firms have sufficient information, they will
all know which partitions are best and cannot be improved on. Nash stable can
be expected to appear far more frequently in reality than core stable partitions.
Moreover, as no individual firm has the incentive to leave, these Nash stable
alliances will also be successful, but to a lesser extent than core stable alliances.
Although the model as worked out here does not guarantee the sufficient condi-
tions of additive separability of preferences and symmetry, it can predict solutions
as we will see in the application of the model in the next section.
5.2.4 Illustration: case of Beer Tender vs Perfect Draft
To illustrate the Alliance Formation Model (see Section 3.1.3 for the underlying
methodology), I will use the case of a home device with replaceable beer kegs,
hereafter called a home tap system. After a general description of the case, the
application of the model to the case will be described. The information on the
case has been taken from the websites of the relevant companies and products
(Beer Tender, Groupe SEB, Heineken, Inbev, Perfect Draft, and Philips, also see
Marketing Online).
The case involves four players which formed two alliances. Heineken and
Krups cooperate to produce the Beer Tender, while Philips and Inbev produce
the Perfect Draft together. Let us first introduce those four players. Heineken
is an international brewer which produces over 170 beers, of which Amstel and
Heineken are the most important brands. In Europe, Heineken has a large market
share and is one of the leaders in this market. Heineken employs about 64,0003
people. Heineken’s partner is the German firm Krups. This company is known
best for its coffee and espresso machines. Krups is part of the Groupe SEB,
operating in the small domestic equipment segment with brands such as Moulinex,
Tefal, and Krups. The Groupe SEB operates on five continents and hires almost
16,000 employees. Inbev is a global brewer with its headquarters in Belgium and it
3Unless otherwise mentioned, the number of employees given for each firm is based on the
information from the firm’s website as of August, 2006.
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produces over 200 brands, including Stella Artois, Leffe, Brahma, and Beck’s. The
firm has a worldwide market share of approximately 14% and has about 77,000
employees. Finally, Philips Electronics is a global company with its headquarters
in the Netherlands. In October 2006, Philips employed approximately 125,000
people.
In the 1990s, the beer market in Western-Europe was shrinking and a real
innovation was needed to stop this decline. Customer research showed that cus-
tomers appreciated a cold and fresh draught beer in a bar the most, and from this
came the idea of a home tap system. In this way, customers who wanted a draught
beer over a can or bottle could stay at home to drink a draught beer. Seeking
to maintain its position on the market, Heineken became the leading player in
this innovation and spent seven years of developing a home tap system. However,
as a beer producer, Heineken was not capable of developing and producing an
appliance for the home tap system alone. Heineken has different options open
to solve this problem: (1) buy a firm with the specific capabilities, (2) use an
Original Design Manufacturer (ODM, another (Chinese) firm manufactures the
appliance and Heineken brands it for sale), or (3) partner with an electronics firm
in an alliance. Heineken took the latter route.
Initially, Heineken choose Philips as its partner. After a few rounds of talks,
Philips pulled out of the negotiations. Heineken later claimed that they could
not reach an agreement with Philips over the right business model to adopt. It
was also argued that Philips was reluctant to connect its brand to an alcoholic
product (‘Sense and Complexity’, 2005). Consequently, Heineken was forced to
find another partner, which was Krups. After a successful pilot in Switzerland,
the Beer Tender was introduced onto the Dutch market on February 2004. Krups
took care of the production and future development of Beer Tender appliances.
Heineken was responsible for the kegs and the marketing. The Beer Tender was
a success with both machines and kegs selling well.
In October 2005, Philips launched its own home tap system in an alliance with
Inbev, the Perfect Draft. In contrast to the Beer Tender, the Perfect Draft is an
open system in which different brands can be used. Besides the Inbev brands,
Grolsch and Bavaria also supply kegs for the Perfect Draft. The Perfect Draft
had a slow start, but its sales increased and the Perfect Draft can now also be
characterized as a success.
A noteworthy event was Heineken’s claim that the Perfect Draft would violate
Heineken’s patents. However, the Dutch courts ruled in December 2005 that
Heineken had no case and the ban on sales of the Perfect Draft requested by
Heineken was rejected. In January 2007, Heineken and Philips settled the case.
Analysis of the case
Using this small case, I want to illustrate how the Alliance Formation Model
works. The objective is not to analyze the case in depth, but to give an illustra-
tion of the potential application of the model. I will discuss the different phases
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of the model: strategy, resource profiles and its relation with strategy, partner
preference, and alliance formation.
To start with strategy, Heineken in particular had a clear strategic ambition
- to end the decline in the beer market. More specifically, Heineken’s strategy
was to launch a product to enable its customers to drink draught beer at home.
Heineken decided to develop a home tap system, thus involving Krups, so that
participation in this sector also became part of Krups’ strategy. Krups’ general
strategy is to produce and market high quality appliances. The second brewer,
Inbev, generally aims at innovation and external growth. On its website, Inbev
states that it seeks to use ’occasion-based marketing’: the promotion of particular
occasions for customers to drink beer, such as celebrations. Finally, Philips strives
to be a technologically innovative company. Philips nowadays aims mostly at
the lifestyle and health care markets, and less at developing cyclical technology.
It appears that Philips was conscious of its image and that, initially at least,
products associated with alcohol did not fit with this image. However, following
the success of the Beer Tender, both Philips and Inbev wanted their own share
of this market, so the development of a home tap system became part of their
strategy to achieve this.
The model assumes that strategy influences the preferred resource profile of
a firm. In addition to more specific strategic aims, all four players (although at
different points in time) aimed at developing some kind of appliance to enable
customers to drink draught beer at home. However, Krups and Philips lacked
the capacity and credibility to produce beer, while Inbev and Heineken lacked the
capacity to develop and produce home appliances. These two facts are the first
two relevant resources for this case: (1) the degree of technology of, knowledge
about, and ability necessary to produce home appliances (resource dimension
one) and (2) the degree of knowledge about and ability necessary to produce beer
(resource dimension two). To make the illustration simple, I will score each player
on each dimension in a ternary way. Players either get 0, 0.5, or 1. In line with
the model, the firms have a current (θ) and preferred (θ′) resource profile. The
preferred resource profile is the profile needed to fulfill the strategic goals of a
firm. To take the initiator as an example, for its current resource profile Heineken
obviously scores zero on resource one and one on resource two. Heineken’s aim was
to develop a home beer system and accordingly, it scores one on both dimensions
in its preferred resource profile. For the remaining players, these scores can be
easily filled in. The two electronics companies currently had resource one, but
lacked resource two. The beer firms has resource two, but lacked resource one.
As a third relevant resource, I introduce the concept of ‘beer innovation’ (re-
source dimension three), by which I refer to the degree to which a firm is innovative
in the beer market. In their initial positions, neither Krups nor Philips were beer
innovative at all, and from the case description we can also conclude that Philips
had no intention of becoming innovative in this market. The fact that Philips
joined the market later can best be explained as a competitive move. It was not
the desire to innovate in the beer market specifically that led Philips to collabo-
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Table 5.2: Resource profiles of the players
Current Preferred
Heineken (0, 1, 0.5) (1, 1, 1)
Inbev (0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1)
Krups (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0.5)
Philips (1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0)
rate on the Perfect Draft; rather, Philips sought commercial success. In contrast
to Philips, Krups was eager to enter this market in order to be an innovative first
mover. However, for Krups beer innovation was not absolutely crucial - the Beer
Tender seemed to be an ad-hoc project. Inbev and Heineken were both already
active in the beer market, but were less innovative than their preferred position.
The fact that Heineken was the initiator of the whole home tap system indicates
that it was more beer innovative than Inbev, as Inbev was a late mover. Hence,
altogether, on this third dimension, Philips scores 0 on both measures. Krups’
current position is 0 and it aims at 0,5. Heineken’s current position is 0,5 and
Inbev scores 0. Both aimed at 1 as their preferred resource position. Together
this leads to a three-dimensional vector for each firm, as presented in table 5.2.
Now, the AD between all firms can be calculated according to equation 5.1.
This is presented in table 5.3. Subsequently, based on table 5.3, utilities can be
determined (equation 5.2). This is seen in table 5.4. The utility is calculated
by taking a λ of 20. A λ of 20 guarantees that positive utilities are reached
(except for u(K,P ) and u(P,K)), but for the rest the choice for λ is arbitrary.
For example, u(H, I) = (λ− (3.41)2) = 20−11.63 = 8.37. For Krups and Philips,
I have set u(K,P ) and u(P,K) at zero, instead of a large negative number. The
higher the utility, the greater the match with the other firm. For each firm, the
highest utilities are denoted in bold. As an example, in the table, one can see
that Krups and Philips are given a utility of 15.69 by Heineken, while Inbev is
Table 5.3: AD between the players
Heineken Inbev Krups Philips
AD(H,x) - 3.41 2.08 2.08
AD(I, x) 3.12 - 2.12 2.12
AD(K,x) 1.67 1.83 - 101.12
AD(P, x) 1.79 1.71 101.00 -
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Table 5.4: Utility
Heineken Inbev Krups Philips
u(H,x) - 8.37 15.69 15.69
u(I, x) 10.27 - 15.51 15.51
u(K,x) 17.22 16.65 - 0.00
u(P, x) 16.81 17.08 0.00 -
only rewarded by Heineken with a utility of 8.37.
After these steps, the preferences of each firm for each alliance can be cal-
culated. The utility of the other members is added and divided by the factor
CSS , depending on #S. For cases in which firms form an alliance to make prod-
ucts together, as in this beer tap co-development case, the smaller the number
of partners, the better. There are several reasons for this assumption. First, the
coordination and management of such an alliance is complex. Furthermore, al-
though adding more partners to the alliance does not necessary increase profit, it
does mean that the profits must be distributed between a larger number of part-
ners. Finally, adding more members is not a goal in itself, unlike, for example,
in standard setting alliances. All in all, having more members is not an added
value for producing a home tap system. Therefore, in this case, the CSS looks as
follows CSS = (#S)2.
Now that the resource profiles of the firms have been determined, and con-
sequently the partner preferences, the firms’ preferences over alliances can be
calculated. In this four-player game, fifteen different partitions are possible: one
partition with solo-alliances, nine partitions with dyadic alliances, three parti-
tions with three-player alliances, and one grand alliance. It is assumed that a
solo-alliance rewards a value of 0 for a firm. Table 5.5 gives an overview of the
payoffs of the two-, three-, and four-partner alliances for each firm. For exam-
ple, the grand alliance gives the players the following: (2.48, 2.58, 2.12, 2.12). The
order of the players is (Heineken, Inbev, Krups, Philips). In the grand alliance,
Heineken gains a total utility of 39.75, which is divided by 42 and this leads to
2.48. The numbers in bold are the highest utility for each firm.
Based on these calculations, it can be seen that the two-partner alliance
{{Heineken,Krups}, {Inbev, Philips}} is the best choice for each firm. Hence,
this partition is the solution to the game. First, it can be shown that this alliance is
a stable set solution. None of the players can improve itself by changing to another
alliance. Any change would only result in the same benefit or less. Secondly, the
solution is also in the core set. No group of players can form a new alliance and do
better. It can also be seen that the conditions of top-alliance property, additive
separable preferences, and symmetry were not all fulfilled.
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Table 5.5: Utility for two-, three-, and four-partner alliances
Heineken Inbev Krups Philips
{H, I,K, P} 2.48 2.58 2.12 2.12
{{H, I,K}, P} 2.67 2.87 3.76 0.00
{{H, I, P},K} 2.67 2.87 0.00 3.77
{{H,K,P}, I} 3.49 0.00 1.91 1.87
{{I,K, P},H} 0.00 3.45 1.85 1.90
{{H, I}, {K,P}} 2.09 2.57 0.00 0.00
{{H,K}, {I, P}} 3.92 3.88 4.30 4.27
{{H,P}, {I,K}} 3.92 3.88 4.16 4.20
The top-alliance property is fulfilled as {Heineken,Krups} and {Inbev,
Philips} are the top-alliances for all players. This is the best situation they can
achieve and hence, we refer to commonality of preferences. As calculation were
performed in line with the model, the condition of additive separable preferences
was partly fulfilled (see arguments on page 102). Finally, symmetry was not
fulfilled (see arguments on page 102). In spite of not fulfilling the conditions, the
game yields to a solution and this is through reasons of mutuality of preferences of
the firms. The alliances represent a win-win for all. Although Heineken and Inbev
are in this example indifferent between the two electronics companies, Krups and
Philips have a more clear preference over the brewers which can be fulfilled in the
solution.
So far, the illustration demonstrates under which conditions Heineken and
Krups, and Philips and Inbev are good matches. This is the case if, in addition
to the home appliance and beer resources, beer innovation plays a role. If the
firms involved in the case consider this beer innovation as a significant element
in their fit, the predicted partition will be the outcome. Of course, a different
input lead to different results. Other relevant resource dimensions might be the
degree of global reach of a firm or the degree of brand credibility of a firm (how
strong a firm’s brand is). With regard to global reach, Philips and Inbev may
be a good match since both operate on a global level. However, the degree of
brand credibility might bring Philips and Heineken together if both are looking
for partners with strong brands. If one is aiming at using the model to look for a
more complete analysis of a case, one should search in depth for all the relevant
dimensions and for the scores of all players on these dimensions.
To conclude, several elements of the model are illustrated with this case. First,
an example of a calculation was given and solutions were reached. Furthermore,
it was illustrated how the principles outlined in Section 5.2.2 can work in real-life
situations. There, it was argued that an alliance is a good route to achieve a pre-
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ferred resource profile if (1) certain new resources are needed, (2) particularly if
those resources are intangible resources, and (3) if those resources are complemen-
tary. Here, all three conditions were fulfilled. Knowledge and technology played
a vital role. Also, firms needed complementary resources but could provide other
important ones themselves. While Heineken needed resources connected with
appliance technology, it could provide expertise on the beer market itself. The
element of complementarity was also present; the firms were able to provide the
resources which the others were missing. Finally, the assumptions of complete
information and non-overlapping partitions were partly present in this case. The
information on resource one and two was not secret, but that Philips scored low
on resource three was initially not known to Heineken. Non-overlapping partitions
were indeed found in the case.
5.2.5 Conclusion of Model 1
The reasons behind this section were (1) incompatibilities between coalition the-
ory and alliances and (2) the lack of theory on the formation of (resource-driven)
alliances. To fill these research gaps, the Alliance Formation Model was presented
to study the formation of alliances by linking strategy, resource deficiencies, pref-
erences over alliances, and finally alliance formation. Based on this theoretically
elaborated model, several conclusions can be drawn.
From a theoretical perspective, the resource based view of alliances, the the-
ory of spatial modeling, and hedonic games (part of coalition theory) have been
combined. This is a theoretical achievement because coalition theory has so far
hardly been applied to the field of alliances. More specifically, the theory of he-
donic games has not been used in a more applied way so far. This is one of the
merits of this model. Developing or using the following elements have enabled
this application:
• partitions
• complementarity
• a dynamic approach
• endogenous preferences
First, the use of hedonic games with its prediction of partitions has proven a
fruitful choice, as it has enabled me to model how several competing alliances are
formed. Other coalition models would not have sufficed as they predict only one
coalition. Moreover, spatial modeling was helpful for positioning firm’s strategy
and resource profile. However, simply calculating the distance between resource
positions did not model the idea of resource complementarity. It was necessary
to develop an adjusted distance measure and size corrector to be able to calculate
firm’s preferences correctly. Thirdly, the process of alliance formation has become
clear through the dynamic approach. The modeling of the different relationships
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between the steps in the process has been particularly insightful; strategy influ-
ences resource needs which in turn determines partner preference - the basis for
alliance formation. Finally, the resource-based view and spatial modeling have
enabled me to define preferences endogenously which served as an input for the
hedonic games. Firms prefer an alliance which has a good balance between the
number of members and the degree to which these members can complement a
firm’s resource deficiencies.
Hence, the main contribution of the Alliance Formation Model has been to
demonstrate that coalition theory can be applied to the alliance field, and in
what way:
Conclusion 5.1 Coalition theory can be used for the field of alliances if the
following elements are taken into account: partitions, complementarity, a dynamic
approach, and endogenous preferences.
Secondly, this model has provided insight into the process of alliance formation.
Let me discuss the most crucial insights for this contribution. A relevant element
of the model is the prediction of stable partitions:
Definition 5.4 Stable partitions are partitions with alliances in which no firm
or group of firms has the incentive to deviate to another alliance.
Stable alliances are potentially more successful as compared to non-stable al-
liances. This leads us to the question of when such stable alliances are reached.
In order to find stable alliances, it is necessary to take all the preferences of all
the firms in the game into account. Although each firm has clear wishes that are
rational at the firm level, on a collective level it may be impossible to unite these
individual wishes; equilibria may not exist for every game. Firms in the decision
making process on an alliance should not only concentrate on their own preference
profile and the means to achieve this. To reach a successful alliance, it is crucial
to take the preferences of all firms into account, as each firm will aim at forming
the alliance that maximizes its preferences. Firms should take into account which
strategic moves the others may make in the alliance formation process.
Conclusion 5.2 In order to arrive at stable alliances, the preferences of all firms
involved should be taken into account.
Furthermore, the literature has presented sufficient conditions concerning firms’
preferences to guarantee the existence of stable alliances: the top-alliance prop-
erty, additive separability of preferences, and symmetry. According to the top-
alliance property, firms share a common idea on what the best alliance in a game
would be. There has to be agreement on which alliances are best. Less strict are
the properties that firms have values for each other which determine their pref-
erence over alliances (additive separability of preferences) and that these values
are reciprocal (symmetry). In business science terms, stable alliances need to be
win-win situations.
Dynamics of alliance formation 111
Conclusion 5.3 Agreement on the best alliance and mutual preferences over
other firms are sufficient conditions for stable alliances.
In other words, whether an alliance is stable and potentially successful de-
pends on the subjective judgements of a firm. Consequently, that alliances fail to
be formed or fail during their life can, amongst others, be the result of firms’ mis-
calculations (caused, for example, by a lack of complete information), a changing
environment, a lack of agreement between firms on what is best, or disagree-
ment during the alliance negotiations. This latter was seen in the case between
Heineken and Philips and is subject of the Model 2.
5.3 Model 2: Procedure Model
5.3.1 Introduction
Once alliance partners have agreed to form an alliance, it is still necessary for them
to negotiate over diverse issues in the alliance4. In these negotiations “... man-
agement must primarily focus on achieving and maintaining a good ‘fit’ between
partners” (Douma et al., 2000, p. 580, recall the theory of fit (Section 2.1.2)).
If alliance partners have achieved a strategic fit, they have a reason to form an
alliance and now need to find similarity on cultural, organizational, operational,
and personal fit. The partners have to agree on, for example, the location of the
head office, the management style adopted, or the technical systems used. What-
ever alliance is considered, partners will always have to agree on the terms of the
alliance. Especially if a large group of firms forms an alliance, these negotiations
can be complex (Das and Teng, 2002; Garc´ıa-Canal, Valde´s-Llaneza, and Arin˜o,
2003; Hwang and Burgers, 1997). The challenge of this model is to capture this
complexity by analyzing multi-partner alliance negotiations.
The Procedure Model predicts which alliance position the negotiations in
multi-partner alliances will lead to. Two aspects of the negotiations will be ex-
amined: the role of procedure and the flexibility of firms in negotiations.
The first aspect under study is the procedure for forming a multi-partner al-
liance since in real-life situations different ways of multi-party alliance formation
are observable. Take for example the One World Airline Alliance; after American
Airlines, British Airways, Canadian Airlines5, Cathay Pacific, and Qantas formed
the initial group in February 1999, Finair and Iberia joined in September of that
year, and by June 2000, Aer Lingus and LAN Chile were added (One-world-
alliance). However, when the US semiconductor industry formed SEMATECH,
fourteen firms decided together to form this alliance and all negotiated simulta-
neously on the terms of the alliance (Browning, Beyer, and Shetler, 1995). These
different paths to alliance formation are intriguing and raise questions about the
4This section is based on De Ridder and Rusinowska (2007) and De Ridder, Rusinowska,
Sa´iz, and Hendrix (2007).
5Canadian Airlines left the alliance in June 2000 after it has been purchased by Air Canada.
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consequences of these paths. Generally speaking, two different ways of multi-party
alliance formation can be discerned: a step-by-step procedure and a simultane-
ous procedure. The step-by-step approach means alliance formation as a process
in which the alliance group forms incrementally; new members are added grad-
ually. In the simultaneous procedure of alliance formation, the firms concerned
immediately negotiate together with all the members of the alliance. Given these
different procedures, the following research questions are arrived at. What role
do these procedures play? Is one procedure more advantageous for a firm? And,
is being a first-mover always advantageous for a party in alliance negotiations?
The second aspect of the model I will isolate is the negotiation flexibility of
firms. What role does the flexibility of firms play in alliance negotiations? In the
model, it is assumed that each firm has a ‘maneuvering space’ which reflects its
degree of flexibility. The size of this maneuvering space is exogenous, such that
the degree of flexility is not defined in the model. The degree of flexibility can
however be used by firms as a strategic means in alliance negotiations. Therefore,
the second research question asks whether being flexible in alliance negotiations
is advantageous for firms. Is a firm better off by being more or less flexible?
By studying these research questions, the aim is to contribute to the field of
alliances and game theory. For the alliance field, more insights will be gained
into which strategy firms involved in alliance formation should adopt. The focus
is on multi-partner alliances in which interaction among the members is more
complicated than in dyadic alliances. Multi-partner alliances have largely been
ignored in the literature (Garc´ıa-Canal, Valde´s-Llaneza, and Arin˜o, 2003). The
model can also offer practical insights into multi-partner alliances concerning the
role of procedures, being a first mover in negotiations, and the effect of more
flexibility. Of course, the model also contributes to the study of the dynamics
of alliance formation (research gap 2.2). More specifically, a more behavioral
perspective on alliance negotiations - a previously understudied area - will be
provided (Rao and Schmidt, 1998).
In game theory, the model can be placed in the tradition of coalition forma-
tion in spatial models (Section 4.2.3). In this field, the model aims to contribute
in two ways: dynamic positions of players and taking the procedure to arrive
at a coalition into account. First, in spatial coalition models, it has generally
been assumed that players have a fixed position. However, this is a shortcoming
in the literature (Laver, 2005) as in reality players change their position during
a game. Here, I will assume that positions are not fixed, but can be changed
during coalition negotiations. Dynamic positions seem a more natural situation,
since negotiating is essentially the art of wheeling and dealing and finding com-
promises. This coincides with research gap 4.5. Secondly, the aim is to model
the different procedures players go through to form a coalition. Until now, most
dynamic coalition models (as Grofman, 1982) have adopted one procedure with-
out acknowledging other procedures or the importance of procedure (exceptions
are Bloch, 1996; Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2005; see also Section 4.4.4). In line
with research gap 4.3, I will study which role procedures play and whether one
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procedure is more advantageous than another. In sum, I have defined two relevant
aspects of coalition models which contradict the reality of alliance formation. The
new model presented here will address those issues.
In short, the model assumes that firms can change their position during the
alliance game, but only to a certain extent. Each firm has a maneuvering space
of positions still acceptable to the firm. Given these maneuvering spaces, firms
will form alliances. Forming an alliance means finding an acceptable alliance
agreement - a position for the whole alliance. Firms will only agree on such
a common position if it is situated within the maneuvering spaces of all firms
concerned. So, an alliance can only be formed if the maneuvering spaces of the
members overlap. The two procedures under study define two paths to achieve
an alliance agreement.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, the basic model is
presented in Section 5.3.2. The remainder of the model and the two procedures are
presented in 5.3.3. Subsequently, the issues regarding to advantageous bargaining
are highlighted in Section 5.3.4 by posing three questions. The illustration section
(Section 5.3.5) provides results of simulations and presents theoretical results
which solve the questions posed. Finally, a conclusion is provided.
5.3.2 The basic model
Some of the elements of the Procedure Model overlap with spatial coalition for-
mation games (Section 4.2). Therefore, I will go through these common elements
more quickly and focus on the new ingredients and the interpretation of the model.
Weight
As in any coalition game there is a group of players, here firms, N , which form
coalitions, here alliances, S. Since this model studies multi-partner alliances, it
is assumed that each alliance consists of more than two firms, #S > 2. Each
firm i has a weight wi. The weight of a firm can be interpreted in different ways.
One may consider weight as a representation of the size of a firm in terms of
(a combination of) its returns, profit, or number of employees. An alternative
interpretation of weight could be the amount of bargaining power a firm has in
the alliance (Yan and Gray, 1994).
In contrast to the (spatial) coalition models of Chapter 4, weight does not
play a role in determining which firms will cooperate. The model studies the
formation process of (multi-partner) alliance agreements. In the case of alliances,
forming winning alliances which have a majority of the weight in a game is not
an issue. As argued in 4.2.5, the concepts of winning or losing are less relevant in
alliance formation. Consequently, in this model weight plays no role in forecasting
winning coalitions, but only in the influence a firm will have in the negotiations.
It is assumed that firms with a larger weight will have more influence and thus
be able to bring the result of negotiations nearer to its own position.
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Position and maneuvering space
Furthermore, it is assumed that each firm has a position in an m-dimensional
Euclidean space Rm. According to the Euclidean standard, distance can be cal-
culated between any two positions:
d(xi, xj) =
√√√√ m∑
k=1
(xik − xjk)2. (5.5)
Each firm has a unique fixed ideal position x∗i which is the favorite position of the
firm.
In general, the ideal position of a firm refers to a firm’s most favored position
with regard to the issues (that is dimensions) which must be agreed on when
forming an alliance. These issues are not issues related to the raison-d’eˆtre of
an alliance, but they concern the terms of the alliance which have to be settled
(Douma, Bilderbeek, Idenburg, and Looise, 2000; Parkhe, 1991). Irrespective of
the branch or the aim of an alliance, every alliance has to agree on these terms and
specifications. Hence, in principle, the Procedure Model applies to every alliance.
So, the model is relevant for both horizontal and vertical alliances. However,
which issues are relevant varies of course from one (kind of) alliance to the other.
Moreover, the number of issues to be settled is also context specific, and hence it
differs how many dimensions will play a role. To interpret an alliance position, I
will give examples for alliance positions in three kind of alliances:
• efficiency alliances
• resource driven alliances
• standard setting alliances
Alliances that anticipate efficiency advantages are, for example, airline al-
liances and alliances in the health-care sector. In the latter, the location of a
new hospital might be an important issue. In airline alliances, relevant issues
may be the number of planes each company provides, the number of flight routes
maintained in the alliance, or the exact combination of the air miles programme.
Access to resources is a very common motive for alliance formation. In this
category, we find co-development alliances; alliances between firms which com-
plement each other’s resource profile so that new products or services can be
developed. The alliance of IBM, Intel, and Microsoft was set up to produce a com-
puter in order to compete with Apple - this is one example of a co-development
alliance. In such an alliance, the following issues can play a role: cultural and
management issues (individualism versus collectivism, confrontation versus har-
mony style) (Douma et al., 2000; Parkhe, 1991; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, and
Aulakh, 2001), marketing issues (the number of countries in which the product
will be sold, the number of products developed together), and the set up of an
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alliance (the kind of contract, the relationship to other brands, the intended du-
ration of alliance). Hence, these issues together can form the dimensions of an
alliance position in the model.
The final type of alliance discussed here is a standard setting alliance. An
example of this type of alliance is the one formed in order to set the technological
standard for recording a DVD. Especially in the early phase of such an alliance,
partners have to negotiate on technical specifications. In this situation, each firm
has its own preferences according to its own technical expertise. In setting a
standard for recording a DVD, technical issues concern the thickness of the laser,
the angle of the laser, or the amount of data stored on a DVD. Non-technical
disputes may be the degree of openness of the alliance (access for new members),
the distribution of digital rights, or the communication style.
Given that each firm has a favored alliance position, we can calculate pref-
erences of firms. Preferences are based on distance. In order to formalize the
relationship between distance and preference, it is assumed that for any two po-
sitions x, y ∈ Rm, a firm i prefers x over y (x i y) if x is closer to i’s ideal
position x∗i : d(x
∗
i , x) ≤ d(x∗i , y). A firm is indifferent if the distances are equal
(x ∼i y if d(x∗i , x) = d(x∗i , y)) and a firm has a strict preference (x i y) if
d(x∗i , x) < d(x
∗
i , y).
It is assumed that firms are not willing to deviate too far from their ideal
position. Each firm therefore has a certain degree of flexibility which is formalized
with a maneuvering space Mi ⊂ Rm which consists of all positions acceptable to
firm i. The maneuvering space is assumed to be a ball in Rm, such that,
Mi = {y ∈ Rm | d(x∗i , y) ≤ ri}, (5.6)
where ri is the radius of the maneuvering space of firm i. The radius represents
the size of the maneuvering space of a firm. In other words, it indicates how
flexible a firm is in negotiations. The maneuvering space of i consist of all the
positions y whose distance with the ideal point x∗i is not bigger than the radius r.
An example of a maneuvering space in two dimensions is given in figure 5.2. Note
that Mi being a ball implies that Mi is bounded and convex. This maneuvering
space enables us to model players’ dynamic positions, an aspect which has been
ignored in spatial coalition theory so far.
In alliance negotiations, the maneuvering space of a firm can be interpreted
as the number of concessions a firm is willing to make. In an airline alliance, a
firm is willing to invest, for example, at least two aircrafts, but not more than
ten, since the firm wants to keep a ceratin percentage of its aircrafts for its own
use. In a co-marketing alliance, an issue in negotiations might be the number of
countries selling the product. Here, the maneuvering space denotes how many
countries the product must be sold in to be acceptable to a certain firm. A firm
preferring to sell in many countries has a wider range than a firm preferring to
focus on a few countries. Finally, in standard setting alliances, the maneuvering
space with regard to the distribution of rights might differ substantially between,
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Figure 5.2: A two-dimensional example of a maneuvering space
for instance, Disney and an electronics company, like Sony. On the dimension
of openness of rights, the former would have a small maneuvering space (a more
closed right system), while the latter would be more flexible on this issue and
have a larger maneuvering space.
Alliance formation
The firms intending to form an alliance have to agree on one common position for
the alliance. This alliance position xS represents the stance of the alliance on the
issues relevant to the alliance. With regard to organizational issues, the position
of the alliance may represent its marketing strategy. The dimension could go from
a pull strategy to a push strategy. Each partner will have its own different ideas
about this marketing strategy and in order to arrive at compromises on this, all
parties would have to change their position.
Hence, in order to form an alliance the partners must be able to compromise
on a common position concerning all dimensions for the alliance. Since no firm is
willing to deviate more from its ideal position further than its maneuvering space
allows, alliances will only form between those firms whose maneuvering spaces
overlap, these will be called feasible alliances:⋂
i∈S
Mi 6= ∅. (5.7)
Moreover, of course,
xS ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi, (5.8)
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which says that the alliance agreement is in the overlap of all the members their
maneuvering spaces.
To sum up, firms that intend to form an alliance are able to agree on this
alliance if their maneuvering spaces overlap. A firm’s maneuvering space consists
of all positions which are acceptable to the firm. Several issues still remain unclear:
which alliance position xS will be reached? How can such an agreement be made?
What influences the agreement?
5.3.3 Two different procedures
To find a solution to the basic model, I will consider and compare the two proce-
dures introduced earlier6. Before continuing with the model, two definitions are
needed: the Gravity center and Pareto efficiency.
Gravity center and Pareto efficiency
In order to determine which alliance position firms will agree on, the concept of
a gravity center is needed. Put simply, a gravity center of several positions is the
weighted average of these positions. More formally:
Definition 5.5 A gravity center xG = (xG1 , ..., x
G
m) is a set of n alliance posi-
tions xi = (xi1, ..., xim) with m dimensions in Rm with weights w1, ..., wn and is
given by the following formula:
xGp =
∑n
i=1 wi · xip∑n
i=1 wi
for p = 1, ...,m. (5.9)
Note that weight begins to play a role in the model at this point; the stronger
partner is able to pull the alliance position closer to its ideal position than the
weaker partner. This idea of gravity center has also been used in Boekhoorn, Van
Deemen, and Hosli (2006).
The second new element introduced here is Pareto efficiency. A position is
Pareto efficient with respect to an alliance if there is no other position in the
overlap of the alliance members’ maneuvering spaces that is more preferred by the
members. For any other, non-Pareto efficient position, there is another position in
the overlap of the maneuvering spaces such that for all members of the alliance,
this position is closer to the ideal point than the non-Pareto efficient position.
Formally:
Definition 5.6 An alliance position y ∈ ⋂i∈SMi is Pareto efficient with re-
spect to alliance S if
6 ∃z ∈
⋂
i∈S
Mi ∀k ∈ S [z k y]. (5.10)
6A more formal discussion of the procedures and the formal proofs is found in De Ridder
and Rusinowska (2007).
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This states that for the members of alliance S there is no position z within the
overlap of their maneuvering spaces which is preferred by all the members over
the alliance position y.
Step-by-step procedure
The first procedure under study is the step-by-step procedure. This incremental
and hierarchical approach sees “... coalition building as a process in which actors
with similar ... preferences first get together in some sort of provisional alliance
and, only after this has been done ..., do they cast around for other coalition part-
ners, adding these until the formation criterion is satisfied” (Laver and Schofield,
1990, p. 140). The proto-coalition model of Grofman (1982) is such a hierarchical
model, and also Seidman and Winter (1998) develop a gradual coalition formation
model. The basic idea is that a multi-partner alliance forms one by one; first two
firms ally, then a third one joins, and so on.
As an initial step, let us study the formation of an alliance among two firms, i
and j. It is assumed that the maneuvering spaces of firms i and j (respective Mi
and Mj) overlap, that is Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅. In order to calculate an alliance position,
a negotiations position is introduced. This position is an intermediate step in the
firms’ negotiation process. The negotiation position of firm i is denoted by x˜{i,j}i
and refers to the position in Mi∩Mj with the minimal distance to the ideal point
of i. Formally, there is always exactly one x˜{i,j}i ∈ Rm such that
x˜
{i,j}
i = (x˜
{i,j}
i1 , ..., x˜
{i,j}
im ) = arg min
z∈Mi∩Mj
d(x∗i , z) (5.11)
If rj < d(x∗i , x
∗
j ), then x˜
{i,j}
i is equal to
7:
x˜
{i,j}
ip = x
∗
jp +
rj · (x∗ip − x∗jp)√∑m
r=1(x
∗
ir − x∗jr)2
= x∗jp +
rj · (x∗ip − x∗jp)
d(x∗i , x
∗
j )
for p = 1, ...,m.
(5.12)
In other words, equations 5.11 and 5.12 refer to the position in the overlap of i and
j’s maneuvering spaces which is closest to x∗i . Similarly, a negotiation position
for firm j is x˜{i,j}j .
After defining the negotiation position of i (x˜{i,j}i ) and j (x˜
{i,j}
j ), the two
firms forming an alliance will choose an alliance position x{i,j} such that it is the
gravity center (see definition 5.5) of their negotiation positions with weights wi
and wj . Hence, the alliance position of firms i and j is the weighted average of
their negotiation positions:
x{i,j}p =
wi · x˜{i,j}ip
wi + wj
+
wj · x˜{i,j}jp
wi + wj
for p = 1, ...,m. (5.13)
7For the more rare case of rj ≥ d(x∗i , x∗j ), consult De Ridder and Rusinowska (2007).
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Figure 5.3: Example of step-by-step procedure
The next step in a step-by-step procedure is to add a third partner k with
Mk(x∗k, rk) to this two-partner alliance with x{i,j}. It is assumed that Mi ∩Mj ∩
Mk 6= ∅. To form an alliance between {i, j} and k, alliance {i, j} has to choose a
new negotiation position x˜{i,j,k}{i,j} such that
x˜
{i,j,k}
{i,j} = arg minz∈Mi∩Mj∩Mk
d(x{i,j}, z) (5.14)
If rk < d(x∗k, x{i,j}), this position is calculated as follows:
x˜
{i,j,k}
{i,j}p = x
∗
kp +
rk · (x{i,j}p − x∗kp)
d(x∗k, x{i,j})
for p = 1, ...,m. (5.15)
This is equivalent to equation 5.12, with the difference that for alliance {i, j} not
the ideal position, but the alliance position has been used. In a similar fashion,
firm k also chooses a position x˜{i,j,k}k .
The final step for the three firms is to choose their alliance position x{{i,j},k}.
This is again the gravity center of x˜{i,j,k}{i,j}p and x˜
{i,j,k}
k :
x{{i,j},k}p =
(wi + wj) · x˜{i,j,k}{i,j}p
wi + wj + wk
+
wk · x˜{i,j,k}kp
wi + wj + wk
for p = 1, ...,m. (5.16)
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This process can continue with adding new members using with the same steps
as shown above, until the aimed alliance has been reached. A picture (figure 5.3)
illustrates how the step-by-step procedure works in a three firms, two-dimensional
situation. It is seen that i and j first reach an agreement (x{i,j}). Subsequently,
k joins. The position of this larger alliance x{{i,j},k} is in between x{i,j} and x∗k.
In De Ridder and Rusinowska (2007), the general step-by-step procedure is
also defined in which an arbitrary number of firms form an alliance. In De Ridder
and Rusinowska (2007), it was proven that this step-by-step procedure for any
two players i and j, in which a player might be a single firm or a proto-alliance:
• always leads to exactly one alliance position x{i,j} as defined in equations
5.13 and 5.16,
• this alliance position is within the overlap of the maneuvering spaces of all
the firms member of the alliance,
• this position is Pareto efficient (see definition 5.6) for members of the al-
liance.
Simultaneous alliance formation
In the simultaneous procedure there are no ‘proto-coalitions’ (see Section 4.4.1)
which form intermediate steps before a definitive alliance is reached; instead, all
the firms in the alliance sit round the table to negotiate together simultaneously.
How this procedure leads to a solution is shown here.
It is first assumed that the maneuvering spacesMi for all members i of alliance
S overlap; ∩i∈SMi 6= ∅. Under this condition, each firm i ∈ S will choose a
negotiation position x˜Si which will again minimizes the distance between a firm’s
ideal point and the overlap of the maneuvering spaces of all members of S;
x˜Si = arg min
y∈∩j∈SMj
d(x∗i , y) for i ∈ S. (5.17)
With this required step the position of the alliance can be determined by taking
the gravity center of the x˜Si positions. Hence, xS is defined as:
xSp =
∑
i∈S wi · x˜Sip∑
i∈S wi
for p = 1, ...,m. (5.18)
Again, a picture (figure 5.4) will illustrate how three firms in a two-dimensional
example reach an agreement if they adopt the simultaneous procedure. When
comparing figure 5.3 and 5.4, the difference between the two procedures is clearly
visible.
As in the step-by-step procedure it was proven in De Ridder and Rusinowska
(2007) that:
• the simultaneous procedure always leads to exactly one alliance position xS
as defined in equation 5.18,
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Figure 5.4: Example of simultaneous procedure
• this alliance position xS is in the overlap of the maneuvering spaces of all
the members of S,
• this position xS is Pareto efficient with respect to the members of S.
To summarize, the main difference between the two procedures is that firms
in the step-by-step procedure form alliance agreements during the process of al-
liance formation and use these positions as starting point for the remainder of
the process. In other words, firms adjust their position during alliance negotia-
tions. However in the simultaneous procedure, firms only use their original ideal
position. A similarity between the two procedures is the role of the negotiation
position x˜i from which the gravity center forms the alliance position. By using
the gravity center, the firms’ weights play a role; more powerful firms will be able
to pull the alliance position more closer to their own ideal position.
5.3.4 Advantageous negotiating?
Two issues from the model are studied in greater depth: the role of procedure
and the degree of flexibility. Both imply choices for firms involved in multi-
partner alliance negotiations. Does procedure always make a difference? And if
a step-by-step procedure is adopted, is it wise to be one of the first movers in
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the negotiations? Then, what kind of degree of flexibility should a firm adopt in
order to achieve advantageous alliance agreements?
Advantageous is defined in terms of a firm’s preference over an alliance and
the path taken to achieve this alliance. This is measured by taking the distance
from the ideal position of the firm (x∗i ) to the position of the alliance compromise
(xS , i ∈ S). The closer the alliance position, the better.
Firms can make several choices when involved in multi-partner alliance nego-
tiations. Here, these choices are limited to three issues:
• the procedure adopted
• being a first-mover
• the degree of flexibility
The choices have an effect on the result of the alliance game. A different choice
may lead to a different alliance agreement, which will in turn lead to different
preferences among the firms concerning the alliance, the procedure by which it is
formed, and the alliance agreement. So, the question boils down to which choices
will give a firm the most preferable result. This section will briefly discusses the
three issues and pose three questions. The illustration section will provide various
(counter-intuitive) examples to provide answers to these questions.
With regard to procedures, take three firms that are planning to form an al-
liance. In that case, four different paths to alliance agreement are possible: the
simultaneous procedure {1, 2, 3} and the three step-by-step procedures with firms
three, two, and one respectively joining as last member: {{1, 2}, 3}, {{1, 3}, 2},
{{2, 3}, 1}8. Calculations have shown that the number of different paths and al-
liance positions can increase dramatically. In a game with ten firms, 210 − 11 =
1013 different 10-party alliances are possible. This number only holds if all al-
liances are feasible, that is, if all maneuvering spaces overlap. When taking differ-
ent procedures into account, there are 4, 932, 045 different step-by-step alliances
plus 1013 simultaneously formed alliances. In sum, if ten parties play this alliance
game, there are 4, 933, 058 different ways of reaching an agreement.
Although many different paths exist to reach different alliances, the question
is whether all these paths always lead to different results. Take a three-partner
alliance; is a different alliance agreement always agreed on if firm one and two
negotiate first, and only then firm three joins as compared to the case in which all
three negotiate together? More generally, does procedure always matter? In the
illustration section, I will show under which conditions different procedures lead
to the same result and claim whether it can realistically be assumed that these
conditions hold, and answer the following question:
Question 5.1 When do the different procedures of alliance negotiations lead to
different results?
8Note that the same coalition is predicted four times: {1, 2, 3}, but that only the procedure
to reach this coalition is different.
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Intuitively, it might be expected that first-movers in bargaining situations have
an advantage. The earlier a firm is involved in alliance negotiations, the more this
firm is able to pull the other firms towards its own ideas. The idea is that, in
this way, a firm can determine and influence the negotiations more and can gain
advantage out of it. When joining negotiations later, a firm will be confronted
with more compromises which have already been agreed on by the others. Hence,
to study whether this intuition is true the following question will be examined:
Question 5.2 Can being a first-mover in multi-partner alliance negotiations be
a disadvantage?
The final important variable in the model is the size of firms’ maneuvering
spaces reflecting the degree of their flexibility in negotiations. This size (denoted
by the radius r) is not defined in the model. Hence, the degree of flexibility of a
firm is exogenous. In general, one can argue that it is better to be less flexible.
The more flexible a firm becomes, the more it is willing to deviate from its ideal
alliance position, which other firms can take advantage of. Hence, the expectation
is that it is better to be less flexible, so that an alliance compromise closer to a
firm’s ideal position can be reached. I will investigate this in the case where
the maneuvering space of the firms involved overlap. The issue is not whether a
change in flexibility leads to a change in the number of feasible partners (more or
less intersections), but rather whether it has an effect on the outcome of alliance
negotiations.
Question 5.3 Can being less flexible in multi-partner alliance negotiations be a
disadvantage?
5.3.5 Illustration: simulations
In order to answer the questions posed above, this section will provide compu-
tational examples derived from simulations (see Section 3.1.3 for the underlying
methodology). These examples illustrate that certain choices in the alliance ne-
gotiation process are not always as advantageous as one might expect. The role
of these simulations is to produce certain results (existence theorems) which may
be counter-intuitive (Axelrod, 2000).
The Procedure Model calculations can be performed with an algorithm devel-
oped by Sa´iz and Hendrix (2007). For the illustrations here, a game with eight
firms was used. Each firm was given a randomly generated two-dimensional ideal
alliance position x∗i within a range [xMIN : xMAX ]. The maneuvering space was
the same for all firms. Furthermore, weights wi were provided in two ways. Some
examples use a weight equal for all firms, while in other examples, a weight within
a range [1 : wMAX ] was randomly assigned to each firm. From the calculations, it
can be seen which firms have an overlap in their maneuvering space and can form
a feasible alliance. This resulted in feasible alliances with a maximum of four
members. Alliances with more members were not found due to lack of overlap.
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Figure 5.5: Example one
In real-life situations, many examples of multi-partner alliances are found. The
introduction discussed airline alliances and the SEMATECH cooperation. Smaller
multi-partner alliances are found in the liner shipping industry as described in
Song and Panayides (2002). This industry has groups of alliances containing three
to four members. Another example of a three-partner alliances is the 1981 alliance
of IBM, Intel, and Microsoft. To compete with Apple, IBM launched its IBM PC
by joining forces with Intel (which supplied the microprocessor) and Microsoft
(which supplied the operating system). Although this alliance has broken up, it
is an example of how a relative small group of firms can cooperate. In general,
multi-partner alliances are formed when members’ specializations are compatible
(for example, they have different positions in the value chain) or when there is a
need for scale advantages. The alliance between IBM, Microsoft, and Intel is an
example of a specialization-driven alliance and the liner shipping alliances is driven
by efficiency and scale motivations. Although the calculations in this section are
based on randomly generated data or theoretical examples, it is believed that
the examples relate to real-life situations in which a small group of firms have to
agree and compromise on alliance conditions. The numbers which were generated
by the computer represent situations as in figure 5.5. This figure can refer to a
fairly realistic situation as it contain few outliers or other extreme characteristics.
Moreover, the aim is not so much to model a real-life situation but to show which
results one can expect from of the model.
For the first example generated by the computer the firms were given a random
x∗i between [−100 : 100] and a weight wi between [1 : 10]. The size of the
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maneuvering spaces were set at 50. The computer generated the following ideal
alliance positions: ((36,−39), (−8, 75), (14,−97), (49, 24), (−89, 95), (21, 99),
(−30, 48), (−77,−12)). Weights were: (5, 3, 7, 4, 10, 8, 5, 8). The situation in this
game is shown in figure 5.5.
In the example, 38 step-by-step alliances and seventeen simultaneous alliances
are feasible. Among these, one four-partner alliance can be formed, namely the
alliance involving players 2, 4, 6, and 7. There are thirteen different paths to reach
this alliance. In addition to the simultaneous procedure, there are twelve step-
by-step procedures in which two firms begin and are later joined one by one by
the other two members. For example, {{{2, 4}, 6}, 7} relates to the procedure in
which firms two and four first reach an agreement, are joined by firm six, and later
by firm seven. For these thirteen different procedures leading to the same 2, 4, 6, 7-
alliance, it was calculated which alliance positions are predicted. Subsequently,
the distance from each member’s ideal position to the alliance position can be
calculated. Table 5.6 shows these results. It holds that, the closer the firms are,
the more favorable the alliance, because in that case a firm has to compromise the
least. The lowest distances are given in bold. For firm four, {{{2, 4}, 7}, 6} yields
the best alliance position: 46.08 has the smallest distance to x∗4. In this way, it
can be analyzed which path is the most advantageous for each firm. So, to recall,
the aim here is not to study which alliance will form, but rather to study which
bargaining moves are advantageous given a certain alliance, here {2, 4, 6, 7}.
The issue in question 5.1 (When do the different procedures of alliance negoti-
ations lead to different results?) is studied with table 5.6. In the situation shown
Table 5.6: Example one: Distance between alliance position and firms’
ideal position
2 4 6 7
{{{2, 4}, 6}, 7} 29.94 46.70 42.43 46.69
{{{2, 4}, 7}, 6} 30.41 46.08 44.44 45.43
{{{2, 6}, 4}, 7} 28.66 48.13 40.87 46.64
{{{2, 6}, 7}, 4} 29.18 47.62 41.13 46.97
{{{2, 7}, 4}, 6} 29.06 47.43 44.39 43.94
{{{2, 7}, 6}, 4} 28.84 47.66 43.42 44.60
{{{4, 6}, 2}, 7} 29.04 47.70 41.33 46.66
{{{4, 6}, 7}, 2} 28.40 48.22 41.79 45.57
{{{4, 7}, 2}, 6} 29.40 47.09 44.41 44.31
{{{4, 7}, 6}, 2} 29.82 47.67 43.31 44.69
{{{6, 7}, 2}, 4} 28.93 47.65 42.37 45.65
{{{6, 7}, 4}, 2} 28.94 47.63 42.36 45.67
{2, 4, 6, 7} 29.28 47.24 43.13 45.34
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in this table, all the distances between a firm’s ideal position and the alliance
position are different, implying that all the procedures lead to different alliance
positions. Hence, although the table deals with the same alliance, the procedure
used to reach the alliance is decisive for the alliance position. In other words,
procedure matters when determining which alliance agreement will be reached.
However, in De Ridder and Rusinowska (2007) it was shown under which
conditions the different procedures can lead to the same alliance position and
consequently the same appreciations by the members. The sufficient condition
under which this holds says that the ideal alliance positions of all the firms in the
alliance are located within the intersection of their maneuvering spaces, which is
a very strict assumption. This situation is illustrated in figure 5.6. Here, the ideal
positions of three firms are all within the intersection of their maneuvering space.
A less strict version of this condition also predicts that the procedures will lead
to the same outcome. This relaxed condition requires that the ideal positions of
all firms, except the last mover, are acceptable for all. Either the ideal positions
are close or the firms are very flexible. If one of these two conditions holds, all
the different procedures lead to the same alliance position. Nevertheless, this is
quite an exceptional case since very close alliance wishes are prerequisite.
Figure 5.6: Three firms with ideal positions in the overlap of their
maneuvering spaces
In conclusion, the procedure by which of alliance formation occurs usually
plays a role in determining the result of alliance negotiations. Therefore, this
procedure should play a role in alliance negotiations.
Result 5.1 With the exception of some cases, for instance in which firms’ ideal
positions are acceptable to all players, the different procedures of alliance negoti-
ations lead to different results.
A follow-up question is to study which procedure is better in which case. Are
there general rules which can predict when a certain path is more advantageous?
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In De Ridder and Rusinowska (2007), a number of sufficient conditions are found
under which one procedure is better than the other. For an alliance with three
members i, j, and k, in which only the ideal position of k belongs to the maneu-
vering spaces of all firms in question, the following holds. Firm k weakly prefers
() the simultaneous procedure {i, j, k} over the step-by-step procedure with k
joining as last ({{i, j}, k}) if two sufficient conditions are met. First, the ratio of
the weight of i and j has to be equal to the ratio of their radii. Secondly, the
alliance position of {i, j} is outside the maneuvering space Mk of k. Firm k will
strongly prefer () the simultaneous procedure over joining the coalition last in
the step-by-step procedure if the following three sufficient conditions hold. The
first condition on the ratio presented above should hold and the second condi-
tion demands that the position of x{i,j} is in Mk. The third condition is rather
technical, but depends on the ideal positions of all three firms and the negotia-
tion positions of i and j. In sum, such conditions are found and demonstrate in
which case which procedure is beneficial. Unfortunately, the conditions are rather
technical and difficult to interpret for alliance negotiations.
A more general answer to finding advantageous paths is that three elements
are vital: (1) the weights of firms involved (their influence), (2) the ideal positions
of the firms, and (3) the radii of firms’ maneuvering spaces (their flexibility). Each
configuration of these three elements may lead to a different situation in which
paths might are favored differently.
Now that the importance of procedure in most cases has been established, the
question arises of which moment in the procedure is the most advantageous for
entry into alliance negotiations. Intuitively, one would argue that involvement
from the beginning is the best strategy. But can we answer question 5.2 (Can
being a first-mover in multi-partner alliance negotiations be a disadvantage?)
affirmatively? Table 5.6 shows clearly which alliance procedures are preferred by
the members. For example, firm four prefers {{{2, 4}, 7}, 6} in which it is one of
the first movers. As expected, most firms in this example prefer early involvement
in the process.
However, firm two does not follow this pattern. This firm has the lowest
distance to the alliance position formed by procedure {{{4, 6}, 7}, 2}. Firm two’s
preference is to join as the last participant in the step-by-step procedure since
this will lead to an alliance position that is closer to firm’s two ideal position.
Hence, being a first-mover is not always the best option in alliance negotia-
tions. Sometimes it pays to wait:
Result 5.2 It can be disadvantageous to be a first mover.
In order to show that weight does not play a decisive role in this, but rather the
spatial configurations of the firms, consider example two as presented in table 5.7.
Here, the same kind of calculations are made with the same randomly generated
ideal positions, but now with a weight fixed at five for each firm. The most favored
alliance position and paths are the same for 2, 4, and 7, but not for 6. The earlier
conclusions still hold.
128 Chapter 5
Table 5.7: Example two: Distance between alliance position and firms’
ideal position
2 4 6 7
{{{2, 4}, 6}, 7} 31.67 44.84 44.61 46.74
{{{2, 4}, 7}, 6} 31.99 44.53 46.53 45.33
{{{2, 6}, 4}, 7} 29.80 46.86 42.25 46.69
{{{2, 6}, 7}, 4} 29.66 47.04 41.91 46.84
{{{2, 7}, 4}, 6} 29.90 46.75 46.49 42.88
{{{2, 7}, 6}, 4} 29.51 47.07 45.79 43.12
{{{4, 6}, 2}, 7} 30,23 46.39 42.78 46.70
{{{4, 6}, 7}, 2} 29.07 47.43 43.37 44.90
{{{4, 7}, 2}, 6} 30.35 46.27 46.51 43.40
{{{4, 7}, 6}, 2} 29.28 47.22 44.67 43.93
{{{6, 7}, 2}, 4} 29.41 47.07 43.99 44.72
{{{6, 7}, 4}, 2} 29.42 47.07 43.98 44.73
{2, 4, 6, 7} 29.74 46.75 44.45 44.66
The final question posed in Section 5.3.4 concerned whether it can be a disad-
vantage for a firm to be less flexible in multi-partner alliance negotiations (ques-
tion 5.3). For this question, the computer was again asked to deliver randomly
generated ideal positions and weights which resulted in example three. The ideal
positions were randomly generated between [1 : 100] and are: (86, 66), (86, 34),
(59, 29), (50, 34), (90, 53), (82, 73), (65, 31), (82, 84). The weights (6, 4, 8, 6, 5, 7, 7, 8)
are randomly generated from a range between [1 : 10]. An algorithm (Sa´iz and
Hendrix, 2007) was applied that calculates the distance between a firm’s ideal
position and generates alliance positions given that this firm decreases the size of
its maneuvering space, while the maneuvering spaces of the other firms remained
constant. For each feasible alliance it was calculated what difference it made if the
radius of the maneuvering space of each member slowly decreased by five, while
the others stay at a radius of 50. The size of the maneuvering space is determined
by its radius and models the flexibility of a firm. The smaller the radius, the less
flexible a firm is.
The most interesting case is alliance {{1, 2}, 8}. The consequences of a de-
crease of the radius for this alliance are shown in figure 5.7. The x-axis shows the
radius for each firm. On the y-axis, the distance between a firm’s ideal position
and the alliance position is shown. The lower the line, the closer the alliance po-
sition is to the firm’s ideal position and thus the better for the firm. Note again,
that only one player decreases its radius at a time in the calculations, while the
rest of the players remain at 50. For player two and eight it is seen that a decrease
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in the radius leads to a lower distance and, thus, being less flexible is more ad-
vantageous. However, the line of player one shows a different direction. For this
player, it appears that a decrease in radius can lead to an alliance position which
is actually further away from its ideal position. This is also seen in table 5.8. A
radius of 35 gives a distance of 19.52, while a radius of 30 is expected to have a
distance of less than 19.52. However, in this example, the distance increases to
21.76.
Figure 5.7: Effect of radius, example three
Table 5.8: Distance between alliance position and firms’ ideal position
for player one, with different radii, example three
Radius 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5
19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52 21.76 29.62 39.10 34.89 23.26 11.63
The intuitive idea that it is advantageous for a firm to be less flexible is
supported by a vast majority of the calculations. The other alliance partners
have to reach further to make a compromise, yielding advantages for the more
stubborn partner. However, a three-partner counter-example was found in which
a player did not profit from inflexibility. Note that when forming a two-party
alliance, being less flexible is never disadvantageous. Since the alliance consists
of only two parties, the more flexible party of the two will be forced to move its
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position more than the other. Such a case can be called a zero-sum situation: what
one firm wins, the other must lose. Nonetheless, as seen in case of an alliance with
three or more members, being less flexible is not always advantageous. A decrease
in flexibility on the part of a partner may be advantageous, disadvantageous, or
may yield the same result for the specific partner.
Result 5.3 Being less flexible in multi-partner alliance negotiations can be a
disadvantage.
5.3.6 Conclusion of Model 2
This model concerned the dynamics of alliance negotiations, and specifically, how
firms adjust their alliance position during alliance negotiations, what the impact
is of their flexibility is, and what role procedure plays. More specifically, it was
shown what is advantageous for a firm involved in multi-partner alliance negotia-
tions. The Procedure Model has contributed in two ways: (1) providing insights
into multi-partner alliance negotiations and (2) theoretical improvements for spa-
tial coalition models.
Multi-partner alliance negotiations are complex and include many strategic
options that firms should be aware of. The Procedure Model has focused on
two of these aspects: procedure and degree of flexibility. Based on the results of
analysis and computer simulations, several conclusions can be drawn. First, it
can be concluded that the procedure adopted for forming a multi-partner alliance
is important (De Ridder and Rusinowska, 2007). Only if certain conditions hold
(for instance, if alliance partners’ ideal positions are really close or if firms are
very flexible) do different procedures yield to similar outcomes. In most cases,
it can be said that the adopted procedure makes a difference for the result of
alliance formation.
Conclusion 5.4 For multi-partner alliance negotiations, it matters for firms which
procedure of negotiating is adopted, except, for example, when the ideal alliance
positions of the firms are acceptable for all firms.
This result is mainly a theoretical contribution which proves the idea that proce-
dure matters. The result contributes to the literature on multi-partner alliances
(e.g. Das and Teng, 2002; Doz, Olk, and Smith Ring, 2000) which has acknowl-
edged the complexity of multi-partner alliances but which has not investigated
the different formation paths of multi-partner alliance formation.
Hence, it can be concluded that it really pays for an alliance manager to care-
fully consider his or her strategic options when entering alliance negotiations. To
delve deeper into the considerations that play a role during alliance negotiations,
the role of being a first or late mover was investigated. It was found that first
movers are not always better off. Intuitively, it would seem advantageous to be
involved in an alliance at the beginning. In this way, a firm is better able to pull
the alliance towards its wishes. With the computation of an example, it was seen
that this does not always hold.
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Conclusion 5.5 For multi-partner alliance negotiations, it can be a disadvantage
for firms to be a first mover.
This theoretical finding can be complemented with some results from a three-
partner case. The focal firm is a firm with an ideal position which is already
acceptable for the two other firms. This firm will be better off with a simultaneous
procedure rather than a step-by-step procedure in which the firm is a late mover
under the following conditions: (1) if the degree of flexibility and the degree of
influence of the firms is in balance and (2) if, in the step-by-step procedure, the
agreed alliance position of the first two movers is inside the range of flexibility
of the focal firm. Hence, the two other firms have agreed on a position which is
acceptable for the late mover. If these two conditions hold, the firm will prefer
simultaneous negotiations.
Finally, the role of flexibility was studied. Firms choose the set of positions
acceptable for the firm. Of course, a firm can choose to be more or less flexible. In
general, it is expected that lower flexibility will lead to better negotiation results.
This was indeed found to be the case in most of the examples calculated. However,
it does not always hold. In some cases, players are disadvantaged by becoming
less flexible. It leads to an alliance position which is further from their alliance
position.
Conclusion 5.6 For multi-partner alliance negotiations, it can be a disadvantage
for firms to be less flexible in negotiations.
Again, this is a theoretical result which contradicts the general idea of a two-
player case in which less flexible players are always better off. Hence, this model
has been able to capture some of the complexities of negotiations in multi-partner
alliances by focusing on procedure, first-moving, and flexibility.
With regard to the second contribution, the Procedure Model has developed
several dynamic aspects which contribute to the theory of spatial coalition models.
In contrast to more static spatial coalition models, this model enables players to
change their position in Euclidean space and the model explicitly studies the
procedures by which coalitions are formed. Changing position is modeled by
introducing the concept of maneuvering space. Each player is assumed to have
a maneuvering space around its ideal position within which lie all the positions
still acceptable to that firm. These maneuvering spaces set the boundaries within
which coalitions may be formed. Since this idea is not common in spatial coalition
theory, I will emphasize it:
Assumption 5.1 During coalition negotiations, players each have a position
from which they are only willing to deviate to a certain extent. The maneuvering
space is the set of all acceptable positions.
Hence, players are able - to a certain extent - to change position during a coalition
game in order to reach a compromise with its partners.
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A second dynamic innovation of the Procedure Model is the introduction and
comparison of two uniquely defined procedures. The analysis has shown that pro-
cedure indeed plays a role and must therefore be taken into account in coalition
models. Certain models, see Grofman (1982) and Seidman and Winter (1998),
would arrive at different results if a different procedure were used. In sum, while
previous models have emphasized the role of power and policy, this model con-
tributes with its attention on the process of coalition formation (procedure and
changing positions).
5.4 Conclusion and model comparison
In this section, a short conclusion will be presented and a comparison between
the two models discussed in this chapter.
This chapter has presented two models which both analyze the formation
of alliances. While Model 1 focuses on the composition of an alliance, Model 2
studies the agreement to be reached in an alliance. Based on the modeling, several
conclusions and propositions have been made. When forming resource-driven
alliances, if preferences of firms over partners are aligned and preferences are
reciprocal, then the process of alliance formation will eventually evolve towards
a stable state. When potential alliance members negotiate about an alliance
agreement, the adopted procedure they adopt and flexibility of the firms’ position
will influence the result of the negotiations. In sum, it can be concluded that
process is important in alliance formation. The theoretical implications of the
models will be presented in the overall conclusion in Chapter 7.
This section continues with a systematic model-comparison of the two pre-
sented models with regard to their basic question, input, throughput, and output.
Table 5.9 is the basis for this comparison. ‘Anatomizing’ the models allows a bet-
ter technical comparison between the two models to be made and can explain in
what sense the models are complementary.
Based on the table, several conclusions can be drawn. First, although the
models study different questions, both models deal with the process of alliance
formation. While the Alliance Formation Model studies how alliances are formed,
the Procedure Model analyzes how an alliance can reach an agreement. Hence,
these two models together offer a reasonable comprehensive picture of how al-
liances are reached; the questions of who will cooperate and how these firms
reach an agreement are addressed.
Furthermore, when taking a closer look at the input and output of the two
models, one can observe an overlap there. The output of the Alliance formation
Model is the input of the Procedure Model. The Alliance Formation Model pre-
dicts which groups of firms will form alliances, while the Procedure Model requires
a group of firms forming an alliance as input. In that sense, the two models are
highly compatible and can even be combined. The Procedure Model naturally
follows the Alliance Formation Model and can use its prediction to study how an
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Table 5.9: Summary of models Chapter 5
Model 1 Model 2
Alliance Formation Model Procedure Model
Basic ‘How can firms in an industry ‘How does procedure influence
question form stable alliances?’ alliance negotiations
in multi-partner alliances?’
- the set of players - the set of players
(firms in an industry) (firms forming an alliance)
Input - firms’ strategy - weights of players
(exogenous) - a linkage between strategy - ideal alliance position of
and resources players
- utility threshold λ - size of players’ maneuvering
- size correction function CS space
- the adjusted distance - the condition of feasible
equation 5.1 alliances
Throughput - the utility equation 5.2 - the two procedures
(endogenous) - preference equations introduced
5.3 and 21
- stability concepts
(the core and stable set)
Output A partition (i.e. a set) of An alliance position
different alliances
alliance can reach an agreement.
Finally, from a more model technical perspective, the models are similar. Both
contain a throughput consisting of a set of equations which formalize the behavior
expected from firms. One could say that this throughput is the real model which
captures the essence of behavior and illustrates the dynamics of alliance forma-
tion. By linking the input with the throughput, certain expectations (output) can
be stated which predict what will happen given the expected behavior of firms.
Hence, the way in which firms form preferences over alliances will determine which
firms will cooperate, while the procedures they adopt and their flexibility during
negotiations will determine which alliance agreement is reached.
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Modeling partner dynamics
within an alliance
Now that two models have been created concerning the formation of alliances, this
chapter focuses on the next step: the behavior of firms within an alliance; the
partner dynamics. In the Coordination Model (Model 3, Section 6.1), coordina-
tion between partners is the central subject. An experimental study is presented
which studies whether players facing a coordination task are influenced by earlier
pre-alliance interaction. The Commitment-Opportunism Model (Model 4, Section
6.2) focuses on opportunism in alliances and analyzes how the dominance of one
member influences opportunistic behavior in an alliance. Three different versions
are used to analyze alliances that are equal, unequal, and that evolve from equal
to unequal. The final section of the chapter provides a conclusion and compares
the two models.
6.1 Model 3: Coordination Model
6.1.1 Introduction
Coordination is one of the many tasks faced by partners within an alliance1. Co-
ordination forms part of the daily operations of the alliance (who will do what at
what time), but also plays a role during alliance preparations (setting the terms of
the alliance). Coordination is required to make the alliance operative; establishing
conditions and reaching daily routines. By definition, coordination is considered
the emergence of agreements and routines through which the integration points,
processes, and division of labor between partners are established (Spekman, Is-
abella, MacAvoy, and Forbes III, 1996). Firms will not always agree on how to
1This section is based on De Ridder and Smeenk, 2007.
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coordinate; conflict can arise as to what the best option is. Coordination tasks
with a conflict are the subject of this section.
The coordination tasks faced by alliance partners will be modeled with a
battle-of-the-sexes (BoS) game (see Section 3.3.5). In a BoS game, situations
are modeled in which there is a need to correlate the behavior of players (Ras-
musen, 2005; Schelling, 1960), but the players in the game disagree on what the
best way of coordinating is. This models the situation outlined above; two firms
in an alliance that disagree about a coordination task. The BoS game has two
pure Nash equilibria which are non-Pareto rankable2. This means that player one
prefers one equilibrium, while player two prefers the other equilibrium. If both
choose differently, however, they end up with the worst payoff. The problem is
then that both players want to coordinate, but disagree on the equilibrium they
will coordinate on (Camerer, 2003). Moreover, the assumption is that the players
cannot make binding agreements3, which makes the selection of strategies even
more difficult. The assumption of no binding agreements does not exclude com-
munication, but simply says that there is no means for the players to convince
each other. Although firms in alliances make binding agreements, such as con-
tracts, reaching such a contract and operating more daily non-crucial routines are
coordination tasks in which partners sound each other out and in which binding
rules are generally lacking. Besides the sense of reality of this assumption, the
challenge here is whether firms can coordinate effectively without binding agree-
ments. To keep the model simple, I will use a two-player BoS game and hence
model dyadic alliances.
The classic Nash equilibrium approach does not predict which of the two
equilibria will be selected by the players. Moreover, it is also unknown under
which conditions one of the two equilibria will be played. That implies that classic
game theory cannot offer a prediction of exactly what will happen. If one wants to
apply the BoS game to model social phenomena, such as coordination in alliances,
this result is unsatisfactory. All that is known is that one firm prefers situation
A while the other prefers situation B and that either A or B will be the result of
the game. In other words, classic game theory does not offer enough unambiguity.
This problem has been acknowledged in game theory literature (e.g. Abele, Bless,
and Ehrhart, 2004; Oechssler, 1997). The question then arises of whether selection
criteria can be found which make one of the strategies more salient. Can game
theory be enriched or supplemented by predicting which strategies will be chosen?
Note that the aim here is not to predict the level of coordination, that is to say,
the equilibrium, but the behavior of firms - their strategy selection.
Here, the solution to the problem of multiple Nash equilibria is found by
2Pareto ranking of equilibria refers to the preference of all players over an equilibrium; a
Pareto better equilibrium is preferred by all players over a Pareto dominated equilibrium. In a
BoS game, there no equilibrium which is Pareto better.
3This is one of the underlying assumption of the non-cooperative branch of game theory. The
strategic game perspective adopted here is part of this branch. In Section 2.4.3, it was already
argued why this branch can be used to study partner dynamics within an alliance.
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taking the past into account (the Associative Approach, Marks, 2002, see Section
3.3.2). The innovation of the associative approach is that it studies repetition of
two different games. While repetition of the same strategic game through time
is a well-developed area of research (Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987), only Marks
(2002) has analyzed how two different games influence each other. In a dynamic
approach to game theory, the repetition of different games seems a natural step.
That is why this section builds upon the associative approach. The main idea is
that a pre-alliance interaction (game one) provides information which players in
a BoS game (game two) can use to make a strategy selection. Through shared
pre-alliance interaction, players are expected to be able to coordinate more easily
and the unambiguity problem can be solved.
This approach has also been chosen for its match with alliances. In Section
2.4.3, it was concluded that relatively little attention has been paid to the role
of pre-alliance interactions on the behavior of firms in an alliance (research gap
2.3). A pre-alliance interaction can refer to previous alliances between firms, but
also to other types of interaction. The influence of previous alliances has been
studied in alliance literature (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Porrini,
2004). These articles studied whether a previous alliance experience with the
same partner influences the performance of the alliance. Although firms, partic-
ularly firms in the same industry or market, do not operate in a vacuum, but
interact frequently with each other, the effect of shared experiences outside an
alliance setting has not yet been studied. Therefore, this model will contribute to
this particular area of study. Outside an alliance setting, firms interact, amongst
others, on the labor market, through the development of new technologies or re-
lations with shared suppliers. This section focuses on the effect of a previous
interaction between two partners on their coordination within an alliance. Any
kind of previous interaction is taken into account: alliance and non-alliance expe-
riences. In principle, the Coordination Model should apply to any kind of dyadic
alliance, but it will be more relevant for horizontal alliances as firms which have
formed a horizontal alliance have more intense and frequent interaction before
and outside an alliance setting.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. The next section will
review the literature on the subject of coordination problems. The subsequent
section will develop the approach of this study further and present the hypotheses
(Section 6.1.3). These hypotheses are tested in an experimental study, which is
reported in Section 6.1.4.
6.1.2 Coordination problems
This section is concerned with coordination problems, modeled as games with
multiple Nash equilibria. In this section, the battle-of-the-sexes game (table 6.1)
is used to analyze a coordination problem in which there is a disagreement be-
tween the players. The two players represent the two partners in an alliance.
For convenience, a specific coordination task is adopted; choosing a governance
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structure for the alliance. It is assumed that the firms can choose between two
strategies both representing one type of governance structure: alliance form A
and alliance form B. These alliance forms can be, for example, a joint venture, a
licensing agreement, or an equity share. The model could also apply to any other
kind of coordination problem: from where to meet for a meeting, to who will be
responsible for a certain task. Firm one prefers strategy A, while firm two prefers
strategy B. If both choose differently, no agreement can be reached on the form
of the alliance and it will fail - the worst outcome for both firms. The two pure
Nash equilibria of this game are (A,A), (B,B). To reach agreement, one of the
firms will have to give in and opt for the preference of the other firm. The game
sec does not give any clues on which firm will be the more selfish or persistent
player and which firm will be more willing to give way.
Table 6.1: Battle-of-the-sexes-game
Firm 2
Alliance form A Alliance form B
Firm 1 Alliance form A 3, 2 0, 0
Alliance form B 0, 0 2, 3
The problem of multiple Nash equilibria has been acknowledged and studied
before in game theory literature. Roughly two types of solutions have been offered,
depending on the use of information from inside or outside the game:
• internal solutions (only use the game sec)
– mixed strategy equilibrium
– evolutionary learning approach
• external solutions (only use information from outside the game)
– focal point theory
– conventions
– pseudo-sequentiality
– associative approach
For each approach, I will review its use for the field of alliances by assessing (1) if
the approach offers a real prediction on what will happen under which conditions
(the desired unambiguity as explained in the introduction) and (2) whether the
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approach is appropriate for the case of alliances4.
A first refinement of game theory that uses only internal information is the
mixed strategy equilibrium, as introduced in Section 3.3.1. The mixed strategy
equilibrium of the game in table 6.1 is ( 35 ,
2
5 ) as calculated in Section 3.3.5. The
mixed strategy equilibrium can be considered as a part of classic game theory.
Mixed strategy equilibria have been interpreted in two ways (Hargreaves Heap
and Varoufakis, 2004; Osborne, 2004; Samuelson, 2002). First, one can consider a
player as a member of a whole population in which p% of the population would opt
for one strategy and the remaining (1-p)% would play the other strategy. This
interpretation does not apply for the case adopted here, alliance coordination.
Firms involved in alliance coordination are specific firms in a specific alliance. In
other words, there is no population of players which plays the same game over and
over again. The two firms cooperate because of a specific fit they have and because
they form a unique match. The second interpretation of the mixed strategy is
that a player plays in p% of the cases a players chooses one strategy and in (1-
p)% the other strategy. Medina (2005) contributes to this interpretation by using
the mixed strategy equilibrium to forecast the likelihood of a certain situation.
Medina (2005) argues that the higher the likelihood of players adopting a certain
strategy, the more likely it is that this strategy combination will be the outcome.
This second interpretation does not suffice in our case either, as it does not offer
the unambiguity desired for our case. The aim is to look for a more specific
prediction of firms’ behavior and not a probability distribution. We would prefer
to know under which conditions which choice will be made.
The evolutionary learning approach (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Oechs-
sler, 1997; Young, 1993) is also an internally oriented solution. Here, equilibrium
selection is considered to be a dynamical process of repeating the game several
times, but played by different agents drawn from one population. Their model
basically selects players from a finite population of individuals which are matched
to play a game. Each player only plays once. To determine their strategy, players
have limited information (this is called myopic learning) concerning the choices
made by other players in earlier rounds. Therefore, actions from the past affect
the strategy selection of future players. Once an equilibrium has been played for
as long as anyone can remember, this equilibrium becomes the conventional way
of playing the game. In this model setting, Kandori et al. (1993) and Young
(1993) prove that one pure Nash equilibrium will eventually be selected with a
probability of one. In the case of alliances, this approach would imply that there
is a population of firms from which every time two firms are selected which play
an alliance game. After they have played the game once, they ‘get back’ to the
rest of the firms and tell the next two players what they have chosen. Although
there is information exchange between firms in different alliances in a real alliance
4In the reviewed literature, the authors offer solutions for games with multiple Nash equilib-
ria, like the BoS game. Oftentimes, the authors use pure coordination games. Notice that the
BoS game is not a pure coordination game, since the players can rank the two Nash equilibria
(but cannot agree). The value of the articles is their approach to multiple Nash equilibria.
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setting, information is not distributed in the public way which is the assumption
made in the evolutionary learning approach.
As a first external orientation, Schelling (1960; see also Sugden, 1995) argues
that players naturally use information from outside a game to choose a strategy.
In this way, coordination problems can be avoided. He has developed the idea
of focal points; equilibria which are more salient or prominent than others. If
players draw on a shared perception or use information from outside the game,
this might make some strategies more prominent than others. Experiments have
indeed shown that some strategies are more salient and hence lead to a focal point
(Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden, 1994; Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden, 1994a).
Players can use many labels to reach a focal point. The theory of conventions
predicts that players will use conventions to make a preference over strategies and
equilibria. A convention refers to a regularity which everyone conforms to, and
which everyone expects everyone else to conform to, and which everyone prefers
to conform to on condition that the others do so too (Lewis, 1969). In other
words, a convention is an expectation of certain behavior. Conventions can also
create confusion when they are ambiguous or when more than one convention
is appropriate. Both the idea of focal points and conventions are potentially
usable as ways to narrow down multiple Nash equilibria in the alliance BoS game.
However, in order to use the focal point and convention theory, questions such as
which focal points are relevant for the empirical domain and which conventions
firms use would have to be answered. Will firms behave as they have done in
earlier alliances? Will they behave in line with management books? Or will they
use certain local habits? This model studies one kind of focal point; revering to
earlier experiences with the alliance partner.
A more psychological social-cognitive explanation for decision making is found
in Abele et al. (2004). These authors performed a multitude of experiments in
which respondents play coordination games. One group played the game simul-
taneously, while the others played the game sequentially, but without knowing
the choice of the opponent. Abele et al. (2004) call this pseudo-sequentiality.
Although both groups have the same amount of information on their opponent’s
choice, differences in their perception of the game can be observed. When playing
in a simultaneous order, players perceive the game as a game of chance and are
more averse to risk. The pseudo-sequentially games, by contrast, are considered
more as social interactions, and here people become more prepared to take risks.
The authors conclude that “... activated schemata and the situational context
play a role in interactive decision making” (Abele et al., 2004, p. 44). Again,
it is seen that information or circumstances from outside the game influence the
selection of a strategy.
Finally, Marks (associative approach, 2002, also see Section 3.3.2) argues that
‘history’ can serve as a focal point for players in a game with multiple equilibria.
Players facing such a game will look back at the past in order to find analogies
with other situations, referring to history. Players will use information from earlier
games with the same player to make a selection. In this way, it will be easier for
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players to make a choice and one equilibrium will be reached more often. Reverting
to an earlier shared experience implies that any kind of earlier interaction can serve
as an association. Hence, different kind of games are combined and therefore the
theory of iterated games is not usable as it predicts iteration of similar games.
Marks has found evidence for the role of an earlier interaction in experimental
studies. Here, I will build on this approach since it enables us to model the
influence of any kind of pre-alliance interaction among firms involved in an alliance
task. There are many arguments in the alliance literature which suggest that pre-
alliance interactions play a role in alliances. This literature is discussed in the
next section. The associative approach also enables us to study the role of past
interactions in greater depth. Furthermore, the associative approach contributes
in an innovative way to the dynamics of strategic games.
Role of pre-alliance interactions
In general, interactions among social actors shape subsequent interactions and
the social setting in which they occur (Abele et al., 2004; Hill, 1990). In busi-
ness settings too, firms meet frequently. Earlier interactions can influence firms’
behavior at a later stage. Evidence for this can be found in the literature on
strategic alliances. Several authors have studied the influence of pre-alliance inter-
organizational relationships among alliance partners on their subsequent alliance
(e.g. Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Porrini, 2004). If firms know
each other from alliances from the past, it is easier to know what to expect and
what choices to make during alliance formation. Hill (1990) introduces the term
‘reputation’. Here, reputation is used in a narrow way: reputation through a
firm’s own direct experience with a partner, as opposed to knowledge gained con-
cerning a partner from third parties. Reputation is also a concept which has been
studied in game theoretical literature, for example in Kreps and Wilson (1982).
The reputation of a firm may play an important role in determining the willing-
ness of others to cooperate. According to other studies, reputation has indeed
been proven to play a role for firms and for alliance formation (Dollinger, Golden,
and Saxton, 1997; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Saxton, 1997). In sum, it can be
stated that pre-alliance interactions may play a role through earlier alliances or
through reputations formed during any kind of pre-alliance interaction.
To conclude, the aim is to study the behavior of two specific firms involved
in an alliance coordination task, modeled with a BoS game. Classic game the-
ory (Nash equilibrium concept and mixed strategy equilibrium) predicts multiple
Nash equilibria and cannot predict which strategy will be played under which
conditions. Since firms are neither part of a relevant population, nor can they
learn from this population, it was argued that internal solutions are not useful.
External solutions reason that players in a BoS game will use information from
outside the game to determine a strategy. In the case of alliance coordination,
it was argued that pre-alliance interactions among firms may play a role. This
role is twofold: earlier alliances among firms and the reputation a firm has built
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in previous (alliance and non-alliance) interactions. This indicates that not only
earlier alliances play a role, but also that different kind of interactions matter.
6.1.3 Modeling the influence of pre-alliance interactions
The real-life alliance situation which is modeled here consists of two firms that
stand for a coordination task as part of the formation of their dyadic alliance.
The coordination task of the two firms is to agree on the governance structure of
the alliance. What form of organization should the alliance adopt? The relevant
choice to be made is the choice for an organization form. Each firm has a different
preference for a particular organization form. This coordination task is modeled
with a BoS game as presented earlier in table 6.1.
To model the influence of pre-alliance interaction, it is assumed these two firms
have had previous contact in a competitive interaction, defined as game one. As
an illustration of this idea, it is assumed that the firms have, in the past (before
any plans for an alliance), competed for a prospective creative employee they were
both eager to hire. Only one of the two firms was able to hire the employee, and
hence to win. The other firm was the losing party. This game with its competitive
nature is considered game one and precedes the BoS game, game two. The result
of game one is a clear winner and loser.
In game theoretical terms, it is expected that the first game serves as external
information in the second game. More specifically, the first game creates a focal
point for the second interaction. This is the main idea of the associative approach
(Marks, 2002) and is visualized in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The idea of the Associative Approach
In the BoS game, none of the strategies is in itself more prominent. The
players will see that there are several equilibria in the game and the game sec
does not help them to pick one strategy. Rather than simply choosing a strategy
at random, Marks argues that players will start looking for analogies with other
situations. It is assumed that the players have played a different game before
the BoS game. If no conventions have developed, players can make associations
according to elements of the game: structure, payoff, and strategy. However, in
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the associative approach, Marks does not specify exactly how associations are
made. No prediction is made as to which aspects of the first game will be used
(payoff, structure, players) and neither is it clear whether players are aware or
unaware of their associations.
Since this study adopts the associative approach in a more applied setting, it
is hoped to offer more insight into these questions. Additionally, embedding the
ideas of the associative approach in a strategic alliance setting allows me to test
the ideas in a different field than the one used by Marks.
Deduced from the associative approach, it is expected that firms which have
participated in a previous interaction will more often choose a certain strategy.
They are expected to see an analogy with the earlier situation (game one). More
specifically, information on the other player is expected to play a role. The first
game results in a winner and a loser. Translated in alliance terms, the information
available is the reputation of players as either a winner or a loser. At t2, the same
two players play the BoS game. The firms know which of the two players was
the winning firm and which was the losing firm. This is the information they are
expected to use in their strategy selection. How exactly the associations are made
is discussed in the hypotheses section.
Hypotheses
First, if there is no prior interaction before a coordination task, it is expected
that the choices of players will be as predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium.
In the experiment conducted to study the hypotheses, it is calculated how many
respondents have chosen strategy ‘Alliance form A’ (p%) versus strategy ‘Alliance
form B’ (1-p%). The mixed strategy equilibrium would predict that 60% of the
players will choose their most favorable option A, and that the remaining 40%
will opt for their less favorable choice, strategy B. Although it was argued earlier
that the mixed strategy equilibrium does not provide the required unambiguity
looking for, it is only adapted here as a way of calculating the prediction of classic
game theory.
Hypothesis 6.1 In a battle-of-the-sexes game between two players that have no
shared past with each other, the strategy selection conforms to the predictions of
the mixed strategy equilibrium.
However, as was argued above, it is expected that an earlier interaction can
change this behavior. If players have had previous contact, they will have formed
an image of each other and know something about the other’s reputation. Thus,
a previous interaction before the BoS game helps the players to depict one of the
strategies. They are expected to make an association between the first interaction
and the BoS game. The first interaction is of such a nature that it results in a
winner and a loser. It is expected that there is a difference between the behavior
of the firm that won and the firm that lost.
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To be a winner in this first interaction requires persistence, and even some ag-
gression. In other words, it is expected that the winner of the first game has built
a reputation which contains these characteristics. The loser of the first interaction
has a reputation of non-persistence and giving up easily. Both players will use
this information about the other player in selecting their strategy. It is expected
that the winner of the first interaction is more likely to play its favorite strategy,
that is, the strategy that gives the highest payoff. This will happen as this firm
will see the analogy with the previous interaction and the previous weakness of its
opponent. Conversely, the loser will perceive its opponent’s reputation as tough.
It makes the analogy that this firm will act in this way again and, therefore, this
losing firm is expected to take its least favorite strategy. The loser anticipates
that the winner will again play its most favorite strategy and given this choice,
the choice for its own least favorite strategy is the most rational one.
Hypothesis 6.2 In a battle-of-the-sexes game between two players that precedes
an earlier competitive interaction, the winner of the earlier interaction will play
its most favorite strategy.
Hypothesis 6.3 In a battle-of-the-sexes game between two players that precedes
an earlier competitive interaction, the loser of the earlier interaction will play the
most favorite strategy of its opponent.
In reality, of course firms can take a fairer approach, but the argument that
it is the losers’ turn to get something back from the other does not apply to the
associative approach. The only information the players have is the information
on what kind of player the other is: persistent or giving in. Based on this, the
players will make an association and will anticipate the same kind of behavior.
The hypotheses have been tested in an experimental study. Section 6.1.4
reports on this.
6.1.4 Illustration: experimental results
I will first report on the method and sample of this experimental study, and
subsequently present the results found.
Method and sample
In Section 3.1.3, I introduced the methodology on experiments (Lewis-Beck, Bry-
man, and Futing Liao, 2004; Weibull, 2004). Here, I will explain how this specific
experiment was conducted. To test the hypotheses, an experiment with a post-
test-only control group design was used (Malhotra and Birks, 2003). In this
design, the respondents are randomly divided into two groups: the control group
and the experimental group. In the control group, the BoS game is played. The
results from this game are used to test hypothesis 6.1. The experimental group
also plays a BoS game, but is manipulated by being given information on the
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outcome of an earlier competitive interaction. The outcome of the second BoS
game is used to test hypotheses 6.2 and 6.3.
For this experiment, 100 students and employees of the Business Administra-
tion division (Nijmegen School of Management) filled in a questionnaire. For this
study, two simultaneous move games have been linked, which implies that each
player decides independently of the opponent’s choice. Therefore, the respondents
did not have to come together at a specific time or location. In addition, because
players make their choices independently of their opponents, it was possible to
conduct the study in a written form.
The data were collected at two different periods. The first set of data was col-
lected by addressing students and employees of the Nijmegen School of Manage-
ment in the library, the computer room, and within the faculty5. The second set
of data was gathered in a classroom experiment during a Master course ’Strategic
Decision-making’. At the start of a lecture, students filled in a questionnaire. Re-
spondents were selected at random, but in equal numbers to represent either the
control group or the experimental group. The response rate was 100%. Because
the study is about strategy selections, it was not necessary to link the various
respondents to arrive at combinations of two players per game.
In the experiment, respondents were asked to imagine that they worked for
a particular firm that is, due to fierce competition, forced to collaborate in an
alliance with a competitor. In order to finalize the alliance negotiations, an agree-
ment has to be reached on the organization form of the alliance. Each firm has to
make a choice without knowing the other’s choice. There are two alliance forms
which the firm and its competitor can choose from: ‘Alliance form A’, the pref-
erence of firm one, and ’Alliance form B’, preferred by firm two. A description
of the payoffs for each choice was provided, the payoffs were given as millions of
euros, therefore, ‘two’ referred to two million euro. It was also explained that the
outcome of the game was dependent on the choice of the firm and the competitor’s
choice (based on the BoS game as presented in table 6.1). Respondents were asked
to choose between A and B, and in other words, to play the coordination game.
Furthermore, a number of the respondents were asked to explain why they had
chosen a certain strategy. These written explanations were used to understand
the players’ choice.
Three versions of the questionnaire were made: one for the control group and
two for the experimental group. Hence, the extra information on the interaction
in the past was under control. In all versions, the above case description was given
and the payoff structure was the same. In the first version, 50 respondents from
the control group had to choose an alliance form which would benefit them or their
opponent more. A standard BoS game was played and the only information that
the respondents had at their disposal was the information in the case description,
as summarized above.
For the experimental group, a second and third version was made. In these
5This was done in the master thesis project of Just de la Pasie`res (2005) and Pietersen (2005).
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versions, in addition to the case description, written information was provided on
an interaction which had taken place prior to the two firms forming an alliance.
The control group lacked this information which enabled us to study the influence
of this information on the respondents’ strategy selection. The two firms had in
the past (before the alliance plans) competed for a potential and creative employee
who they were both eager to hire. It was explained that one of the two firms won
this battle for the employee by hiring him or her, while the other had lost. Twenty-
five respondents from the experimental group were asked to fill in the second
version, in which they had the knowledge that their firm (one) had previously
won the earlier battle for the employee at the expense of firm two. The other 25
respondents filled in the third version of the questionnaire, in which they (firm
two) were the loser of the earlier competitive interaction with firm one.
Results
In this section, the results of the experiment will be discussed. For each ques-
tionnaire, the number of respondents who chose a certain strategy was calculated.
This distribution is compared with a test proportion which represents an expected
distribution. For the control group, the observed proportion is compared with the
test distribution as predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium (hypothesis 6.1).
It was assumed that in a BoS game between two firms that have no shared past
with each other, the degree of coordination would not deviate significantly from
the degree of coordination as predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium (the test
proportion). As discussed in the previous section, this mixed strategy equilibrium
predicts that 60% of the respondents will chooses alliance form A and 40% will
chooses alliance form B. For the experimental group, the distributions observed
were compared with the distributions found in the control group to establish
whether the respondents with additional information had chosen significantly dif-
ferently from the respondents without this information. In order to compare the
distribution found with the test distribution in both cases, we will use a binomial
tests. This test is an appropriate test for the number of respondents involved in
this experiment (100) (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). The number of respondents is
sufficiently large enough to draw results based on this test (Siegel and Castellan,
1988). Because the aim was to find out whether the two groups differed signifi-
cantly, a two-tailed significance had to be used. In the binomial tests as presented
in the tables only one-tailed significance is provided, therefore it has been doubled
to obtain the two-tailed significance.
The first binomial test concerns the control group respondents and is reported
in table 6.2.
Recall that the aim was to test whether the percentage of respondents who
choose alliance form A was significantly similar (=) or dissimilar (6=) from .60 (the
percentage predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium, the test proportion). As
can be seen in table 6.2, 27 control group respondents (46%) chose alliance form A,
their strategy with the best payoff. The remaining 23 control respondents (54%)
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Table 6.2: Binomial test control group
Alliance N Observed Test Signi-
form proportion proportion ficance
Control group A A 27 .46 .60 .031a
Control group B B 23 .54 .40
Total 50 1.00 1.00
a One-tailed
chose alliance form B, which gave them the lowest payoff. When the proportion
observed here (.46) is compared with the test proportion (.60), it appears that
these proportions differ significantly (p = 2 ∗ .031 = .062). That implies that the
respondents in the experiment did not behave as expected by the mixed strategy
equilibrium. The choice of strategy A or B was more almost 50/50 and not
the expected 60/40. This indicate that hypothesis 6.1 cannot be accepted. In
other words, players in a BoS game between two firms that have no shared past
with each other do not choose strategies according to mixed strategy equilibrium
prediction, but players rather play the two strategies fifty-fifty.
Hypothesis 6.2 states that in a BoS game between two firms that precedes
an earlier competitive interaction, the winner of the earlier interaction will play
its most favored strategy. In the tested game, firm one was assumed to be the
winner and for this firm, strategy A is its most favored option. To test the
hypothesis, a binomial test was conducted for the experimental group respondents
that represent firm one. The behavior of this experimental group was statistically
compared with a test proportion. The observed proportion of the control group
respondents choosing their favorite strategy (.46) was used as test proportion.
Table 6.3 presents the results of this binomial test.
Table 6.3: Binomial test experimental group: Firm one
Alliance N Observed Test Signi-
form proportion proportion ficance
Experimental group1 A A 19 .76 .46 .002a
Experimental group1 B B 6 .24 .54
Total 25 1.00
a One-tailed
As can be seen in table 6.3, nineteen experimental group respondents who
148 Chapter 6
represent firm one (76%; Experimental group1 A) chose alliance form A, whereas
six respondents (24%; Experimental group1 B) chose alliance form B. Hence,
the vast majority of these winners chose its most favored strategy. When the
proportion observed here (.76) is compared with the test proportion (.46), it
appears that these proportions differ significantly (p = 2 * .002 = .004) when we
use an α of 0.1. In other words, the respondents in the experimental ‘winner’
group behaved significantly different from the control group.
These results indicate that hypothesis 6.2 can be accepted; a winner chooses
the most profitable strategy within the BoS game. After all, alliance form A yields
a payoff of three for firm one, whereas alliance form B only yields two. This find-
ing was supported by the respondents’ explanation for their choice. The answers
of the winner group can be divided into three categories: some respondents did
not take the previous interaction into account, some respondents considered them-
selves superior, and other respondents estimated the opponent as being weaker.
The latter set of answers was the largest; most winner respondents thought their
opponents had a weaker position in relation to them and they anticipated that
their opponent would choose the winner’s favorite outcome. Although some re-
spondents also took their own strong position and tougher reputation into account,
the reputation of the other appeared to be a more important factor.
The final hypothesis (6.3) investigated whether in a BoS game between two
firms that has been preceded by an earlier competitive interaction, the loser of
the earlier interaction will play the most favored strategy of its opponent, that is,
its own least favorite strategy. In the game setting adopted here, the losing party
is firm two. For firm two, A is its least favorite choice and B is its most favored
choice. To compare the experimental group respondents representing firm two
with the control group respondents, a binomial test was conducted comparing the
found proportion of the experimental ‘loser’ group with the found proportion of
the control group. It is important to recall that in the control group, 54% choose
their least favored strategy, which is strategy B. This difference is related to the
experimental losing group being player two in the game, while the control group
respondents were all player ones. Hence, the proportion of respondents choosing
their least favored strategy is compared. Table 6.4 reports the outcome of this
binomial test.
The numbers in table 6.4 show that fourteen respondents of the losing ex-
perimental group choose their least favorite strategy, alliance form A (56%, Ex-
perimental group2 A), whereas eleven respondents choose their favorite strategy,
alliance form B (44%, Experimental group2 B). Hence, a majority of the re-
spondents chose the less favorable strategy consistent with an underdog position.
However, if this proportion is statistically compared with the test proportion (the
proportion found in the control group) this experimental group does not behave
significantly differently to the control group respondents (p = 2 ∗ .142 = .284).
These findings do not provide sufficient evidence to support hypothesis 6.3. In
other words, a firm that has lost a previous competitive game does not behave
significantly differently to a firm without this previous competition.
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Table 6.4: Binomial test experimental group: Firm two
Alliance N Observed Test Signi-
form proportion proportion ficance
Experimental group2 A A 14 .56 .54 .502a
Experimental group2 B B 11 .44 .46
Total 25 1.00
a One-tailed
Apparently, previous losers do not take this loss into account so that their
behavior will differ from firms without this extra information. The qualitative in-
formation indicates that most loser respondents did not take the extra information
into account when picking a strategy.
6.1.5 Conclusion of Model 3
This section has studied the influence of a pre-alliance interaction on the coor-
dination of firms within an alliance by using an experimental study. The main
question we sought to answer was whether a previous interaction influenced this
coordination task; is the behavior of alliance partners influenced if they have met
before? In this way, insight has been gained into the role of past interactions and
in alliance coordination.
As a first conclusion, it can be stated that the experiment conducted partly
confirms the ideas on the influence of pre-alliance interactions. It was shown
that past interaction matters, but it only plays a role in the case of players that
had a winner experience during previous interaction. The winners of the first
interaction chose their most profitable strategy more often than firms without an
earlier interaction. Hence, in the experiment, extra information for the winners on
the losing status of their opponent significantly changed their alliance coordination
behavior. However, losers did not behave significantly differently from players that
had no extra information regarding past interaction. Apparently, information
about the opponents’ winning status was not used to make a strategy selection.
The main result of this study is therefore that players which know that they
have previously won an earlier interaction with their opponent will be more likely
to choose their profitable strategy. A past interaction influences the choice of
players, but only if they obtained a positive result from this. It also shows that
players are capable of making the association between two different games, but,
again, they only make or use the association if they have previously won.
Conclusion 6.1 In general, players are able to make associations between two
different strategic games.
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Conclusion 6.2 If players make associations, there is a difference between the
winners and losers of the pre-alliance interaction. Winners take past interaction
into account more and are thus more likely to select their most advantageous
strategy.
Of course, these conclusions only hold for the experiment we conducted. Al-
though 100 respondents were used and this is sufficient number for the test per-
formed, including more respondents would improve the validity of this study. To
validate the results further, a larger scale experiment could be conducted. It
would be advisable to conduct this experiment in a real business setting and to
use managers as respondents.
Furthermore, the question arises of why losers do not behave differently from
the mixed strategy equilibrium predictions, whereas winners do. A first reason
may be the adopted n. Further research will have to study whether this finding
indeed holds. Secondly, as the qualitative results show, the losers ignored the extra
information. It seems logical, then, that they did not behave significantly different
from the control group which lacked the extra information. Either the extra
information was not considered important enough for the losing group (although
it was for the winner group) or this group preferred to ignore their loss and the
gains of the winner respondents.
In sum, the first two conclusions offer new insights into how players behave
and make certain choices. This is an addition to the literature offering solutions
for multiple Nash equilibria (e.g. Abele et al., 2004; Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden,
1994; Oechssler, 1997).
An additional conclusion is that the control group which lacked information
on past interaction did not behave as expected by the classic mixed-strategy
distribution. Instead of a 60%− 40% distribution, the respondents approached a
fifty-fifty distribution. Half of the players played their favored strategy and half of
the group played their non-favored strategy. This result is not a verification of the
presented model, but rather a lack of support for the mixed strategy equilibrium.
This strengthens the choice made for alternative approaches like the one presented
here (Marks, 2002).
These conclusions lead to the first contribution of the Coordination Model in
the field of dynamic strategic games. As argued earlier, the theory of dynamic
strategic games has been able to model repetition of similar games (e.g. Axelrod,
1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Taylor, 1987). However, the model presented
here (Marks, 2002) enables us to study the repetition of different games. This
model is an innovation within the literature of dynamic games which is valuable
because it allows studying the past more thoroughly. In real life, players are
involved in a variety of interactions which need to be modeled with different
kind of games. The way games are repeated in the associative approach differs
substantially from more traditional repeated game theory. There is no super-
game, nor do players choose a super-strategy before the super-game starts. The
information structure of the two games in the associative approach is different;
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before game one, the players do not know whether there will be a game two. It
is only when game two begins that the players are assumed to look back. Instead
of looking forward, the associative approach rather looks back in time. This
makes it more difficult to forecast the players’ behavior. Although the associative
approach takes a step forward in developing dynamics in strategic games, the step
is relatively small and needs further testing and development (involving more than
two games, for example).
As a second area of contribution, I will draw several cautious conclusions
concerning the impact for the field of alliances. These conclusions are tentative
because they are based only on an argumentation and on an experimental study
conducted among business students and scholars, adopting a business case. The
ideas about the role of reputation and prior business interactions among alliance
partners were partly confirmed. This contributes to the literature on the role
of pre-alliance interactions (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Dollinger, Golden, and
Saxton, 1997; Gulati, 1995; Porrini, 2004). This literature states that previous
relations play a role in firms’ alliance behavior. This study showed that previous
interactions among potential alliance members can facilitate alliance coordination.
The mechanism at work is that the shared past experiences help the previous
winners decide on a strategy. The firm that previously won holds an expectation
that the losing firm will behave less selfishly. The losing firm, meanwhile, knows
that the other firm was stronger and the stronger firm will be more likely to choose
its own favored option. That indeed proved to be the case in our experiment: the
previous winner chose its best strategy more often. There are however some
limitations to these findings: there is only one type of coordination task, other
than past interactions, no other explanations were posited for why the firms might
chose a certain strategy, and the set-up of the experiment, which used students
and scholars and a simplified case.
Proposition 6.1 When alliance partners face coordination tasks, past interac-
tion is expected to play a role. Firms that came out as winner in a pre-alliance
competitive interaction are expected to choose more often the coordination option
that benefits them most.
6.2 Model 4: Commitment-Opportunism Model
6.2.1 Introduction
As well as coordination challenges, alliance partners are also faced with the
dilemma of choosing between commitment and opportunism6. If firms form al-
liances, there is no guarantee that all partners will be wholeheartedly committed
to this alliance. Why not behave opportunistically by sitting back and relying on
6This section is based on De Ridder, 2005.
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the efforts of your partner to make the alliance work? And what would happen if
all members acted like this? Various studies have addressed this problem of com-
mitment versus opportunistic behavior in alliances (e.g. Das and Rahman, 2002;
Zeng and Chen, 2003) and it has been widely acknowledged that opportunism is
a potential problem within alliances. Lack of commitment on the part of member
firms is an issue that can adversely affect the performance of an alliance (Das and
Teng, 2000; Zeng and Chen, 2003). The commitment-opportunism balance has
often been modeled as a social dilemma (Das and Teng, 2000; Douma, Bilder-
beek, Idenburg, and Looise, 2000; Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria, 1994; Kogut,
1989; Zeng and Chen, 2003). The idea is that each firm has an incentive to
behave opportunistically, but that opportunism by all members is a collectively
undesired result. Despite this, each firm persists in behaving opportunistically in
order to avoid losing out to free-riding of the other members.
A flaw in the literature on the commitment-opportunism balance is that this
balance has not been studied in the case of unequal alliances (Zeng and Chen,
2003), while many alliances are unequal in character: they might begin unequal
or evolve towards inequality (Yan and Gray, 1994). This means that the influence
of dependency and power has hitherto been neglected in this field of study, in
spite of the significant influence that power has on the functioning and perfor-
mance of an alliance (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Kogut, 1989; Yan and Gray,
1994). Alliance failure can often be attributed to an asymmetric power balance
(Muthusamy and White, 2005). This leads us to the main contribution of this
study; to build on existing knowledge about the commitment-opportunism bal-
ance by studying this balance in unequal alliances, since this is an area which has
not been studied before in the literature. By combining dependency and power
with the commitment-opportunism balance, two partner dynamics are studied in
a related way (research gap 2.4).
In line with previous research (Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria, 1994; Kogut,
1989; Zeng and Chen, 2003), the issues of commitment and opportunism will be
studied through a game theoretical lens or, more specifically, a social dilemma ap-
proach. The commitment-opportunism dilemma will be studied in three different
kinds of alliances: (1) equal alliances (studied with a repeated prisoner’s dilemma,
in line with earlier research), (2) dominated alliances (modeled as a repeated hy-
brid prisoner’s dilemma-chicken game), and (3) an alliance that changes from
equal to dominated. Again, the focus is on dyadic alliances. The Commitment-
Opportunism Model can apply to any alliance which is a sustainable relationship,
such as a co-development alliance in which each firm is dependent on the re-
sources, capabilities, and technology of the other to produce its products. An
example of such an alliance would be the cooperation between Rover and Honda
(Carr, 1999; Pilkington, 1996), the cooperation between Heineken and Krups to
produce the BeerTender, and between Philips and Sara Lee to produce the Senseo
coffee-maker.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. The first section will
study the balance of commitment-opportunism in an equal alliance and examine
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the question of how two firms can achieve mutual commitment. Subsequently,
Section 6.2.3 will study unequal or dominated alliances. It will be demonstrated
how the dilemma between commitment and opportunism changes when an al-
liance becomes dominated by one partner. Section 6.2.4 considers alliances that
change from equal to unequal. In the illustration section (Section 6.2.5), an illus-
tration of these ideas is provided by an analysis of the Rover-Honda case. Finally,
conclusions are drawn.
6.2.2 A prisoner’s dilemma approach to equal alliances
Here, the starting point is an equal alliance among two firms which can either
behave in a committed way or in an opportunistic way. This interaction will
be modeled after a two-by-two prisoner’s dilemma (see Section 3.3.3). This sec-
tion reviews such a prisoner’s dilemma perspective on commitment versus oppor-
tunism. In the first part, I will explain the two strategies, in which I argue why
opportunism is a problem in alliances, and I will justify the choice of a prisoner’s
dilemma. The second part describes how firms can escape the dilemma. This
section is a review of previous research by Cullen, Johnson, and Sakano (2000),
Gulati et al. (1994), Hill (1990), Hwang and Burgers (1997), and Zeng and Chen
(2003), and also serves as the basis for the new approach of Section 6.2.3.
Defining the commitment-opportunism dilemma
The two strategies that the firms have at their disposal are commitment and op-
portunism, alternatively known as cooperation and competition7. Commitment
refers to being loyal to the alliance by investing in the alliance as promised and
by behaving in a way that it is optimal for the success of the alliance. As a min-
imal norm, a committed member will honor the alliance contract. A committed
member can also work on a harmonious relationship by enhancing communica-
tion and trust in attitudinal commitment (Cullen, Johnson, and Sakano, 2000;
Zeng and Chen, 2003). A committed member is, in other words, a cooperative
member which wants to ensure the success of the alliance. Opportunism refers to
non-faithful and self-interested behavior on the part of a member; an opportunis-
tic member only focuses on gains for its own firm - (partly) at the expenses of
others - and is less concerned with the interests of the alliance as a whole. The
learning race view of Hamel (1991) coincides with this perspective on behavior.
Emphasizing formal control in the alliance is also typical for competitive behavior
(Inkpen and Currall, 2004). Beware that opportunism does not necessarily imply
rational behavior as defined in game theory (see page 48). Opportunism is one
of the two strategies a member has at its disposal. Which form of behavior is
7Some authors consider intermediate forms between commitment and opportunism (Zeng
and Chen, 2003) or add an exit option as a third strategy (Arend and Seale, 2005; Phelan,
Arend, and Seale, 2005).
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rational depends on the payoff structure, and it is not the case that opportunism
always gives the highest payoff.
Several elements of an alliance give rise to opportunistic behavior (Hamel,
Doz, and Prahalad, 1989; Parkhe, 1993a; Zhang and Li, 2001). The often infor-
mal character of alliances, the lack of the creation of a new entity in an alliance,
the lack of a central authority, cooperation between competitors, and the flex-
ibility of an alliance are factors which increase the likelihood of opportunistic
behavior (Barringer and Harrison, 2000). In spite of the development of trust
and the existence of formal control mechanisms, which may indeed lower the risk
of opportunistic behavior, this risk should never be completely ignored (Inkpen
and Currall, 2004; Kogut, 1989).
If both partners behave opportunistically the alliance will not be able to per-
form as expected. Opportunism affects the performance of the alliance in terms of
the rewards the alliances can be expected to yield, because too little investments
take place. The partners will not be able to realize the potential of the alliance
which can lead to premature alliance termination. Moreover, opportunism can
negatively affect the stability of an alliance (as defined on page 14) and can affect
the relationship among partners. Clearly, then, opportunism does not necessarily
equate to a rational choice. In fact, opportunism has indirect negative conse-
quences for a firm’s individual gains.
However, the dilemma firms involved in alliances face is that if members try
to avoid opportunism and commit themselves fully and unconditionally to the
alliance, they are more vulnerable to being exploited and abused by their part-
ners which can free-ride on their efforts (Das and Teng, 2000a; Zeng and Chen,
2003). In this way, partners in an alliance will find themselves trapped in a social
dilemma; each member has an incentive to behave opportunistically, which will
lead to an undesired collective outcome.
More specifically, player one appreciates the outcomes as follows: (oppor-
tunism, commitment)  (commitment, commitment)  (opportunism, oppor-
tunism)  (commitment, opportunism). The best situation for a firm is free-riding
which implies being opportunistic while the other is committed. Meanwhile, mu-
tual commitment is preferred over mutual opportunism. The least favored out-
come is being the only committed member and being vulnerable to the free-riding
of the other. Both players are equally dependent on the alliance, as can be seen
in the valuation of mutual opportunism. Mutual opportunism can lead to a lower
alliance performance, and both prefer mutual commitment to this scenario of low
performance. Both seek to avoid mutual opportunism, however, this is not so
important to either partner that they want to avoid it at all expense. Allowing
the other to free-ride is the worst option for both firms. Finally, both have the
same appreciation of their efforts for the alliance.
This description leads us to a prisoner’s dilemma. Table 6.5 presents the
prisoner’s dilemma model of the commitment-opportunism dilemma. The Nash
equilibrium is (opportunism, opportunism). Hence, no commitment is achieved
in this game.
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Table 6.5: Commitment-opportunism dilemma
Firm 2
commitment opportunism
Firm 1 commitment 3, 3 1, 4
opportunism 4, 1 2, 2
A way out of the dilemma
However, for the prisoner’s dilemma, it has been mathematically proven (Taylor,
1987) and shown by means of a computer tournament (Axelrod, 1984) that under
certain conditions commitment can be achieved. This was previously discussed
in Section 3.3.3. Here, I will recapitulate these results and interpret them for the
case of the commitment-opportunism balance in alliances.
Cooperation can be achieved in a prisoner’s dilemma if8:
• the game is repeated an indefinite number of times
• the discount factor is high enough
• players adopt a certain super-strategy, for example the tit-for-tat strategy
I will discuss all three conditions which are based on Axelrod (1984) and Taylor
(1987) and interpret their meaning for the alliance case. These conditions are
sufficient to achieve cooperation and are important, because they offer a way out of
the prisoner’s dilemma and determine the circumstances under which cooperation
can pay in a prisoner’s dilemma setting.
The first condition requires that the prisoner’s dilemma is dynamic in the sense
that it is repeated an indefinite number of times. The game (and the alliance) has
an end, but players do not know when the game will end. They cannot therefore
behave as if the game is in its last round; they know there is a likelihood of future
meeting and behave accordingly. Note that the condition does not necessarily
require that the game is repeated an infinite number of times, rather, for alliances,
this condition implies the players assume the relationship has no end-date or firms
do not know in advance when the alliance will be terminated. This condition
always holds because alliances are intentionally long-term arrangements. This is
what differentiates an alliance from a market transaction.
Secondly, the discount factor has to be high enough. The discount factor refers
to a number between zero and one which denotes how important the future is. A
low discount factor implies that future payoffs are not important to players at this
8Additionally, cooperation can also be achieved if there is uncertainty about the player’s type
(Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson, 1982).
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moment. The condition requires that players appreciate future payoffs enough in
order to reach mutual cooperation. If the discount factor is too low, players will
behave with only the short term in mind. This condition applies when firms
judge the alliance and its future as valuable. Indicators of a high discount factor
are high frequency of interaction, an intensive alliance, and a shorter time span
between alliance outcomes assessments (Parkhe, 1993a). Firms which perceive
their alliance as a long-term relationship will have a higher discount factor than
firms in an ad-hoc short-term alliance. Das and Rahman (2002) argue that the
longer a relationship lasts, the weaker the tendency towards opportunism. Ac-
cording to Inkpen and Currall (2004), cooperative behavior among firms increases
in proportion to the duration of the relationship. When interactions take place
and an alliance develops, trust could increase and the likelihood of opportunistic
behavior will possibly decrease.
Finally, the tit-for-tat rule states that a player should start with playing com-
mitment and the player should only maintain this strategy in subsequent rounds
if the other player has played commitment in the round before. This refers to
reciprocal behavior in an alliance. If one partner behaves in a way which is likely
to promote the success of the alliance, the other partner will do so to. As soon
as one begins to behave opportunistically, the other one will follow. Reciprocity
refers to the potential to reward and penalize other partners. As indicated by
Kogut (1989), this is fundamental to the achievement of long-term cooperation;
a high norm of reciprocity in a joint venture will increase its stability.
6.2.3 A hybrid game approach to dominated alliances
The question now arises whether the conclusion that a high value for the future
and reciprocity stimulate cooperative behavior also applies when one of the part-
ners is less dependent on the alliance and, consequently, in a position of greater
power. As alliance partners seldom have the same degree of dependency and, con-
sequently, power during an alliance (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Yan and Gray,
1994), this question is highly relevant. Moreover, earlier research has shown that
a power imbalance can negatively affect the performance of an alliance (Barringer
and Harrison, 2000; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).
However, the tension between commitment and opportunism in an alliance has
so far not been studied in unequal alliances (Zeng and Chen, 2003); what is the
consequence of a power difference for firms’ (commitment-opportunism) behavior?
Inequality in an alliance
Yan and Gray’s article (1994) from the alliance literature provides a great deal of
insight into inequalities within alliances9. Yan and Gray (1994) provide two the-
9Game theory also has theories studying power (for example power indices such as the
Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power index). I will, however, follow the line of reasoning of
alliance theory here.
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oretical perspectives: bargaining theory and resource-dependency theory (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978; see also Section 2.2.2) which together lead to three dimen-
sions of power. First, a partner’s stakes in a relationship influences the bargaining
power of that partner. A partner’s ‘stake’ refers to the degree of dependency that
partner has on the relationship and its outcome. The second dimension concerns
the alternatives available to a firm. If there are many ways in which a firm can
achieve its specific goal, the firm has high bargaining power. This also relates
to the firm’s stake because if a party has many alternatives outside the alliance,
it is less dependent on the alliance. Finally, according to resource-dependency
theory, the power of a partner depends on the number of critical resources a firm
brings to the relationship. This forms the third dimension; the more a relation-
ship depends on the critical resources of a firm, the more powerful this firm will
be. Note the distinction between the first two and the last dimension; the former
relates to the partner’s dependency on the alliance, while the latter relates to the
alliance’s dependency on the partner. It is on this principle that the dependency
structure of the alliance is based. This dependency structure leads to inequalities
in alliances and, consequently, to an uneven power balance. For our purposes,
‘power balance’ refers to the characteristic of an alliance which is caused by an
unequal dependency structure in the alliance.
Given these three dimensions, an alliance can be situated anywhere on the
power continuum between equal and unequal. Instead of equal and unequal, I will
also use the terms ‘balanced’ and ‘dominated’. In an equal alliance, both partners
are equally dependent on the alliance and the alliance depends equally on both
partners. In an unequal alliance, one member is less dependent on the alliance
and the alliance is still (or even more) dependent on this member. This puts
this firm in a position of greater power and it can now be called the dominant
partner. The partner that is still (or more) dependent on the alliance will be
called the dependent partner. Note that the power balance in an alliance is always
a consequence of the dependency structure of the alliance. The term ‘power’ here
is no reflection of the amount of investments each partner has made, the number
of employees a firm has, or the equity distribution within an alliance. In between
the two extremes of an equal and unequal alliance, a continuum is found in which
alliances have a more or less equal dependency structure and power balance. In
sum, the dependency structure underlying an alliance determines the balance of
power within the alliance, which can be equal or unequal.
An unequal dependency structure and power balance can develop in two ways.
First, the alliance is less important for the dominant firm than for the dependent
firm. This relates to the learning capacity of the dominant firm, its better ex-
ternal options, or other mechanisms which make less dependent on the alliance.
At the same time, this firm can be dominant because the alliance as a whole is
more dependent on this firm. Although the dominant firm sees the alliance as
less important, the alliance still needs this firm to operate well. Secondly, the
dependency of the other partner increases through external circumstances, a lack
of outside options, a lack of learning capacity, or other mechanisms. The depen-
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dent firm needs the alliance, however, the alliance can also be less dependent on
this firm. Note that the differences between the partners in an unequal alliance
are more fundamental than an imbalance in rewards from the alliance. In other
words, the focus is not on a position within the alliance, but rather on a firm’s
position towards the alliance. Of course, a firm’s position towards the alliance
also affects its position within the alliance.
As stated earlier, the literature has concluded that an unequal power balance
in an alliance can be a source of instability for the alliance and have a negative
effect on alliance performance. However, the literature is less clear on how this
inequality will affect players’ behavior within the alliance. What happens to
the tension between commitment and opportunism as previously described? The
argument here is that the dominance by one firm changes the characteristics of
the alliance game, and, consequently, the game used to model the alliance should
be adjusted accordingly.
The hybrid game
One possibility for modeling dominated alliances is an asymmetric prisoner’s
dilemma. In such a prisoner’s dilemma, the payoff structure is the same as the
normal prisoner’s dilemma, but the dominant player gets a higher payoff than its
opponent. Due to its stronger bargaining position, the dominant player can profit
more from the game. However, both players have an equal interest in the outcome
of the game, which does not reflect the firms’ positions towards the alliance given
in the dependency structure.
I would argue that the scenarios outlined above call for a different appreciation
of the outcomes. The difference lies in the appreciation of mutual opportunism.
For the dependent firm, the survival of the alliance is more important for the
dominant firm and, consequently, its strategies will be different. The dependent
firm can now choose to comply with its position in the alliance by investing as
promised to the alliance (stay and remain committed), or, alternatively, it can go-
its-own-way. The firm can leave the alliance or can stay in the alliance but behave
in an opportunistic way. However, going its own way can result in a low alliance
performance and may therefore be a worst case outcome for the dependent firm,
because of its dependency on the alliance. It still needs the alliance. Actually,
it is willing to be the only committed member in the alliance and to comply. It
would seek to avoid risking alliance failure by any means. Its position towards
the alliance has changed such that it is willing to be the only investing member,
since it has no better alternatives. Being opportunistic or leaving will harm the
firm more since it is still dependent on the alliance. In sum, a dependent firm has
the following appreciation of outcomes if it were a player one: (go-its-own-way,
commitment)  (comply, commitment)  (comply, opportunism)  (go-its-own-
way, opportunism). For player one, this is the payoff structure of the game of
chicken (see Section 3.3.4).
For the dominant member, its two strategies remain opportunism and com-
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mitment. The original situation holds: (opportunism, comply)  (commitment,
comply) (opportunism, go-its-own-way) (commitment, go-its-own-way). This
payoff structure belongs to the prisoner’s dilemma. This partner is not willing to
be the only committed member since it does not need the alliance that much.
To summarize, it is argued that the dominant firm still plays a prisoner’s
dilemma, while for the dependent firm the game has changed into a chicken game
with comply and go-its-own-way as possible strategies. Hence, a hybrid prisoner’s
dilemma-chicken game, as given in table 6.610, is expected to be a better repre-
sentation of a dominated alliance. The argument for this is that power differences
between firms are expressed in terms of a different payoff structure. The difference
is found in the choices now available for the dependent partner. Instead of being
able to choose between commitment and opportunism, the dependency structure
and consequently the power balance has now forced it into a worse position. It is
trapped in a new game in which it can only comply or go-its-own-way. The game
is such that going its own way is never a rational choice, a reflection of the firm’s
dependency position on the alliance.
Table 6.6: Hybrid commitment-opportunism dilemma
Firm 2 (dependent)
comply go-its-own-way
Firm 1 (dominant) commitment 3, 3 1, 4
opportunism 4, 2 2, 1
In Chapter 3, hybrid games were already briefly introduced. In two-by-two hy-
brid games, two games are mixed such that different payoff structures are used for
the different players.. The game I will adopt here is a hybrid game in which player
one (the dominant firm) has preferences according to the prisoner’s dilemma and
player two (the dependent firm) according to the game of chicken. This hybrid
game applies to situations in which player two values the ‘public good’ more than
player one, but player two does not value the public good so highly that player
two would be prepared to provide more of the good if player one already provided
some (Taylor, 1982, p. 40). The Nash equilibrium of this game is (opportunism,
comply), firm one is always better off with opportunism (4 > 3 and 2 > 1), so
that firm two can best reply with comply (2 > 1).
If the hybrid game is repeated through time, this equilibrium will also hold.
To achieve a situation of mutual commitment, the firms need to play a tit-for-tat
type strategy. The question is whether this strategy is beneficial for both firms.
10It is also very likely that the dominant firm will have a relative higher payoff than its
partner. For example 10,9,8,7 instead of 4,3,2,1. The equilibrium of and the fundamental
structure underlying the game in table 6.6 will however not change. For simplicity, I will keep
4,3,2,1.
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Let us consider a deviation by firm one. If firm one would consider a strategy in
which it plays opportunism, it is always rational for firm two to reply with comply.
Comply gives a payoff of two in each round, while go-its-own-way gives a payoff of
one in each round. Assuming firm two will behave in this way, firm one can choose
between tit-for-tat with payoff three in each round and an opportunism strategy
with payoff four in each round. Hence, since firm two will reply with comply, the
best strategy for firm one is to play opportunism. Under any condition, firm one
will benefit from a strategy involving opportunism and firm two will reply with
comply. Since this always holds, there is no need to consider deviations from the
tit-for-tat strategy by firm two. The reasoning would imply calculating whether a
change from tit-for-tat to go-its-own-way would pay off given that firm one stays
with tit-for-tat. Since assuming that firm one will stick to tit-for-tat is not realistic
and rational for firm one, firm two does not need to consider changing. Hence,
((opportunism, comply), (opportunism, comply), ..., (opportunism, comply)) is
the equilibrium of the dynamic game in table 6.6.
This dynamic game applies to situations in which no changes take place in the
balance of power. Throughout the whole game, the alliance is unequal. In this
case, the dominance of firm one leads to an irrevocable choice for opportunism,
since this is its best strategy given the payoff structure. The other firm knows this
and is therefore forced to ‘save the game’ by complying. For this firm, there are
no alternative moves available: the firm is dependent on the alliance, has fewer
alternatives, and the alliance is less dependent on it. If it were to go its own
way, the alliance could perform badly and this is an even worse option for the
dependent firm, which after all still needs the alliance. Therefore, in contrast to
an equal alliance, the expectation is that in a dominated alliance, opportunism
will occur. The dominant firm will behave opportunistically, and the dependent
firm will comply.
6.2.4 From an equal to an unequal alliance
During an alliance, alliances may undergo a change in the balance of power. In
this section, I will study the change from an equal alliance to an unequal alliance.
First, the causes of such a change will be discussed after which the consequences
of the change for the commitment-opportunism dilemma will be analyzed.
A power distribution can be altered by both external and internal factors
(Yan and Gray, 1994). External factors are found at different levels of analysis:
macro-, industry-, and firm-level (Huff, Huff, and Thomas, 1994). At the macro
level, demographic or economic changes, or new government policies might cause
changes. Demographic and economic changes cause shifts in the demand for
certain products or services and may therefore lead to different stakes for firms.
Their interest in a specific alliance might decrease or increase. Moreover, macro-
developments such as new technological innovations can make the alliance less
dependent on a specific resource which one of its partners provides and that
partner will thus loose power (Yan and Gray, 1994). At industry level, the group
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of participating firms and their strategies and performances can change. This
could offer new alternatives outside the alliance for one of the partners (the second
dimension of power), and, consequently, more power. The reverse procedure can
also occur. Finally, modifications at firm level can influence strategic change:
new ownership or leadership, change in performance or the portfolio of business.
These mutations affect the first and last dimension of power: the dependence of
a firm on the alliance and the dependence of the alliance on the firm.
In addition to these external events, internal developments within the alliance
itself can cause modifications to the balance of power. The key concept here
is learning differences (Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998), as it is one of the
most important determinants of power (Hamel, 1991). According to Kumar and
Nti (1998), differential learning occurs because partners have different absorptive
capacities. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) describe the process of differential learning
in an international joint venture. Over time, the acquisition of the skills and
knowledge by the partner decreases a firm’s dependency on the relation and results
in a shift in the power balance of the partners. Hamel’s (1991) empirical data
on international strategic alliances confirm that a difference in learning between
partners may exist and that this results in a shift in the relative competitive
positions of the partners. The more powerful firm will continue to learn more
quickly and become less dependent, gaining ever more power. In the end, this
can lead to the dissolution of the relationship. If one of the partners however
intervenes in this one-sided learning race process, however, the relationship can
be renegotiated and new control mechanisms can be agreed on.
Besides learning, an alliance can also be affected by the partner dynamics
which developed during the course of the relationship which may influence the
power balance between its members (Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Inkpen and
Currall, 2004). These partner dynamics go beyond the individual level of the
alliance members and relate to the relational quality that develops between the
partners. Most of the literature has been devoted to the development of trust (e.g.
Inkpen and Currall, 2004; see also Section 2.2.4). Although one could argue that
the blind trust a firm has on its partners gives this trusted partner more power,
this argument is not as strong as the learning argument. With regard to trust,
changes takes place on the relational level, and less in the dependency between
partners. I will not ignore, however, the fact that relational quality plays a role
in the internal power dynamics between partners.
So far, it has been argued that equal alliances can achieve mutual commitment
and that unequal alliances will result in opportunism by one partner. What, then,
will happen in an alliance that changes from equal to unequal. In line with the
rest of the model, this implies a change from a prisoner’s dilemma to a hybrid
game. Assuming this change takes place at time t, I will now study a dynamic
game which changes at t from a repeated prisoner’s dilemma to a repeated hybrid
game.
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From a repeated prisoner’s dilemma to a repeated hybrid game
To grasp the idea of a change in game fully, consider table 6.7. It is assumed the
firms know that at time t the game has changed from a prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
into a hybrid game (HG). Of course, the firms do not know at time 1 that the
game changes to a hybrid game. However, when the change has taken place (at
time t), the firms know this. They have experienced the change from an equal
into an unequal alliance. Although this change from equal to unequal alliance
will in real-life situations not be as abrupt as described here, it is for the sake of
convenience assumed that this change takes place at time t. In real-life situations,
it is of course much more difficult to denote the exact moment the situation has
changed or to even attribute this change to one particular point in time.
Table 6.7: From a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) to a hybrid game (HG)
Round: 1 2 . . . t t+ 1 . . .
Game: PD PD . . . HG HG . . .
The question now is which equilibrium will arise in the repeated game as
outlined in table 6.7. Let us consider again the various options which the firms
have at their disposal and deduce their most rational option (best payoff). Now,
two different games have to be taken into account. As long as the discount factor
is high enough in the first part of the game, until t, the players will play a tit-
for-tat type strategy. This phase will evolve as described in Section 6.2.2. The
question is what will happen at t in the second part of the game (the repeated
hybrid game). Is it rational for player one to change from tit-for-tat to another
strategy? And player two, which has entered a new game, what will this firm do?
If firm one changes to the opportunism strategy from t on, it can be reasoned
that firm two will reply with comply. Given this reply, opportunism gives firm
one from round t on a payoff of four (the hybrid game payoff for opportunism-
comply applies). However, if firm one decides to stay with tit-for-tat, this yields
a payoff of three from t on (the hybrid game payoff for commitment-comply).
So, it is easy to deduce that the opportunism strategy leads to a higher payoff.
Note that the first part of the game is the same in both cases. Therefore, the
comparison is made on the basis of the second part. As argued in Section 6.2.3,
it is not useful to consider deviations from the tit-for-tat strategy by firm two in
the second part. In sum, if the discount factor is high enough, this will be the
equilibrium of this dynamic game: until t: (tit-for-tat, tit-for-tat) and from t on
((opportunism, comply), (opportunism, comply), ... ).
It may seem irrational for a firm involved in an alliance with a dominant
and opportunistic partner to stay in the alliance and comply with the situation.
However, the firm’s dependency is the reason that it maintains its compliant
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behavior. Although comply seems an irrational choice, it leaves the dependent
firm with no other option; leaving the alliance would be a worst alternative. The
firm needs the alliance to ensure its own future and cannot afford to leave. In
sum, it is locked in. A change in the balance of power, a new partner, a new
investor, or an external event are examples of events which could eventually alter
this situation. It is quite likely that the alliance will eventually be terminated.
This lock-in principle is nicely illustrated by the Rover-Honda alliance, as seen in
6.2.5.
6.2.5 Illustration: Rover-Honda case
To illustrate the games presented above, I will work out an illustration on the
basis of the Rover-Honda alliance case. This case is an example of a situation in
which one of the partners is more dominant. A thorough description of the case
is found in Berendts (2005), Carr (1999), and Pilkington (1996).
The alliance under study is the cooperation between the Japanese firm Honda
and the British firm Rover which lasted from 1979 to 1994. At the beginning
of their relationship, both firms had problems and were looking for partners to
achieve mutual gains. For Rover, an important problem was its unfavorable fi-
nancial situation and low market share on its own local, British market. Further-
more, Rover wanted to make a better and more complete product portfolio with
a wide range of cars. Rover especially lacked design capabilities. Rover preferred
a non-European partner to help it overcome these problems. Honda’s challenge,
meanwhile, was how to extend its strong position in the Japanese market to the
European market. However, Honda’s products did not meet the European mar-
ket expectations, a fact which was aggravated by the protective character of the
European market for Japanese firms such as Honda. Honda therefore needed a
European partner to gain access to the European market.
This alliance will be considered as a sequence of phases in which each new
phase denotes a new project. A project is defined as a joint model brought onto
the European market. I will now go through the important events during those
different phases.
The first joined project undertaken by Rover and Honda took place in 1979.
With a licensing agreement, the two parties produced the Triumph Acclaim for
the British market. Most of the car’s parts came from Honda, and Rover’s role
was to assemble the car. The car was received well in the media, but did not
bring the financial results hoped for. Although neither partner has intended to
build a long term relationship, the were encouraged by the good reception of the
media, and it was anticipated that the firms could easily build more competitive
models. By using Honda’s models as the starting point for new models for the
European market, Rover expected to learn from this cooperation. Rover hoped
that it could, in the future, bring strong models to the market on its own.
The next phase started in 1984 when the Rover 200 was developed. This car
was basically a Japanese design, but with interiors and other parts from Rover.
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Rover was unfortunate in producing the 1.6 liter engine which sold less well than
the 1.3 developed by Honda. Parallel to this, Rover wanted to set up a new
product line. However, the company lacked the human and financial resources as
they were already being used for the Rover 200. As a consequence, Rover had to
fall back on the products based on Honda cars. Evidently, Rover was becoming
more dependent on Honda.
In 1986, the ambitious project of the luxury Rover 800 forced Rover to use
Honda’s engineering capabilities and facilities once again. Honda played a big
role in the design of the car and made the important decisions. In spite of Rover’s
participation in the development process of the car, it was Honda which was in
control. In this way, the contractual agreements were such that all parts had to
be bought from Honda. Again, Rover had no resources left to work on its own
production and design processes. One crucial event happened in 1988 when the
British government sold Rover to British Aerospace (BA). BA was not allowed
to sell Rover for five years. Since Rover remained quite independent from BA,
the alliance with Honda continued. It was even confirmed by a share exchange in
1989, in which both firms received 20% of the other’s shares.
The Rover 200/400, launched in 1990, was supposed to be a true joint venture
project with joint design and production teams. However, during the project,
Honda again dominated the negotiations on design specifications and contracts.
Nevertheless, Rover was dependent and had to comply with Honda’s wishes.
Rover was forced to take over a product strategy for the more luxurious top
end of the market, a disadvantage at the time when the British market was in
its downfall. Rover spent more time updating old models and participating in
joint projects than learning sufficiently from the design capabilities of Honda and
Rover also remained dependent on Honda for a large part of the production. The
financial position of Rover deteriorated through disappointments on the British
and US market.
Since the financial position of Rover continued to decline and Rover had spent
a great deal of resources on updating old models, it could only afford to play a
minor role in the development of the next model, the Rover 600 (1993). Honda
had developed the car, and Rover’s only role was to make a customized version
of the car for the European market. In this phase, the alliance seems to have
developed into a buyer-supplier relationship.
The alliance came to and end in 1994. BA wanted to dispose of Rover, but
Honda was not interested for various reasons. First, it was not Honda’s style to
take over firms. Moreover, Honda had managed to enter the European market.
It had, for example, built its own factory in the UK. The German firm BMW was
interested in taking over Rover. Honda did not want to cooperate with a large
German concern, and it sold its 20% share which gave BMW a 100% share of
Rover. Hence, an external event ended the alliance.
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Analysis of the case
What this case really shows is how one of the partners in an alliance is locked in
the alliance due to its dependency and, consequently, lack of bargaining power.
Bargaining power is seen here notably according to the first and third dimen-
sion. Rover was much more dependent on the alliance for its own survival than
Honda. For Honda, the alliance was simply a way to reach the European market
which was supposed to complement its success in other countries. There is then
a clear difference between how dependent both firms were on the alliance. Ac-
cording to the third dimension (the power of a partner depends on the number
of critical resources a firm brings in the relationship), Rover depended too much
on Honda. Rover lacked design capabilities and needed Honda for this. Initially,
Honda needed Rover to make adjustments to its models for the European market.
However, during the alliance Rover failed to develop its own design capabilities,
while Honda learned how to operate on the European market. The success of
selling cars was much more dependent on the resources of Honda and this made
Honda the more powerful partner.
A first conclusion from the case is that the alliance did not start out on a
completely equal footing. During the alliance, Honda obviously gained even more
bargaining power, while Rover’s dependency increased. Section 6.2.4 argues that
both external and internal events can lead to the development of such a dominated
alliance. An external event seen in the case is the bad economic circumstances
which Rover faced. Learning is a relevant internal event: Honda was able to
acquire knowledge of and access to the European market, but Rover failed to
learn sufficiently in the areas where it faced shortcomings to such a degree, in fact,
that it became fully dependent on the design capabilities of Honda to maintain
its business.
To establish the relationship between this inequality of the alliance to the
behavior of the partners in the alliance, I will adopt the hybrid game. It is
expected that the Rover-Honda alliance can, during its whole life, be modeled as
a hybrid game. Honda was always the more powerful member, dominating the
alliance. Honda agreed to the cooperation because it expected to make a profit
out of it and to learn from its European experience. However, after agreeing
to a longer relationship, Rover was never able to reach the goals it aimed at.
Rover was the dependent partner and Honda dominated the alliance, a situation
which was strengthened during the alliance. In such circumstances, the theory
would suggest that the powerful member would behave opportunistically and the
dependent member would comply.
This behavior is indeed seen in the case description. Rover, having no other
choice, complied with its situation. It was so dependent on Honda that it needed
the relationship to survive, even after it was bought by BA. During all the phases,
it is seen that Rover tried to learn and develop its own line of cars, but simply
failed in this. It is also seen that Honda made the most of its dominant position.
Honda frequently arranged things such that they were to its own advantage. The
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choice to produce a more luxurious Rover 200/400 was, for example, unfavorable
for Rover and Rover’s contractual obligation to use parts made by Honda also
points to such behavior. Furthermore, Honda learned as it had hoped and was
eventually able to access the European market on its own. All these aspects
point to opportunism by Honda. Due to the power balance, Rover was unable
to respond by leaving the alliance. An external event was needed to end this
alliance.
It is clear that in this dominated Rover-Honda alliance, the dominant part-
ner (Honda) acted opportunistically. The dependency structure forced the other
member (Rover) to comply with this situation.
For this case, then, the model has proven useful. Through the theoretical
insights from alliance literature, the alliance can be characterized as an unequal
alliance. The model has analyzed that the partners in such an alliance face a
hybrid game. The result of this game is a dynamic equilibrium of (opportunism,
comply), and this was indeed found in the case. The model and analysis of the
hybrid game have enabled us to understand why Rover and Honda behaved in
the way outlined above.
6.2.6 Conclusion of Model 4
This section has focused on the influence of the dependency structure and power
balance of an alliance on the tension between commitment and opportunism, as
part of the dynamics between alliance partners. Although previous research (e.g.
Das and Rahman, 2002; Zeng and Chen, 2003) has analyzed the commitment-
opportunism tension in equal alliances, this tension has hitherto not been studied
in unequal alliances (Zeng and Chen, 2003). This is the main contribution of the
Commitment-Opportunism Model to the alliance literature.
In this section, three situations have been considered:
• an equal alliance (an iterated prisoner’s dilemma)
• an unequal alliance (an iterated hybrid game)
• a change from an equal to unequal alliance (a shift from an iterated pris-
oner’s dilemma to an iterated hybrid game)
Based on this analysis, several concluding propositions can be formulated.
The first proposition states under which conditions equal alliances are ex-
pected to contain committed members. These conditions are derived from game
theoretical analyses when modeling an equal alliance as a prisoner’s dilemma (also
see Zeng and Chen, 2003).
Proposition 6.2 In an equal alliance with no fixed end-date, a norm of reci-
procity and a high value of the future are sufficient conditions for committed
members.
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Alternative views on how to avoid opportunistic behavior in alliances is found
in, for example, the transaction cost economics approach (Section 2.2.1). There,
contractual agreements and governance structures are used to avoid opportunism
(Williamson, 1991). Parkhe (1993) and Zeng and Chen (2003) also point out the
positive effect of a change in the payoff structure of an alliance. Moreover, it
will be more likely to achieve a cooperative alliance if the relational quality (see
Section 2.2.4) between the partners has increased. This implies good commu-
nication, sufficient trust, fair norms, a high identification with the alliance, and
perceiving a significant individual impact (Inkpen and Currall, 2004; Zeng and
Chen, 2003). In addition, see the overview of mechanisms to protect an alliance
against opportunism by Das and Rahman (2002).
Secondly, alliances can also be unequal (Khanna et al., 1998; Yan and Gray,
1994), an understudied antecedent of (opportunistic) behavior in alliances. This
model provides new insights in the consequences of inequality on opportunistic
behavior. An unequal or dominated alliance is an alliance with an unequal depen-
dency structure, and consequently, an unequal power balance. It was argued that
the dependency structure of unequal alliances changes the partners’ appreciation
of the outcomes of the alliance-game. Through its dependency, the dependent
firm is locked into the alliance and its only options are to comply (with the sit-
uation) or go its own way. If the dependent firm chooses to go its own way, it
is likely to suffer from the alliance non-performance. The dominant firm’s best
strategy is opportunism, since then it is less dependent on the alliance and can
manage more easily outside it. Since the dependent firm has no power to convince
the dominant partner to change its behavior, the expectation is that the domi-
nant firm will behave opportunistically, which will force the dependent member
to comply. This behavior was also observed in the Rover-Honda case.
Proposition 6.3 Caused by the unequal dependency structure in a dominated
alliance, it is expected that the dominant partner will behave opportunistically
and the dependent partner will be expected to comply.
Although the issue of opportunism in dominated alliances has not been studied
extensively, several mixed conclusions are found in the literature. On the one
hand, several studies seem to support the conclusion that exercising power evokes
opportunism. Mannix (1993) also found that the power distribution in a group
has an effect on the amount of opportunistic behavior perceived by the group
members. Members in a group with an unequal power balance perceive more
competition and retaliation than groups with an equal power balance. This is
also seen in Arend and Seale (2005) who model alliances as prisoner’s dilemma
games with an exit-option. Firms with low opportunity costs (that is, a high
dependence on the alliance and hence little power) are more committed than
firms with high opportunity costs. Finally, Das and Rahman (2002) find that
opportunistic behavior decreases if the amount invested in an alliance increases.
In other words, if a firm is dependent on the alliance - through the resources it
has invested - its opportunism will decrease.
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On the other hand, alternative conclusions are found in Inkpen and Currall
(2004) and Madhok and Tallman (1998). They argue that exercising power in
an alliance abuses trust between partners. The dependent partner will notice
this maltreatment and react by undermining the alliance by also behaving oppor-
tunistically. Inkpen and Currall (2004) anticipate on opportunistic behavior by
partners in an alliance where one firm has greater initial control. These partners
will want to be compensated for their lack of control and influence. Adopting
such a relational or social exchange perspective (e.g. Muthusamy and White,
2005) gives hence a different result, but ignores that the degree of dependency
and power differences give the powerful member the ability to dictate the alliance.
While I recognize that the dependent member will feel offended by the dominant
partner’s behavior and would prefer to act in the same way, the earlier analysis
shows, assuming rational behavior, it is forced to commit to the alliance to pre-
vent a worse situation from occurring. Eventually, the alliance will probably be
terminated.
Thirdly, alliances are considered which change from equal to unequal over
the course of time. Relevant mechanisms which influence dependency and power
differences are learning and alternatives outside an alliance. A game theoretical
analysis of alliances that change from equal to unequal has shown that it is again
expected that opportunism will eventually occur. Although the alliance starts
out equal, the changed dependency structure and consequently the changed pay-
off structure eventually produce a game in which the dominant partner will be
opportunistic and the dependent member will comply.
Proposition 6.4 A shift from an equal to a dominated alliance is expected to
result in a decrease of commitment in the alliance. In the first (equal) phase the
alliance can have mutual commitment. However, in the second (unequal) phase
the dominant partner will display opportunistic behavior whereas the dependent
partner will be committed.
6.3 Conclusion and model comparison
This section presents a small overall conclusion for this chapter and compares the
two models presented in the chapter.
The models both focus on the partner dynamics within an alliance. Model 3
studies whether pre-alliance interactions between alliance members changes their
coordination behavior within the alliance. By means of a small experiment, it
has been found that winners of a previous interaction indeed behave significantly
differently than players which have never met before. This does not hold for losers
of a pre-alliance interaction. This indicates that pre-alliance interactions partly
influence behavior in alliances.
In Model 4, it was analyzed how the tension between commitment and op-
portunism can be affected by an unequal dependency and power balance. It is
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Table 6.8: Summary of models Chapter 6
Model 3 Model 4
Coordination Model Commitment-
Opportunism Model
To study the behavior To study the behavior
of partners within an alliance: of partners within an alliance:
Basic ‘Does a past interaction influence ‘How does an unequal
question coordination of partners dependency on the
in an alliance?’ alliance influence the
commitment-opportunism
balance?’
- the set of players - the set of players
(firms in an alliance) (firms in an alliance)
Input - strategy: organization - strategy: commitment
(exogenous) form to choose or opportunism
- payoff structure - payoff structure
- repeated game
The manipulation A change in the conditions
Throughput of information: underlying the basic game:
(endogenous) which player was a winner an alliance with an unequal
and who was a loser dependency structure
in a previous game
Output Selection of strategies A dynamic Nash equilibrium
by the players
expected that in a less equal alliance, the dominant member will behave in an
opportunistic way, leaving the dependent member with no other choice than to
comply with the situation by remaining in the alliance and staying committed.
Both models have used dynamic strategic game theory. The consequences of the
models for this branch of theory are discussed in Chapter 7.
As in Chapter 5, I will compare the two models of this chapter on basic
questions, input, throughout, and output in table 6.8.
What the two models have in common is that both study the behavior of
partners within an alliance. The novelty of both models is to study particular
certain influences on this behavior. The Coordination Model focuses on the in-
fluence of past interaction and the Commitment-Opportunism Model studies the
influence of an unequal dependency structure. In both cases, the throughput of
the models enables analysis of these influences. In that sense, the throughput of
the models offers an explanation for behavior of alliance partners. Nevertheless,
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the models are quite different in approach and subject, and therefore, difficult to
compare. To sum up, the models are similar in that both study the influence of a
throughput on the behavior of partners in an alliance. However, the two models
are not complementary, but rather additional since both study a different aspect
of partner behavior.
Chapter 7 will provide an overall conclusion by assessing the contribution
of the four presented models to the research gaps that were found in the three
literature chapters.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This final chapter of the dissertation brings all the previous chapters together into
one overall conclusion. The chapter is organized as follows. The chapter starts
with the main findings of this study (Section 7.1). Subsequently, I will present
a theoretical reflection from both an alliances perspective (Section 7.2) and from
a game theory perspective (Section 7.3). In the reflection, the implications of
this study for the literature are discussed. Section 7.4 discusses limitations and
sets out an agenda for future research. Finally, Section 7.5 discusses the practical
reflection.
7.1 The dynamics of alliances: main findings
In spite of a growing body of literature dedicated to strategic alliances, the scien-
tific attention given to the dynamics of alliances has been insufficient (Das and
Teng, 2002; Reuer, 2000; Styles and Hersch, 2005). The main theoretical alliance
perspectives such as transaction cost economics (e.g. Hennart, 1988; Williamson,
1985; 1991), the resource-based theories (e.g. Barney, 1991; Das and Teng,
2000; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), strategic behavior theory (e.g. Hagedoorn, 1993;
Kogut, 1988), and the relational elements perspective (e.g. Arin˜o and De la Torre,
1998; Muthusamy and White, 2005) focus on why alliances are set up and why
some alliances perform betters than others. When assessing this alliance field, the
conclusion was drawn that knowledge was lacking, amongst others, in the follow-
ing areas (1) the process of alliance formation and (2) partner dynamics within
an alliance.
In this study, it is argued that a game theoretical approach to alliances can
provide a more dynamic perspective. Game theory can not only offer this dy-
namic perspective, but is also able to study alliances from a multi-actor per-
spective adopting a more formal and abstract approach. These characteristics of
game theory were expected to complement the main theoretical approaches to
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alliances. Two branches of game theory can contribute to the dynamics of al-
liances: (1) coalition theory (e.g. Axelrod, 1970; Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez,
2001; Grofman, 1982; Rapoport, 1970; Van Deemen, 1989) and (2) the theory of
strategic games (Axelrod, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Taylor, 1987). The
former can study how alliances are formed, while the latter can be used to analyze
behavior of firms within an alliance.
This led to the following research aim:
To develop dynamic game theoretical models
in order to explain the dynamics of and within strategic alliances.
In order to present a game theoretical approach to alliances, two aspects of
game theory needed adjustment. First, it was necessary to repair elements of
game theory which were not in line with alliance principles. Secondly, one of the
elements which was not in line with the alliance field was the lack of dynamics,
especially in coalition theory. More detailed problems were defined throughout
the thesis in the form of research gaps. In this concluding chapter, I will return to
these research gaps and assess to what extent this study has been able to bridge
the gaps defined.
To meet the research aim, four new models were developed:
• Process of alliance formation:
– Model 1: the Alliance Formation Model which studies the process of al-
liance formation by linking strategy, resource deficiencies, and alliance
formation (Section 5.2)
– Model 2: the Procedure Model which studies the process of alliance
negotiations, especially the role of procedure and flexibility (Section
5.3)
• Partner dynamics within an alliance:
– Model 3: the Coordination Model which studies how past interaction
influences alliance coordination (Section 6.1)
– Model 4: the Commitment-Opportunism Model which studies how an
unequal power balance influences commitment and opportunism within
an alliance (Section 6.2)
Several assumptions were used to develop the models, of which rational behavior
of the players and complete information were the most important.
The main findings derived from these four models will be presented in three
steps: (1) the process of alliance formation, (2) partner dynamics within an al-
liance, and (3) the overall alliance dynamics.
First, the process of alliance formation has been characterized as a process
with two steps, one subsequent to the other: reaching a decision on whom to
form an alliance with and reaching an alliance agreement within an alliance.
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The starting point for forming an alliance can be firms’ resource deficiencies.
Not only do these deficiencies make cooperation necessary, but they also determine
the preferences held by firms over potential partners. A firm’s preference combines
a valuation of the size of an alliance and the degree to which an alliance will fulfill
a firm’s resource deficiencies. The dynamics of agreeing on the composition of the
alliance is a process of different phases (resource deficiencies, alliance preferences,
and alliance formation) all of which influence each other. From the model, it can
be concluded that if firms in an industry agree on which alliances are best and
if the firms’ preferences are reciprocal, then stable alliances can be formed. In a
stable alliance, no firm or group of firms has the incentive to change to another
alliance.
After a (multi-partner) alliance has agreed on the firms which are to partic-
ipate, the next step is to negotiate on issues concerning the organization of the
alliance (an alliance agreement). In this process, several dynamics play a role.
Which procedure is adopted is crucial. It is proven that it is relevant whether
a multi-partner alliance is set up in a step-by-step manner or in a simultaneous
manner. Furthermore, in a step-by-step procedure, it is relevant who is a first
mover. It has also been demonstrated that the flexibility of firms involved in
negotiations plays a role in the process.
Secondly, several issues play a role in the dynamics among partners within an
alliance. In this study, the focus is on coordination problems between partners
and on the balance between commitment and opportunism.
During the whole life of an alliance, partners face coordination tasks which
they often disagree on. Making a choice can be difficult in a coordination problem.
We studied such coordination problems in an experiment. As could have been
expected from the theory, it appeared that behavior in such a coordination task
changes if players have met before the alliance was initiated. Even if this contact
took place in a completely different kind of setting, respondents take this past
interaction into account. However, not all respondents take a past interaction
into account; only the winners of a previous interaction (the respondents that had
been better off in this pre-alliance interaction) were influenced by their behavior
in the past. The players that had not profited from the previous interaction did
not take the past into account. Translating these insights into field of alliances
implies that coordination can be influenced by a past interaction.
The commitment-opportunism balance in an alliance is influenced by the de-
pendency structure of an alliance. While in equal alliances the prospect of the
future and reciprocal behavior can be sufficient conditions commitment from both
alliance partners, this does not hold in unequal alliances. Alliances with an un-
equal dependency structure have an unequal power balance with one dominant
member and one dependent member. If an alliance becomes unequal, the dom-
inant partner will become more opportunistic, while the dependent partner will
comply to the situation and remain committed. The dominant partner will need
the alliance less than the dependent partner, while the dependent partner is locked
into the alliance. Hence, the partner dynamics of commitment and opportunism
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are driven by the dependency structure of an alliance.
Thirdly, the overall dynamics of an alliance are driven by a combination of
the processes explained above. In this way, a link is made between Model 1
and 2 on the one hand and Model 3 and 4 on the other hand. In the process
of alliance formation, reciprocity of preferences, agreement on what are the best
alliances, procedure, and negotiation flexibility play a role. These elements influ-
ence whether the process of alliance formation will reach a stable state. A stable
state actually denotes the end of the process of alliance formation; all the firms
involved in the process have reached an alliance and an alliance agreement which
cannot be improved on if the process were to be continued. The elements men-
tioned are the conditions under which a stable state can be attained. If such a
stable state is not attained, there are firms with an incentive to deviate to another
alliance or alliance agreement, and this will influence the partner dynamics within
an alliance.
An alliance member’s incentive to leave an alliance decreases its dependency
on the alliance. As explained earlier, an unequal dependency structure and, con-
sequently, the balance of power both influence the commitment-opportunism bal-
ance. The dominant member will behave in a more opportunistic way. This will
influence the stability of the dynamics among partner in a negative way. In sum,
an increased incentive to leave an alliance by at least one alliance member will
lead to less stable partner dynamics. Although switching between alliances is
not common, the threat of a partner having better alternatives can also influence
behavior within the alliance.
To summarize the findings of this study, the following elements play a role in
reaching and consolidating a stable state in the alliance dynamics: aligned pref-
erences of firms, the procedures used in alliance negotiations, a firm’s flexibility
in negotiations, shared previous interaction, an equal power balance within an
alliance, a prospect of the future, and reciprocal behavior. The next two sections
elaborate on the implications of these findings and the underlying models for the
alliance literature and for game theory.
7.2 Theoretical reflection: alliance literature
This section reflects upon how this study contributes to the field of alliances.
Throughout this study, it has been argued that the dynamics of alliances is an
area of the alliance field which is understudied. This study has been able to
contribute to (a part of) this unexplored area. The process of alliance formation
(research gap 2.2) and the interaction between partner dynamics (research gap
2.4) are the specific aspects of alliance dynamics which have been taken into
account.
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7.2.1 Alliance formation
From the dynamics of alliances, I have developed models which study the forma-
tion of alliances (Model 1 and 2) using coalition theory. The models have shown
what the underlying dynamics of alliance formation are. We have seen how the dif-
ferent phases of alliance formation influence each one other: from defining alliance
wishes to defining partner preferences to selecting partners to form an alliance and
from taking a negotiation position to shifting this position to make compromises
to, eventually, reaching an alliance agreement. I have also found which elements
play a role in the stability of this process: the aligned preferences of firms, the
alliance negotiations procedures, and the firm’s flexibility in negotiations.
Characterizing the process of alliance formation is a contribution to the al-
liance literature, in which the focus so far has mainly been on why alliances
are formed and which factors lead to a high performance (e.g. Das and Teng,
2000; Eisenhardt and Bird Schoonhoven, 1996; Hennart, 1988; Pfeffer and Nowak,
1976). The small amount of literature on the process of alliance formation is de-
scriptive in nature (De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004; Ireland et al., 2002; Spekman,
Isabella, MacAvoy, and Forbes III, 1996; Styles and Hersch, 2005) and offers no
theoretical explanations.
Hence, given the state of the literature, the models in this dissertation have
been able to contribute to the explanation of the dynamics of alliance formation.
The models presented are substantial contributions which complement the current
alliance theory. The models are substantial contributions because, first, hardy any
alliance theory so far has analyzed the dynamics of alliance formation. Secondly,
it is novel to apply coalition theory to alliances. From an alliance literature
perspective, it can be concluded that using coalition theory to study alliance
formation has been fruitful and can help us to analyze an area of research which
has so far been understudied.
7.2.2 Partner dynamics
From the perspective of partner dynamics within an alliance, I have studied coor-
dination problems (Model 3), commitment versus opportunism, and the balance
of power (both Model 4). In contrast to earlier research on partner dynamics, I
have been able to combine several of these partner dynamics. In this way, first,
insight has been gained concerning the influence of pre-alliance interactions on co-
ordination problems. From this study, it can be concluded that pre-alliance inter-
actions between firms influence their behavior later, during the alliance. Secondly,
it can be concluded that the commitment-opportunism balance in an alliance is
influenced by the dependency and power balance within the alliance. Whereas
equal alliances can achieve mutually committed members, unequal alliances are
expected to suffer from an opportunistic dominant member and a committed de-
pendent member, which is locked into the alliance.
The models differ from the current literature in two ways. First, partner
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dynamics have been studied in such a way that the different aspects have been
linked: the influence of pre-alliance interactions on alliance coordination and the
influence of power differences on the commitment-opportunism balance. This ap-
proach works towards a more comprehensive framework of partner dynamics and
their mutual interactions. Secondly, the adopted strategic games are dynamically
more advanced than the games adopted in previous work (e.g. Arend and Seale,
2005; Das and Teng, 2002a; Zeng and Chen, 2003). I have not only used iter-
ated games, but I have used a change of game form during a game and repeated
different kind of games. This more advanced approach enabled us to study more
complicated dynamics, such as the relationship between several partner dynamics.
In sum, together with the game theory work earlier applied (Section 2.2.5), the
models of Chapter 6 start to develop towards a comprehensive framework of part-
ner dynamics and their mutual interactions. The dynamically advanced games
adopted here allowed us to take a step forward. The game theoretical (strate-
gic games) approach has thus been relevant in explaining the partner dynamics
within an alliance, and will remain relevant in the future. Many game forms, for
example the prisoner’s dilemma and the game of chicken, can model the internal
tensions of the partner dynamics. Moreover, dynamic advancements in the field
of strategic games are useful. The models of Chapter 6 are a contribution to the
alliance literature, but more in an incremental way as these models continue on
a line of research, in contrast to the alliance formation models.
7.2.3 Relating dynamics of and dynamics within alliances
In Section 7.1, I have argued how the two kind of dynamics are related. An un-
stable alliance formation process can lead to unstable dynamics between partners.
The two kinds of dynamics influence each other. This relationship between the
two kinds of dynamics was deduced from the models, but not explicitly modeled.
This is not only the case in this study, but also in alliance literature in general;
hardly any models or theories have combined the life cycle approach with the
dynamics between partners.
An exception is Model 3. In this model, it was analyzed how pre-alliance
interactions between firms (dynamics of alliances) influence coordination within
the alliance (dynamics within alliances). It was found that in some cases pre-
alliance interaction has influence on the behavior of firms in alliance coordination.
This contributes to the current literature which only considers the influence of
previous alliance experiences on alliance behavior of firms (Bucklin and Sengupta,
1993; Gulati, 1995; Porrini, 2004). This study has acknowledged that interactions
other than within alliances can influence behavior of firms in an alliance.
7.2.4 Overall
In sum, the dynamics of cooperation are complex and difficult to catch in one
model (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford, 1995). In this light, this dissertation has been
Conclusion 177
able to explain dynamic aspects of alliances, working towards a comprehensive
and complete theoretical framework for those dynamics. It is believed that the
game theoretical approach was a valuable choice to reach such a coherent view on
dynamics. First, the four models and their contribution can serve as evidence for
this statement. The presented models have shown that interaction is an important
aspect of alliances; the processes leading to alliances and the underlying partner
dynamics are shaped by the interactions between firms. Game theory is one
of the few theories with this focus on interaction. Secondly, game theory is a
well developed and coherent stream of research which can explain cooperation
between actors, in most cases with a dynamic approach. In principle, this enables
researchers to offer a coherent and comprehensive framework on alliance dynamics.
This dissertation has demonstrated that both coalition theory and strategic game
theory are of use. This study should be seen as a first step towards developing
such a coherent and comprehensive dynamic alliance framework.
The next section discusses the implications of applying game theory to the
alliance field for game theory itself.
7.3 Theoretical reflection: game theory
This dissertation has involved combining two different theoretical streams: the
field of alliances and of game theory. In this section, I reflect on this application
and on the game theoretical implications.
7.3.1 Applying game theory
The application of game theory - both coalition theory and the theory of strategic
games - to the field of alliances is the main contribution of this study. It has often
been acknowledged in the literature that such a game theoretical approach to
alliances has been lacking (Camerer, 1991; Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996;
Parkhe, 1993). Coalition theory in particular has hardly been used in the field as
the vast majority of the game theoretic alliance studies have used strategic games
(e.g. Arend and Seale, 2005; Hill, 1990; Hwang and Burgers, 1997; Parkhe, 1993;
1993a; Zeng and Chen, 2003). Nevertheless, it has been argued that game theory
can play an important role in the field of alliances (Camerer, 1991; Nalebuff and
Brandenburger, 1996; Parkhe, 1993; see also Chapter 1 and Section 2.3).
This study has demonstrated (1) that and (2) how game theory can play a
role in the field of alliances. Game theory can model the behavior of firms within
an alliance. It is the branch of strategic games which is used, both in this study
and in earlier research, to analyze partner dynamics within alliances. Moreover,
a new application has been developed in this study; the use of coalition theory to
study the process of alliance formation. It was discussed what the contribution
of both kind of applications is for the alliance literature in Section 7.2.
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Concerning the how question (2), it was neither easy nor obvious how to apply
game theory to the alliance field. Game theory was not designed specifically for
the alliance field. In order to apply the theory, an extra step has to be made to
interpret and even adjust the abstract and sometimes unrealistic elements of the
theory. One way of doing this was to define relevant situations and examples in
which the theory hold, as has been done in this thesis. While it is believed that
game theory can be applied again in the future, researchers should be aware of
the relevance of interpretation. Another way used here to attune theory to the
field of application is adjusting parts of the theory, such as its assumptions. It is
important that the assumptions underlying the models are in line with the field
of application.
In sum, this study offer not only a systematic exploration of how game theory
can be applied to the alliance field, but also solves some of the problems related to
this ambition. The consequences of this application for coalition theory (Section
7.3.2) and for the theory of strategic games (Section 7.3.3) will be discussed now.
7.3.2 Coalition theory
In order to use coalition theory to explain the process of alliance formation, the
following incompatibilities of game theory with the field of alliances were de-
fined and addressed (research gap 4.1): the static approach (research gap 4.2),
the assumption of similarity, the assumption of exogenous preferences, and the
prediction of winning coalitions (theory of simple games).
The static approach of coalition theory is the most important deficiency of
the theory, and one which in this study has been addressed by developing dy-
namic coalition models. In spite of a growing body of dynamic coalition theories
(e.g. Axelrod and Bennett, 1993; Bloch, 1996; Brams, Jones, and Kilgour, 2002;
Grofman, 1982; Laver and Underhill, 1982), the dynamic approach to coalition
theory remains less well-developed and mature than the static approach yet. In
this thesis, I have worked on the following dynamic elements of the theory: the
different procedures for forming a coalition, the influence of pre-coalition games,
and dynamic positions. Consequently, the theory does not only analyze which
coalitions will be formed with a certain coalition agreement, but the way to reach
these equilibrium states is also taken into account. This does not replace the con-
cepts of equilibria such as the core and stable set, but the route by which these
states are reached is simply added. The implication for coalition theory is that
the dynamics underlying coalition formation play an important role which should
be acknowledged in the theory. While earlier research has focused on the role of
power, policy, or institutions, the message here is that process matters.
Furthermore, adjusting the assumption of similarity enabled me to model al-
liance in which complementarity is the norm (such as resource-driven alliance).
Instead of finding partners which are close in space, players find partners that are
close to their needed position but are far away from their own current position.
Defining preferences in a different way does not change the theory radically, but
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is a small adjustment which makes the theory better applicable. Again, the main
concepts of the theory, such as the equilibria concepts, are not replaced or weak-
ened. Rather, a part of the axiomatic base is adjusted in such a way that the
main concepts of the theory make more sense. A related issue is that most coali-
tion theories assume that preferences are exogenous. Although preferences can
be determined empirically, modeling is stronger and easier to test if preferences
are determined endogenously, as was done with the models of Chapter 5.
Another problem of coalition theory for the alliance field is the prediction of
winning coalitions or ‘dichotomic structures’. To avoid this problem, the theory
of hedonic games (e.g. Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2001; Bogomolnaia and
Jackson, 2002) was used, although this theory has so far mainly been used in
a technical, non-applied way. The theory of hedonic games is able to forecast
several coalitions, or the ‘partition’ of players into coalitions. To model alliance
formation, the theory of partitions is a better choice than the theory of simple
games. This implies that formal alliance formation models should make use of a
theory which works with partitions.
In sum, the adjustments to the theory which have been made, have enabled
me to use coalition theory for the alliance field. Since a coalition theory approach
to alliances was in its infancy, the line of research presented here is a first step
towards its further development.
7.3.3 Theory of strategic games
To explain the behavior of firms within an alliance, the theory of strategic games
was chosen. Since the theory of strategic games had already been used more
frequently in the field of alliances to explain partner dynamics (e.g. Arend and
Seale, 2005; Gulati, Khanna, and Nohria, 1994; Hill, 1990; Hwang and Burg-
ers, 1997; Parkhe, 1993; Parkhe 1993a; Phelan, Arend, and Seale, 2005; Zeng
and Chen, 2003), fewer incompatibilities with the field of alliances were present.
Therefore, the models in this study focused on the further development of the
current literature by analyzing the role of power and past interactions.
As a reflection for the theory of strategic games, the dynamics of strategic
games are already well developed (Akiyama and Kaneko, 2000; Axelrod, 1984;
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Osborne, 2004; Samuelson, 2002; Taylor, 1987),
especially the theory of iterated games. However, in a business setting, it is
likely that firms will interact often in different kind of settings. To model this
variety of interaction between firms, the repetition of non-similar games should
be used. However, little work has been dedicated to repetition of different games.
This study has contributed to the dynamics of strategic games by studying more
advanced repetitions of (non-similar) games.
By adopting the associative approach (Marks, 2002) in Model 3, I have been
able to model repetition of non-similar games. A change in game form during a
dynamic game was also studied (in Model 4). These models could be a path of
research to further advance the dynamics of strategic games.
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7.3.4 Overall
It can be concluded that the abstract world of game theory and the dynamic
and business-oriented world of alliances can be fruitfully combined under the
conditions of careful model building and illustrative material. Future research
should bring the two fields still closer together. In the next section, I will elaborate
on the limitations of this study and give suggestions for further research.
7.4 Limitations and future research
Although progress has been made in explaining the dynamics of alliances and
developing a game theoretical approach to alliances, the problems underlying the
ambitious research agenda of this study have not all been solved. In this section, I
will discuss the degree to which the gaps in alliance literature have been bridged,
the limitations of the models, and game theoretical suggestions for future research.
7.4.1 Future research on alliance dynamics
This study has provided new insights into the dynamics of alliance formation and
partner dynamics, but this study is also a first step in the direction of explain-
ing alliance dynamics. Although game theory has proven valuable in explaining
alliance dynamics, I do not claim that game theory is the only approach which
should be used. Rather, game theory provides insights on how we could see the
world of alliance dynamics. By developing more dynamic approaches to alliances,
which could adopt different theoretical streams, such as resource based theories or
transaction cost economics, different, but comprehensive theoretical frameworks
to explain alliance dynamics could be created.
It is important that more dynamic alliance theories are developed, whether
they adopt the perspective of game theory or another theory. More alliance studies
should focus on the question of how alliances are formed. More importantly,
alliance management and alliance termination have not been studied at all in this
thesis. Alliance management partly overlaps with partner dynamics, as alliance
management implies, amongst other things, stabilizing internal forces. That the
process of alliance termination has not been studied is more problematic. The
subject is understudied (with Arin˜o and Doz, 2000; Park and Ungson, 2001;
and Peng and Shenkar, 2002 as exceptions), and, moreover, premature alliance
termination is a problem which alliances suffer from (Das and Teng, 2003; Inkpen
and Beamish, 1997), so greater knowledge concerning the process of termination
is needed.
Concerning partner dynamics, we can already build on previous studies. In
line with this study, relating different kinds of partner dynamics and adopting
more advanced game theoretical approaches is a suggestion for future research.
Although I have studied coordination, power balances, and commitment-oppor-
Conclusion 181
tunism, many other aspects of the dynamics between partners have been ignored,
such as trust, flexibility, and communication. There is still work to be done.
To get a more comprehensive picture of alliance dynamics, one should study
the life cycle of alliances and the partner dynamics in a related way. Apart from
Model 3, the two kind of dynamics have hardly been studied in an integrated
way in the alliance literature. If future research picks up this subject it may be
possible to analyze how partner dynamics, such as trust, commitment, and power,
influence the formation process, alliance management phase, or alliance termina-
tion process. This could provide new insight into the dynamics of the alliance.
Correspondingly, studying how partner dynamics evolve during the life cycle of
the alliance could tell us more about, for example, building trust, maintaining
committed members, and solving coordination problems.
In sum, it has already been concluded that the game theoretical models devel-
oped are partly able to explain the dynamics of alliances, but that future research
is needed to develop a more comprehensive approach to alliance dynamics. Ide-
ally, such an approach should include all phases of the alliance process (formation,
management, and termination), more partner dynamics, and a link between the
alliance process and partner dynamics. Game theory is one of the theoretical
perspectives which may help to achieve this ambition because of its more formal,
abstract, and systematic nature in comparison to other alliance perspectives. This
enables the theory to develop a coherent alliance dynamics approach.
7.4.2 Future research on the presented models
In this section, I will discuss two limitations of the models presented: limitations
concerning the models themselves and the lack of empirical testing.
A limitation of Model 1 is that the adopted theory of hedonic games cannot
handle overlapping coalitions. Hence, it is not possible to model a situation in
which a firm is a member of more than one different coalition. Unfortunately,
almost no - well-developed - theories can be found that can handle overlapping
coalitions in a coalition structure1. This is an area for future research which would
help the application of coalition theory to the alliance field.
A drawback of Model 3 and 4 is that the models deal with dyadic alliances,
using two-player game theory. Whereas the models of Chapter 5 explicitly focus
on multi-partner alliances, the models of Chapter 6 are limited to two-partner
alliances. Since multi-partner alliances are an understudied area (Garc´ıa-Canal,
Valde´s-Llaneza, and Arin˜o, 2003; Das and Teng, 2002), a suggestion for future
research is to expand those models to multi-partner alliances, using n-player game
theory. The question is whether the principal mechanisms at play will differ
substantially in multi-partner alliances. How many committed members would
be needed to achieve a good performance? Can two more dependent firms counter-
balance one dominant firm? And, do coordination problems become more difficult
1The exception that I found was Albizuri, Aurrecoechea, and Zarzuelo (2006).
182 Chapter 7
to solve in multi-partner alliances when unanimity is demanded, or does a majority
rule make it easier?
Although several assumptions from game theory have been ‘repaired’ in this
thesis, others are maintained and may be problematic when comparing with real-
life situations. Complete information is an assumption which can give rise to
problems when used in alliance reality. Often, information is not as complete and
perfect as is assumed in the models. In spite of the examples of markets in which
information is expected to be more complete (Section 5.2.3), working on alliance
models with incomplete information is a necessary step for future research. The
world of business in particular - and more than political situations - consists of
dynamic and international markets on which many firms compete and in which
information is often hidden. In this thesis, it was chosen to keep the models
relatively simple and work on other incompatible assumptions. Nevertheless, the
complete information assumption is an important assumption which needs to be
explored further. After research on how well information really is distributed in
a business setting, the models could be adjusted accordingly.
Moreover, the assumption of rationality may be a problematic one. Are firms
- or human decision makers in firms - really as rational as assumed? This assump-
tion could be tested in a more experimental setting.
Besides these theoretical advancements, the models should be empirically
tested and, depending on the results, be developed further. Models 1 and 2
could be tested in a qualitative way to study whether the assumptions hold and
whether the steps in the process are interrelated as suggested in the models. This
is considered a necessary step before further large-scale quantitative tests, such
as simulations using real data or survey-based research. The models presented
in Chapter 6 would also benefit from empirical testing. Although Model 3 has
been tested in a small scale experiment, a next step may be a more extensive ex-
periment with alliance professionals as respondents. Model 4 could be tested by
developing scales for commitment, opportunism, and power and, as a next step,
conducting a large scale survey-based research. An alternative method would be
a more in-depth qualitative approach.
7.4.3 Future research on game theory
As suggestions for the game theory field, two things are relevant. First, the inter-
pretation and application of game theory is important. Application of the theory
can contribute to the field of social science such as the alliance field. Moreover,
application of the theory uses and justifies the advanced technical achievements of
the theory. One could even claim that application partly legitimates those tech-
nical advancements. I want to emphasize that applying the theory is not easy; it
requires the combination of two fields of research. More efforts on application to
the various fields of social science would enrich the theory of games itself.
Secondly, in this thesis, I have made the case for a more dynamic approach to
coalition theory and the theory of strategic games. In coalition theory, given the
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importance of dynamics in coalition formation, further development of coalition
dynamics should be the way forward for the field. Many issues remain unsolved:
the process of coalition formation, the past and future of a coalition, the termina-
tion of coalitions, dynamics in the set of players, or information dynamics during
a coalition game. Although the dynamics of the theory of strategic games is quite
well developed, the theory would benefit from more advanced dynamics going be-
yond the repetition of similar games. Although the associative approach (Marks,
2002), as used in Model 3, is a step forward, this approach can only model how
one earlier game influences a later game. A strategy is chosen after the first game,
so that there is no overall rational approach to playing two different games. The
change of game form during a super-game could also be developed further to an-
swer the question of why a game form changes and whether players can anticipate
this change by choosing a rational super-strategy? For both game forms, most
models work with discrete time neglecting continuous time (an exception is Perry
and Reny, 1994). Time is divided into artificial time steps. Players can only act
at pre-determined points in time. A more realistic way of modeling should adopt
continuous time.
7.5 Practical reflection
The aim of this dissertation has not been to provide a normative perspective
on how to play an alliance game. Rather, the focus is on explaining, with the
underlying idea that understanding the game will enable alliance professionals to
play and control the game better. Practical recommendations are the next step
after comprehension (Aumann in Van Damme, 1998). Comprehension has been
achieved here by modeling alliance interactions in a game theoretical framework.
The kind of dynamics to be expected in these games was analyzed here. These
expectations have not been empirically tested, but illustrated with examples,
small cases, a computer simulation, and an experiment. This section will briefly
elaborate on the practical lessons which can be learned from the models (Section
7.5.1) and the degree to which the current state of the models is capable of
producing practical recommendations (Section 7.5.2).
7.5.1 Practical implications
The models in the thesis analyze which factors play a role in the processes which
underlie alliances. In this way, we know more about how the processes evolve and
how it is possible to intervene into and manage these processes. Section 7.1 has
already summarized what the main findings are and which elements play a role
in alliance dynamics.
Generally, all models show that the preferences and alternatives of all (poten-
tial) alliance partners are important. Since firms do not operate in a vacuum,
taking interaction seriously is essential (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991). Due to the
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interactive element of the alliance business and its dynamic nature, alliance games
become a process of action and reaction. In acting, firms should not just blindly
pursue their own interest, but look ahead and around to act in such a way that
they pursue their own interest given the interests of the other players. Offering
this insight is a valuable contribution of game theory.
More specifically, each of the four models offers insights into a certain kind of
alliance dynamics. I will briefly discuss the practical lessons that can be drawn
from each model.
From Model 1, we can learn which conditions lead to a process in which stable
alliances will be formed. The model has been applied to a case in which two
alliances were formed: Heineken and Krups with the Beer Tender and Philips
and Inbev with the Perfect Draft. Both alliances produce a household appliance
for tapping beer from kegs filled with either Heineken or Inbev products. A
lesson to be learned from this case is that it is important to take the preferences
of other firms into account. Let us study the perspective of Heineken in this
example. Given three dimensions (knowledge on appliances, knowledge on beer,
and beer innovation), Heineken was indifferent between Philips and Krups as
partner. Both could offer the necessary knowledge on appliances so that a machine
could be developed to tap beer. Equally, both lacked knowledge of beer and beer
innovation. This beer innovation refers to the degree a firm is innovative on the
beer market. However, Philips was not indifferent between the two beer companies
involved. Philips preferred Inbev over Heineken. Since Philips was neither active
in the beer market nor desired to be a big player in this market (this did not
correspond with its image), it was looking for a partner which matched this profile.
Since Heineken was an active player on the frontier of the beer market, Inbev was
a better match.
Initially, Heineken choose Philips as its favored partner. Nevertheless, the
analysis shows that Philips had a better match with Inbev. Consequently, the
negotiations between Heineken and Philips failed. Later, Heineken formed the
alliance with Krups. However, Heineken could have taken the needs and prefer-
ences of its fellow players in the game into account more to reach an alliance in
an easier way.
Model 2 teaches us the importance of process in alliance negotiations. What
should an alliance manager do with the insights from this model? First, a manager
should be aware that both the procedure adopted and the order of negotiations
play a role in multi-partner alliance negotiations. Secondly, the simulations and
formal proofs have generated certain situations so that it is possible to analyze
what to do in that case. Let us focus on one specific situation with three firms:
A, B, and C. Those three firms have agreed to form an alliance, but still need
to settle an alliance agreement to reach consensus on, for instance, marketing
issues, management style, technological choices, and the distribution of patents.
For convenience, I focus on two issues, or two ‘dimensions’. The three firms each
have an ideal position they want to achieve which is surrounded by positions still
acceptable (in the two-dimensional case, this set is a circle). A compromise has
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to be reached which is acceptable to all partners. In this case, firm A has an
ideal alliance position which is already acceptable for the other two firms. This
is visualized in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Example: Ideal position of A acceptable by B and C
Under two conditions, firm A will be better off with a simultaneous procedure
(whereby all three negotiate together) instead of a step-by-step procedure (nego-
tiations are built up one by one) in which B and C start the negotiations and A
enters later. First, in the step-by-step procedure, the agreed alliance position of B
and C should be inside the range of flexibility of A. This is the case in figure 7.1.
Secondly, the degree of flexibility and the degree of influence of the firms must be
in balance. If these two conditions hold, A prefers simultaneous negotiations.
Model 2 is the most complicated model of the thesis from which it is most
difficult to deduce general practical guidelines. With the small example presented
here, I have aimed to show how the model can be used to arrive at more concrete
recommendations. Each alliance negotiation could be formalized according to the
model and it can, consequently, be analyzed which moves are best for a firm.
From Model 3, alliance practitioners can learn that pre-alliance interactions
between alliance partners can play a role in the behavior of partners over the
duration of the alliance. Through an experiment, it was shown that the firm that
has benefited from an earlier interaction will act in its own interest again, even
at the risk of there being no solution for the whole alliance. This insight can help
alliance practitioners which do not know what kind of behavior to expect from a
partner. Looking back at the past is one the ways to learn more about a partner
and can tell something about its future behavior.
For Model 4, let us go back to the case of the Rover-Honda alliance (Section
6.2.5). This is an example of an alliance involving an unequal dependency and
power structure. In line with the theoretical expectations, opportunistic behavior
by the dominant firm (Honda) was observed and the dependent firm (Rover)
complied in the situation. What would have been a good advice to the managers
of Honda and Rover?
I would say that the managers of Honda have understood the game they
were playing. Consequently, Honda played the game well. Honda was aiming
at access to the European market, which they indeed gained during the alliance.
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Over the course of the alliance, Rover became more dependent, giving Honda a
dominant position. Rover recognized and used this position by following a quite
opportunistic line of behavior. In this way, Honda was able to get the most out
of the alliance, even if the initial goal was already achieved.
This implies that the managers of Rover did not play the game particularly
well. They lost sight of part of their initial alliance aims: to improve their financial
situation and expand their portfolio of cars and design capabilities. Soon, the
alliance evolved towards an unequal situation which allowed Honda to play the
game in such a way that Rover could not work on its portfolio and learning
ambitions. Rover allowed Honda to dictate the alliance. Of course, Rover was
dependent on the alliance, and had, due to its financial situation, little alternative.
However, such a situation should not last for almost fifteen years, particularly
considering that an external investor (BA) took over Rover during that time. In
sum, Honda should have tried to end this alliance much earlier. This would have
allowed the firm to work on its own aims to ensure the long-term development of
the firm.
7.5.2 Reflection on practical implications
To what extent can practical lessons be drawn from the models and from game
theory in general? I think that game theory can partly handle the complexity of
alliance practice. By zooming in on certain aspects of this practice, useful insights
can be gained, for instance, on alliance processes, multi-partner negotiations, and
partner dynamics. However, neither game theory nor any other alliance theory
has so far been able to present a comprehensive framework for alliance dynamics
with practical relevance. In defense of the study presented here, a first step
has been taken. I have explored new directions for research which will need
further development. Such developments should take the form of adjusting more
of the assumptions, conducting profound empirical testing, and, in dialogue with
practitioners, providing practical tools and recommendations.
Appendix: List of symbols
• General
R the real numbers
F1 : N → R a function F1 assigns to each player in N
a real number R
∀ for all
∃ there exists
6 ∃ there does not exist
t time
iff if and only if
= is equal to
6= is not equal to
< less than
> greater than
≤ less or equal
≥ greater or equal
and equivalent 6<, 6>, 6≤, and 6≥
A i B player i strictly prefers A over B
A i B player i prefers A over B or
considers A and B equal
A ≈i B player i is indifferent between A and B
and in negation: 6, 6, and 6≈
Set theory
{. . . , . . . , . . . } a set
∅ an empty set
∈ an element of
/∈ not an element of
⊂ subset
∩ intersection
∪ union
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• Strategic games (Section 3.3 and Chapter 6)
i (or j) a player
N the set of all players
si a strategy of player i
ui utility of player i
• Coalition theory
i (or j) a player
N the set of all players
S (or T ) a coalition
e.g. {i} or {1, 2, 7}
S′ players not in S (complement of S)
example: if N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S = {1, 3},
then S′ = {2, 4}
∅ empty coalition
#S the number of players in S
Policy blind theories (Sections 4.1, 4.2.1, and 4.3)
xi payoff to player i∑
i∈S xi the sum of payoff of all the players in S
α a side-payment
vi value of player i
ADomB A dominates B
players in B can improve themselves in A
Partitions (Sections 4.3 and 5.2)
S a coalition, e.g. {1, 2, 3}
P a partition, e.g. {S, T, V }
in which S = {1, 2, 3}, T = {4, 6}, and V = {5}
hence, P = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 6}, {5}}
no overlap of members in different coalitions
Π the set of all partitions in a game
Policy coalition theories (Section 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 5.3, and 5.2)
xi position of player i
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(x1, x2, . . . , xn) positions of all the players
Rm Euclidean space with m dimensions
xS or x{i,j} position of alliance S or {i, j}
x∗i ideal position of player i
x˜i negotiation position of player i
xiΘxj position of player i is to the left of
position of player j
d(xi, xj) distance between position xi and xj
xG Gravity center
Mi maneuvering space of player i
ri radius of Mi, i.e. the size of Mi
wi weights of player i
q quota to be winning
L the set of losing coalitions
W the set of winning coalitions
θA position of firm A in the resource space
θ′A preferred position of firm A in the resource space
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Summary
The dynamics of alliances.
A game theoretical approach
Introduction
In the past few decades, the world of business has witnessed an increasing number
of strategic alliances between firms, a form of cooperation which is intentionally
long-term and in which each firm remains independent. Alliances are set up for
different reasons, for instance, to produce a product together, to achieve scale
advantages, or to learn from each other. The scientific literature has also paid
considerable more attention to alliances (e.g. Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Das
and Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1988; Ireland, Hitt, and Vaidyanath, 2002). A defi-
ciency in strategic alliance research is the lack of substantial attention paid to the
dynamics of alliances (Bell, Den Ouden, and Ziggers, 2006; Das and Teng, 2002;
Reuer, 2000; Styles and Hersch, 2005).
This deficiency is problematic for different reasons. First, insight is lacking on
the processes of and within alliances: how is an alliance formed, how do alliances
evolve, and how are alliances terminated? As the current alliance literature (such
as transaction cost theory (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985), resource theories
(Barney, 1991; Das and Teng, 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), and relational
perspectives (e.g. Arin˜o and De la Torre, 1998; Muthusamy and White, 2005) is
mostly aimed at explaining why firms cooperate and why some alliances are more
successful than others, the process of alliances remains understudied. Secondly,
it seems unnatural to provide static explanations for phenomena which take any-
where from a few months to even a few years to be formed and which could last
for years, sometimes even decades before being terminated. Thirdly, there is ev-
idence that the processes underlying alliances play a role in the performance of
the alliance.
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Game-theoretical approach
To study this under-researched area, this dissertation adopts a game-theoretical
approach. Game theory is a mathematical approach to study social interactions
and has not been designed for one specific empirical domain. Typical for game
theory is a formal approach which uses the axiomatic deductive method and
which is based upon rational choice theory. Important assumptions are: complete
information (each player knows all players, their strategies, and their payoffs) and
rational behavior (players know their preferences and act such that they strive for
the highest ranked preference, this gives them the highest utility). Furthermore,
it is relevant that players are interdependent; the strategic decisions of all players
together determine the outcome of a game and the utility each player gets.
This game-theoretical approach is used for several reasons. First, game the-
ory is focused on interaction: aggregating behavior on the player (firm) level to
collective outcomes. This interdependent multi-actor level has been lacking in
other alliance theories. In this way, we can study how cooperation is reached.
Moreover, game theory is a more abstract and formal approach to alliances. Not
only is such an approach hitherto lacking in the alliance field, it also allows us
to search for explanations to complement the more descriptive nature of some
dynamics alliance theories. Furthermore, game theory is able to offer a dynamical
perspective. Many theories within game theory are dynamical in nature or offer
enough grips to be developed in a more dynamical way. Finally, game theory is
aimed at explaining cooperation. Two branches of the theory are relevant:
• coalition theory (cooperative game theory, n-player) (e.g. Axelrod, 1970;
Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2001; Grofman, 1982; Rapoport, 1970; Van
Deemen, 1989)
• strategic game theory (non-cooperative game theory, here 2-player) (e.g.
Axelrod, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Taylor, 1987)
Coalition theory is aimed at the formation of coalitions and studies which coali-
tion(s) will be formed in a group of players and how the payoffs of the coalition
will be distributed between the members of a coalition. In strategic games, players
have a number of strategies at their disposal and choose one of those strategies
without being able to communication or make binding agreements (this is the non-
cooperative character). Cooperation or competition are just two of the strategies
which are seen in those kind of games. The focus is not necessarily on cooperation,
cooperative behavior of players is just one of their options.
Alliance dynamics
Alliance dynamics is divided into two kinds of dynamics:
• the dynamics of alliances; the life-cycle of alliances
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• the dynamics within alliances; how partners interact during the alliance
Within the life-cycle of alliances, several phases can be distinguished: the
formation of alliances, alliance management, and alliance termination. This study
focuses on the process of alliance formation and aims to complement the more
descriptive literature on this subject (De Rond and Bouchiki, 2004; Styles and
Hersch, 2005).
In the dynamics within alliances, trust, opportunism, power, flexibility, and
coordination play, amongst others, a role. During the whole life cycle of alliances,
partners observe each other and act to keep the internal dynamics balanced. To
join earlier research (Das and Teng, 2002a; Doz, 1996; Kogut, 1989), this study
is aimed at the interaction between several aspects of partner dynamics: the role
of pre-alliance interactions on coordination and the effect of an unequal power
balance on opportunistic behavior.
Research aim
So, based on the lack of scientific attention to the dynamics of and within alliances
and the choice for a game theoretical approach, the following research aim is
underlying this study:
To develop dynamic game theoretical models
in order to explain the dynamics of and within strategic alliances.
In order to reach this goal, four models have been developed in this study.
Model 1 and 2 study the process of alliance formation, while Model 3 en 4 focus
on the partner dynamics within an alliance. In the thesis, the emphasize is on
theory development, because (1) there is a lack of theory on the subject and (2)
game theory (especially coalition theory) has not been used frequently to explain
alliances between firms. No empirical testing of the models has taken place.
However, the relevance of the models for the field of alliances is not ignored.
The models are built in line with the alliance literature, examples are provided,
and each model is enriched with an illustration. The following illustrations are
used: small cases adopting secondary data (Model 1 and 4), computer simulations
(Model 2), and an experiment (Model 3).
Model 1 and 2: the dynamics of alliance formation
Coalition theory is suited the most to study the dynamics of alliance formation.
Coalition theory is aimed at the formation of coalitions (players which cooperate).
The theory has not been designed specifically for the alliance field and this may
lead to incompatibilities between theory and the field of application.
For instance, many coalition theories forecast one (winning) coalition, such
that it is not analyzed what the remaining players will do. For the business field
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in which usually many alliances are formed, a theory which works with parti-
tions would be a better choice. A partition is a distribution of players into non-
overlapping coalitions. Moreover, many theories model that players prefer similar
partners, which conflicts with, for instance, resource-driven alliances which con-
sist of complementary partners. Many other theories assume that preferences
of players are exogenous, which makes it difficult to test the theories. Finally,
a majority of the coalition theories lacks a dynamical perspective (Arnold and
Schwalbe, 2002; Laver and Schofield, 1990; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Van Deemen,
1997). It remains unclear how a coalition is formed and how a coalition evolves.
Unanswered questions are, for example, do procedures play a role? How can a
theory incorporate that players change their position during a game? Does the
past of a coalition play a role? The objective is to find solutions for these insuf-
ficiencies of coalition theory, such that coalition theory can explain the dynamics
of alliance formation with relevant models.
Model 1 (Alliance Formation Model) is aimed at the formation of resource-
driven alliances. Examples of such alliances are firms which cooperate to produce
and sell a product together, like Heineken’s and Krup’s Beer Tender and the Per-
fect Draft developed by Inbev en Philips. The model forecasts different alliances
(a partition) and takes several steps into account. These steps have been devel-
oped by using alliance literature and are modelled with spatial theory and the
theory of hedonic games (e.g. Banerjee, Knoshi, and So¨nmez, 2001; Bogomolnaia
and Jackson, 2002). The theory of hedonic games works with partitions, which
enables studying how a group of firms forms several (non-overlapping) alliances.
Relevant steps in the model are: a firm sets its strategic aims, defines its cur-
rent and preferred resource position in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space, and,
based on this, determines its preferences over each alliance. Due to a preference
equation developed in the study, the model can determine preferences endoge-
nously, and, moreover, complementarity can be modelled. Based on these pref-
erences, the theory of hedonic games forecasts which firms will cooperate (Nash
and core stable partitions). In such stable partitions, no firm or group of firms
has an incentive to deviate to another alliances given the preferences of all firms.
Stable partitions can be reached if (1) all preferences of all firms are taken into
account. Since a partition is only stable if no alliance member has an incentive to
deviate, firms need to consider preferences of all the firms involved in the game.
Moreover (2), it is important that the firms agree on which alliance is best given
the preferences, and the preferences of the firms have to be reciprocal. These
conditions are sufficient for the existence of stable partitions.
In addition to these insights which lead to stable alliance formation, Model 1
has also demonstrated how coalition theory can be applied to alliance formation,
which has not been done before.
Model 2 (Procedure Model) studies how a group of firms (> 2) which have
decided to form an alliance can reach an alliance agreement. In the model, an
alliance agreement is formalized as a position for the alliance which all members
agree on and which determines the choices made in an alliance concerning, for
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example, marketing issues, management style, and technical standards. Irrespec-
tive of the aim of an alliance, every alliance has the task to negotiate and agree
on such an alliance position. Especially for alliances with more than two firms
(multi-partner alliances), these negotiations can become complex.
The main question of Model 2 is whether procedure plays a role in these multi-
partner negotiations. Do firms reach a different agreement when negotiations are
done in a step-by-step way versus a simultaneous approach? In step-by-step
negotiations, first, two firms reach an agreement and are then one by one joined
by additional members. The model also takes into account that firms adjust their
individual ideal alliance position during the game.
The model assumes that each firm has a degree of flexibility around its ideal
position; all the positions still acceptable for the firm (called a maneuvering space).
If the maneuvering spaces of potential alliance partners overlap, then these part-
ners can reach an agreement. The question is which position exactly they will
agree on. To answer this question, the two procedures mentioned earlier have been
formalized. With formal proofs and the result of computer simulations, several
results can be presented.
First, it appears that in most cases it matters which of the two procedures
will be used; procedure can determine which result is reached. It is also proven
that for firms it can happen that joining later in a step-by-step negotiation is
more advantageous than negotiating directly from the start. Advantageous is
defined as reaching an alliance agreement with the firms together which is close
to a firm’s own ideal alliance position: the closer, the better. Moreover, it is not
always advantageous to be inflexible. Although less flexibility usually pays off for
a firm, there are situations in which more flexibility is better for a firm. Finally,
the study has found several (sufficient) conditions under which certain procedures
are more advantageous than others.
Summarizing, this model has demonstrated how relevant procedure is. Fur-
thermore, it is not always intuitive and straightforward which procedure is most
advantageous for a firm.
Model 3 and 4: the partner dynamics within an
alliance
In addition to earlier research (e.g. Arend and Seale, 2005; Gulati, Khanna, and
Nohria, 1994; Parkhe, 1993; Zeng and Chen, 2003), Model 3 and 4 use the theory
of strategic games. The models are aimed at explaining the behavior of firms
within an alliance. Given alliance partners’ insecurity on each others’ behavior
and the lack of a central authority which guards the interaction, the theory of
strategic games is the best choice. The theory of strategic games, as part of the
non-cooperative branch, has several games which capture the core of some typical
social interactions: the battle-of-the-sexes-game, the prisoner’s dilemma, and the
game of chicken. Especially the dynamic versions of these games are very useful
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to analyze social interactions such as alliance behavior. Model 3 and 4 use these
dynamic games to explain behavior of firms in dyadic alliances.
Model 3 (Coordination Model) studies coordination problems in alliances.
In every alliance, partners’ behavior has to be attuned. This may cause conflict
if partners have opposing preferences. Such a situation can be modelled with a
battle-of-the-sexes-game (BoS). A disadvantage of the BoS game is that is contains
several pure (Nash) equilibria such that it remains unclear whose preferences will
be the result of the game. Model 3 studies whether one of the two pure equilibria
is more salient when partners have interacted before in a non-alliance setting.
The idea is that this interaction in the past gives information on what kind of
player the other is. In this way, players can estimate what kind of choice the other
will make and, consequently, adjust their own behavior (Marks, 2002). This idea
is also found in alliance literature. There is evidence that earlier alliances and
reputation play a role (e.g. Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993; Gulati, 1995; Saxton,
1997).
The idea that pre-alliance interaction plays a role in an alliance has been tested
in an experiment with 100 student and employees of the Nijmegen School of Man-
agement. The control group only played the coordination problem with the BoS
game. The experimental group received extra information on a competitive inter-
action which took place before the alliance. Half of the experimental respondents
were a winner in the previous interaction, the other half was the loser.
The results of the experiment demonstrate that only winners of a pre-alliance
interaction took the extra information into account. They choose significantly
more often than the losers for their most favorite strategy. The losers did not
choose their less favorable strategy significantly more often than the control group.
The winners reason that they are the stronger and more superior player, while they
assess their opponent as weaker. The conclusion is that pre-alliance interaction
partly plays a role, it does for winners, but not for losers.
Model 4 (Commitment-Opportunism Model) studies a dilemma for al-
liance partners: committed versus opportunistic behavior. If a partner behaves
opportunistically, the alliance may not perform as expected, which also affects the
opportunistic partner. However, if a firm is committed, its partner can sit back
and rely on the efforts of its partner and behave opportunistically. This dilemma
is modelled with a prisoner’s dilemma. We know from the literature (Axelrod,
1984; Parkhe, 1993; Taylor, 1987) that the dilemma can lead to committed part-
ners if (1) the alliance has no fixed end-date, (2) the partners appreciate the
future, and (3) partners behave reciprocally (punish and reward behavior of the
other). This only holds for alliances in which both partners have an equal amount
of power. The question raises whether mutual commitment can be achieved in
alliances with an unequal power balance.
An unequal dependency towards the alliance determines that the balance of
power in an alliance is also unequal. The argumentation is that an equal power
balance changes the characteristics of the game in such a way that another game
is better capable of modelling the situation. A mix of two games is suggested (a
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hybrid game): for the independent, dominant partner, the payoff structure of the
prisoner’s dilemma still hods, while the dependent partner is involved in a game
of chicken. The dependent partner can only choose between the strategy to leave
the alliance or to comply (stay and be committed). If this game is repeated, there
will be no mutual commitment. Since one of the partners is more dependent,
this partner cannot afford to leave the alliance or behave opportunistically as this
will lead to the failure of the alliance. The dominant partner can use this and be
opportunistic. Even if the alliance evolves from equal to unequal, the result will
eventually be opportunism by the dominant firm and comply by the dependent
firm.
This behavior was also observed in the alliance between Rover and Honda
(1979-1984). Honda was the dominant partner which ‘abused’ the much more
dependent partner Rover.
Conclusion
Several conclusions can be drawn. First, this study has contributed to the al-
liance literature by adopting a dynamical perspective on alliances. Especially the
dynamics of alliance formation have been understudied in the scientific literature.
Also, the more integrated approach to study partner dynamics within an alliance
is an addition to the literature which usually studies one aspect at a time. I have
connected coordination to past and power to commitment-opportunism.
Second, the game theoretical approach has been valuable to these contribu-
tions. Coalition theory had, so far, hardly been applied to alliance formation.
This study did quite some work to make the theory applicable, that is, work
on some of the incompatibilities and a dynamical approach. This dissertation
demonstrates that and how coalition theory can be applied to alliance formation.
Concerning the partner dynamics within an alliance, I have adopted a more ad-
vanced dynamical approach than has been used so far in the literature. This had
also lead to more advanced models that can explain more than previous research.
Game theory is capable to model the dynamics of and within alliances, but
this field needs further development. The line for the future is to work further on
the incompatibilities and to build on the dynamics of game theory. Testing the
presented models would would also be a good step in future research.
As a final conclusion, we can state that this study has been capable of explain-
ing certain aspects of alliance dynamics, but for a more complete and compre-
hensive framework, more research is needed. With its game theoretical approach,
this study has taken a first step.
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Samenvatting
De dynamiek van allianties.
Een speltheoretische
benadering
Inleiding
Steeds meer bedrijven vormen strategische allianties, langdurige samenwerkings-
verbanden waarin ieder bedrijf zelfstandig blijft. Deze allianties worden opgezet
om bijvoorbeeld nieuwe producten te ontwikkelen, om schaalvoordelen te behalen
of om van elkaar te leren. In de wetenschappelijke literatuur wordt ook steeds
meer aandacht besteed aan allianties (bijv. Arin˜o en De la Torre, 1998; Das en
Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1988; Ireland, Hitt en Vaidyanath, 2002).
In de literatuur is de dynamiek van allianties een onderbelicht onderwerp (Bell,
Den Ouden en Ziggers, 2006; Das en Teng, 2002; Reuer, 2000; Styles en Hersch,
2005). Het gebrek aan wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar alliantiedynamiek is om
verschillende redenen problematisch. Ten eerste is er geen inzicht in hoe processen
van allianties verlopen: hoe komt een alliantie tot stand, hoe evolueren allianties
en hoe wordt een alliantie bee¨indigd? Doordat de huidige alliantietheoriee¨n (zoals
transactiekosten theorie (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985) ‘resource’ theoriee¨n
(Barney, 1991; Das en Teng, 2000; Pfeffer en Salancik, 1978) en relationele pers-
pectieven (bijv. Arin˜o en De la Torre, 1998; Muthusamy en White, 2005) met
name gericht zijn op het verklaren waarom bedrijven samenwerken en waarom
sommige allianties beter presteren dan anderen, blijft de proceskant onderbelicht.
Daarnaast is het een probleem dat statische verklaringen worden geboden voor
een fenomeen dat zo duidelijk dynamisch is. Allianties duren vaak jaren en komen
ook niet van de ene op de andere dag tot stand. Tot slot zijn er aanwijzingen dat
de dynamiek van allianties een rol speelt bij de prestaties van allianties.
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Speltheoretische benadering
Om dit ononderzochte gebied nader te bestuderen wordt in dit proefschrift een
speltheoretische benadering gehanteerd. Speltheorie is een mathematische be-
nadering van sociale interacties die niet voor e´e´n empirisch toepassingsgebied is
ontworpen. Kenmerkend is dat de speltheorie een formele benadering is die ge-
bruik maakt van de axiomatisch deductieve methode en een basis heeft in de
rationele keuze theorie. Een aantal belangrijke aannames is: volledige informatie
(iedere speler heeft volledige kennis van het spel (ze kennen alle spelers, hun
strategiee¨n en uitbetalingen)) en rationeel gedrag (iedere speler kent zijn of haar
voorkeuren, kent er nut aan toe en handelt altijd zo dat zijn of haar nut optimaal
is). Belangrijk is dat spelers interdependent zijn: de uitkomst van een spel en
het nut dat een speler krijgt, hangt af van de strategische beslissingen van alle
spelers.
Er zijn verschillende redenen om een speltheoretische benadering te gebruiken.
Ten eerste richt de speltheorie zich op interactie: het aggregeren van gedrag op
het niveau van een speler (bedrijf) tot collectieve uitkomsten. Dit interdepen-
dente multi-actorniveau ontbreekt in andere alliantietheoriee¨n. Op deze manier
kan bestudeerd worden hoe samenwerking tot stand komt. Ook biedt de spel-
theorie een meer abstracte en formele visie op de dynamiek van allianties. Zo’n
formele benadering ontbreekt nu nog binnen de alliantieliteratuur en stelt ons in
staat om te zoeken naar verklaringen, in tegenstelling tot de beschrijvende aard
van sommige dynamische alliantiestudies. Bovendien is speltheorie in staat een
dynamisch perspectief te bieden. Veel theoriee¨n binnen de speltheorie zijn dy-
namisch van aard of bieden aanknopingspunten om meer dynamisch ontwikkeld
te worden. Tot slot richt de speltheorie zich op het verklaren van samenwerking.
Twee takken van de theorie zijn relevant:
• coalitietheorie (coo¨peratieve speltheorie, n-spelers) (bijv. Axelrod, 1970;
Banerjee, Knoshi en So¨nmez, 2001; Grofman, 1982; Rapoport, 1970; Van
Deemen, 1989)
• strategische spelen (non-coo¨peratieve speltheorie, hier met 2 spelers) (bijv.
Axelrod, 1984; Fudenberg en Tirole, 1991; Taylor, 1987)
De coalitietheorie richt zich op de vorming van samenwerkingsverbanden en be-
studeert welke coalitie(s) er in een groep spelers tot stand komen en hoe de spelers
de uitbetalingen van die coalitie(s) verdelen. In strategische spelen hebben spe-
lers een aantal strategiee¨n tot hun beschikking die ze moeten kiezen zonder dat
bindend overleg mogelijk is (non-coo¨peratieve karakter). Samenwerking of juist
competitie zijn strategiee¨n die voorkomen in zulke spelen. Het is dus niet vanzelf-
sprekend dat spelers samenwerkend gedrag vertonen.
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Alliantie dynamiek
De dynamiek van allianties is onder te verdelen in twee soorten:
• de dynamiek van allianties, de levenscyclus van allianties
• de dynamiek in allianties: hoe partners gedurende de alliantie interacteren
Binnen de levenscylcus van allianties kunnen verschillende fases onderschei-
den worden: alliantievorming, alliantiemanagement en alliantiebee¨indiging. Deze
studie richt zich op het proces van alliantievorming en wil daarmee een aanvulling
zijn ten opzichte van de meer beschrijvende literatuur (De Rond en Bouchiki, 2004;
Styles en Hersch, 2005).
Bij de dynamiek in allianties spelen vertrouwen, opportunisme, macht, flexi-
biliteit en coo¨rdinatie onder andere een rol. Gedurende de hele levenscyclus van
een alliantie observeren partners elkaar en handelen ze om zo steeds de interne
dynamiek in balans te houden. In aansluiting op eerder onderzoek (Das en Teng,
2002a; Doz, 1996; Kogut, 1989) richt deze studie zich op interactie tussen de
verschillende aspecten van partnerdynamiek: de rol van pre-alliantie interacties
op coo¨rdinatie en het effect van een machtsonbalans op opportunistisch gedrag.
Doelstelling
Gegeven het gebrek aan wetenschappelijke aandacht aan alliantiedynamiek en de
keuze voor de speltheoretische benadering is de volgende doelstelling opgesteld:
Het ontwikkelen van dynamische speltheoretische modellen
om de dynamiek van en in allianties tussen bedrijven te verklaren.
Om tot dit doel te komen zijn in de studie vier modellen ontwikkeld. Model 1
en 2 bestuderen het proces van alliantievorming en Model 3 en 4 bestuderen de
interne dynamiek van een alliantie. Door het gebrek aan theorievorming op dit on-
derwerp en doordat speltheorie (met name coalitietheorie) nauwelijks is gebruikt
voor het verklaren van allianties, ligt de nadruk op theorie- en modelontwikke-
ling. Er vindt dan ook geen empirische toetsing van de modellen plaats. Wel
wordt aandacht besteed aan de relevantie van de modellen voor het alliantieveld
door ze te koppelen aan alliantieliteratuur, het geven van voorbeelden waarin de
modellen van toepassing zijn en enkele illustraties. Ieder model is voorzien van
een illustratie: toepassing op een case (secundaire data) (Model 1 en 4), compu-
tersimulaties (Model 2) en een experiment (Model 3).
Model 1 en 2: de dynamiek van alliantievorming
Coalitie theorie is het meest geschikt om de dynamiek van alliantievorming te
bestuderen. De coalitietheorie richt zich namelijk op de vorming van coalities
218 Samenvatting
(samenwerkende spelers). De theorie is echter niet specifiek ontworpen voor al-
lianties en dat kan leiden tot onverenigbare aspecten tussen theorie en toepass-
ingsgebied.
Zo voorspellen veel coalitietheoriee¨n e´e´n (winnende) coalitie, zodat onbekend
is wat de andere spelers in het spel doen. Voor allianties is het beter om theo-
riee¨n te gebruiken die werken met partities aangezien meestal meerdere allianties
gevormd worden in het bedrijfsleven. Een partitie is een onderverdeling van de
groep spelers in niet-overlappende coalities. Verder modelleren veel theoriee¨n dat
spelers voorkeur hebben voor gelijksoortige spelers, wat niet overeenstemt met
bijvoorbeeld ‘resource’-allianties die uitgaan van complementaire partners. Veel
andere theoriee¨n nemen de voorkeuren van spelers als exogeen voor de theorie,
wat voorspellen lastiger maakt. Tot slot ontbreekt bij de meerderheid van de
coalitietheoriee¨n een dynamisch perspectief (Arnold en Schwalbe, 2002; Laver en
Schofield, 1990; Luce en Raiffa, 1957; Van Deemen, 1997). Het blijft onduidelijk
hoe een coalitie gevormd wordt en hoe deze evolueert. Onbeantwoorde vragen zijn
bijvoorbeeld: spelen procedures een rol? Hoe kan de theorie meenemen dat spe-
lers gedurende het spel van positie wisselen? En speelt verleden van een coalitie
nog een rol? Het doel is om oplossingen te vinden voor deze tekortkomingen van
de coalitietheorie zodat de dynamiek van alliantievorming verklaard kan worden
met behulp van relevante modellen.
Model 1 (Alliantie Formatie Model) richt zich op het vormen van ‘resour-
ce’-allianties. Denk hierbij aan allianties die opgezet worden om samen een pro-
duct te ontwikkelen en op de markt te zetten, zoals de Beer Tender van Heineken
en Krups of de Perfect Draft ontwikkeld door Inbev en Philips samen. Het model
kan verschillende allianties (een partitie) voorspellen en doorloopt daarvoor di-
verse stappen. Deze stappen zijn ontleend aan de alliantieliteratuur en worden ge-
modelleerd met ruimtelijke theorie en de theorie van ‘hedonic games’ (o.a. Baner-
jee, Knoshi en So¨nmez, 2001; Bogomolnaia en Jackson, 2002). De theorie van
‘hedonic games’ werkt met partities, zodat onderzocht kan worden hoe een groep
bedrijven meerdere (niet-overlappende) allianties vormen.
In het model zijn de volgende stappen relevant: strategiebepaling van een
bedrijf, definie¨ring van huidige en gewenste resource profielen in meerdimensionale
Euclidische ruimte, en aan de hand hiervan bepalen van voorkeuren voor allianties.
Door een in het proefschrift ontwikkelde preferentievergelijking, kan het model
zowel endogeen voorkeuren bepalen als complementariteit modelleren. Op basis
van deze voorkeuren voorspelt de theorie van ‘hedonic games’ welke bedrijven nu
gaan samenwerken (Nash en core stabiele partities). In zulke stabiele partities
heeft geen enkel bedrijf of groep bedrijven nog een prikkel om naar een andere
alliantie over te stappen gegeven de voorkeuren van de bedrijven.
Stabiele partities komen tot stand als (1) alle voorkeuren van alle relevante
bedrijven meegenomen worden. Omdat een partitie pas stabiel is als geen enkele
speler een prikkel heeft tot overstappen, dienen bedrijven rekening te houden met
voorkeuren van alle betrokken bedrijven. Bovendien (2) is het van belang dat
de betrokken bedrijven overeenkomen welke allianties het beste zijn gegeven de
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voorkeuren van eenieder en de voorkeuren van bedrijven dienen wederkerig te
zijn. Dit zijn voldoende voorwaarden voor het bestaan van stabiele partities van
allianties.
Naast inzichten in wanneer alliantievorming stabiel is, heeft Model 1 laten zien
hoe coalitietheorie toegepast kan worden op de vorming van allianties, wat nog
niet eerder gedaan is.
Model 2 (Procedure Model) bestudeert hoe een groep bedrijven (> 2) die
besloten heeft een alliantie te vormen, tot een alliantieovereenkomst kan komen.
Een alliantieovereenkomst is in het model geformaliseerd als een positie voor de
alliantie waar alle leden van de alliantie het over eens zijn en deze positie heeft be-
trekking op de koers van de alliantie (denk aan marketingissues, managementstijl
en technische afspraken). Ongeacht het doel heeft iedere alliantie de taak over
zo’n alliantiepositie te onderhandelen en overeenstemming te bereiken. Met name
bij allianties met meer dan twee partners (multi-partner allianties) kunnen deze
onderhandelingen complex worden.
De centrale vraag bij dit model is of procedure er toe doet bij zulke multi-
partner onderhandelingen. Komen bedrijven tot een andere overeenkomst als ze
de onderhandelingen stap voor stap voeren versus onderhandelen met de hele
groep tezamen? Stap voor stap onderhandelingen beginnen met twee bedrijven
en worden steeds met een extra bedrijf aangevuld. Het model neemt tevens mee
dat bedrijven gedurende het spel hun individuele meer-dimensionale Euclidische
ideale alliantiepositie veranderen.
In het model wordt verondersteld dat ieder bedrijf rond zijn ideale alliantieposi-
tie een verzameling van posities heeft die nog acceptabel is (de manoeuvreer-
ruimte). Als de respectievelijke verzamelingen van acceptabele posities van de
potentie¨le alliantiepartners overlappen, kunnen de partners tot overeenstemming
komen. De vraag is nu op welke positie ze precies zullen uitkomen. Om dit
te onderzoeken worden de twee eerder genoemde procedures formeel uitgewerkt.
Aan de hand van formele bewijzen en resultaten van computersimulaties kunnen
verschillende bevindingen worden gepresenteerd.
Zo blijkt dat het in de meeste gevallen uitmaakt welk van de twee procedures
gebruikt wordt: procedure kan bepalen welk resultaat bereikt wordt. Ook blijkt
dat het voor bedrijven aantrekkelijk kan zijn om niet direct mee te onderhandelen,
maar later in de stap voor stap procedure deel te nemen. Aantrekkelijk is hier
gedefinieerd als gezamenlijk een alliantiepositie bereiken die dicht bij een eigen
ideale positie van een bedrijf ligt: hoe dichter, hoe beter. Bovendien is het niet
altijd voordelig om ‘star’ en inflexibel te zijn: hoewel minder flexibel meestal
beter is voor een bedrijf, zijn er situaties waarin meer flexibiliteit loont. Tot slot
zijn enkele (voldoende) voorwaarden gevonden waaronder een bepaalde procedure
meer loont dan anderen.
Resumerend kan gesteld worden dat dit model heeft aangetoond hoe belang-
rijk proces en procedure zijn. Bovendien is het niet altijd intu¨ıtief logisch welke
procedure nu het meest in het belang is van een speler.
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Model 3 en 4: de interne dynamiek in een alliantie
In aansluiting op eerder onderzoek (bijv. Arend en Seale, 2005; Gulati, Khanna en
Nohria, 1994; Parkhe, 1993; Zeng en Chen, 2003) gebruiken Model 3 en 4 de theo-
rie van strategische spelen. De modellen richten zich op het gedrag van bedrijven
in de alliantie. Gezien de onzekerheid jegens het gedrag van anderen en het gebrek
aan e´e´n autoriteit, lijkt non-coo¨peratieve speltheorie de beste keuze. De theorie
van strategische spelen, als onderdeel van de non-coo¨peratieve speltheorie, heeft
enkele spelen die de kern van bepaalde sociale interacties weten te modelleren: het
‘battle-of-the-sexes-game’, het ’prisoner’s dilemma’ en het ‘game of chicken’. Met
name de dynamische benadering van deze spelen is erg nuttig voor het bestuderen
van interacties, zoals alliantiegedrag. Model 3 en 4 gebruiken deze dynamische
spelen om gedrag van partners in dyadische allianties te verklaren.
Model 3 (Coo¨rdinatie Model) bestudeert coo¨rdinatieproblemen in allianties.
In iedere alliantie moeten partners hun gedrag op elkaar afstemmen en dat kan
gepaard gaan met conflict als partners andere voorkeuren hebben. Dit kan ge-
modelleerd worden met een ‘battle-of-the-sexes-game’ (BoS). Een nadeel is dat
het BoS spel meerdere (Nash) evenwichtssituaties voorpelt zodat het onduidelijk
blijft wiens voorkeur nu het resultaat zal zijn. In Model 3 wordt bestudeerd of een
van de twee mogelijke uitkomsten van het spel als evenwicht meer voor de hand
ligt als de partners eerder met elkaar ge¨ınteracteerd hebben in een niet-alliantie
setting. Het idee is dat deze eerdere interactie extra informatie oplevert over wat
voor soort speler de ander is. Op deze manier kunnen spelers inschatten wat voor
keuze de ander zal maken en hun eigen keuze daarop afstemmen (Marks, 2002).
Dit idee vindt ook steun in de alliantieliteratuur waar bewijs is dat een eerdere
alliantie en reputatie een rol spelen (bijv. Bucklin en Sengupta, 1993; Gulati,
1995; Saxton, 1997).
Het idee dat pre-alliantie interacties een rol spelen bij gedrag van bedrijven in
een alliantie is onderzocht in een experiment met 100 studenten en medewerkers
van de Faculteit der Managementwetenschappen. De controlegroep speelde alleen
het coo¨rdinatieprobleem via het BoS spel. De experimentele groep kreeg extra
informatie over een competitieve interactie die voor de alliantie plaatsvond. De
ene helft van de respondenten was winnaar van de vorige interactie, de andere
helft was de verliezer.
De uitkomsten van het experiment tonen dat alleen de winnaars van de pre-
alliantie interactie de extra informatie meenamen. Zij kozen significant vaker voor
hun meest favoriete strategie ten opzichte van de controlegroep. De verliezers
kozen niet significant vaker voor hun minst favoriete strategie ten opzichte van de
controlegroep. De winnaars redeneerden dat zij het sterkere, superieure bedrijf
zijn, terwijl hun partner zwakker werd geacht. Als conclusie kan gesteld worden
dat een pre-alliantie interactie gedeeltelijk invloed heeft: wel voor winnaars, niet
voor verliezers.
Model 4 (Betrokkenheid-OpportunismeModel) bestudeert een dilemma
voor alliantiepartners: betrokken versus opportunistisch gedrag. Als een bedrijf
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zich opportunistisch gedraagt in een alliantie is de kans aanwezig dat de alliantie
een slecht resultaat zal hebben, wat ook in het nadeel is van het bedrijf. Echter,
als een bedrijf zich betrokken en samenwerkend opstelt kan een partner hierop
meeliften door te profiteren en zelf opportunistisch te zijn. Dit dilemma wordt
gemodelleerd met een ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. We weten uit de literatuur (Axelrod,
1984; Parkhe, 1993; Taylor, 1987) dat het dilemma toch tot betrokken partners
kan leiden als (1) de alliantie geen einddatum heeft, (2) partners de toekomst
waarderen en (3) partners zich wederkerig gedragen (straffen en belonen van
gedrag van de ander). Deze redenering geldt voor allianties waar beide part-
ners evenveel macht hebben. De vraag is nu of er ook wederzijdse betrokkenheid
bereikt kan worden als de alliantie een ongelijke machtsbalans heeft.
Een ongelijke afhankelijkheid jegens de alliantie ligt ten grondslag aan een
ongelijke machtsbalans. De redenering is dat de machtsbalans de verhoudingen
van de spelers ten opzichte van de alliantie zodanig verandert dat een ander spel
dit beter kan modelleren. In het model wordt gepleit voor een mix van twee spelen:
voor de niet-afhankelijke, dominante partner een uitbetalingsstructuur van een
‘prisoner’s dilemma’, en een ‘game of chicken’ voor de afhankelijke partner. De
afhankelijke partner kan nog slechts kiezen uit de strategiee¨n de alliantie verlaten
of berusten (blijven en zich committeren). Als dit spel door de tijd heen herhaald
wordt, zal er geen wederzijdse betrokkenheid ontstaan. Doordat e´e´n van de twee
partners meer afhankelijk is, kan deze partner zich niet veroorloven de alliantie
te verlaten of zich opportunistisch te gedragen doordat dit kan leiden tot falen
van de alliantie. De dominante partner kan hier gebruik van maken en meeliften
op het goede gedrag van de ander. Ook als een alliantie evolueert van gelijk naar
ongelijk, zal het resultaat uiteindelijk opportunistisch gedrag door de dominante
partij zijn, terwijl de andere partner zich hierbij neerlegt en betrokken blijft.
Dit gedrag is ook terug te vinden in de alliantie tussen Rover en Honda die
van 1979 tot 1984 duurde. Honda was de dominante partner die misbruik maakte
van het veel afhankelijkere Rover.
Conclusie
Verschillende conclusies kunnen getrokken worden. Ten eerste heeft deze studie
een dynamisch perspectief op allianties gepresenteerd en is daarmee een bijdrage
aan de alliantieliteratuur. Met name de dynamiek van de formatie van allianties
was onderbelicht in wetenschappelijke studies. Ook de meer ge¨ıntegreerde manier
van partnerdynamiek bestuderen is een aanvulling op de literatuur waar meestal
e´e´n aspect wordt bestudeerd. Hier heb ik verleden aan coo¨rdinatie gekoppeld en
macht aan betrokkenheid-opportunisme.
Ten tweede heeft de speltheoretische benadering geholpen bij deze bijdrages.
Coalitietheorie is hiervoor nauwelijks toegepast op alliantievorming. In deze studie
is veel werk verricht om de theorie toepasbaar te maken: herstellen van enkele
onverenigbare elementen en een dynamische benadering. Dit proefschrift laat
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zien dat en hoe coalitietheorie toegepast kan worden op alliantievorming. Voor
de dynamiek in allianties is een meer geavanceerde dynamische benadering van
strategische spelen gebruikt dan wat de literatuur tot nu toe deed. Dit heeft
ook geleid tot meer geavanceerde modellen die meer kunnen verklaren dan eerder
onderzoek.
Speltheorie is geschikt om alliantiedynamiek te bestuderen, maar dit gebied
vereist wel verdere ontwikkeling. De lijn voor de toekomst is dan ook het verder
werken aan de onverenigbare elementen en het verder uitbouwen van de dyna-
mische speltheorie. Verder zou het goed zijn om de gepresenteerde modellen
empirisch te toetsen.
Als eindconclusie kan gesteld worden dat deze studie in staat is gebleken
bepaalde aspecten van alliantiedynamiek te belichten, maar dat voor een volledig
en meer samenhangend raamwerk om de dynamiek van allianties te verklaren
meer onderzoek nodig is. Met de speltheorstische benadering zet deze studie een
eerste stap in die richting.
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